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Description 
This art-thesis offers a response to the question of what can be done to challenge the 
hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. The traditional idea of a thesis embodies 
the construction and dissemination of knowledge which, in the hypermasculine discipline of 
political theory, is built upon the saturation and repetition of patriarchal ideas. By creating 
the thesis as an artistic encounter, I develop a theoretically informed artistic practice that 
aims to challenge this traditional idea of the thesis. This art-thesis is an enfolded theory-
practice that embodies a plurality of feminist arguments, both sculpturally and in terms of 
connective forms of argumentation. What has been produced here is a piece of scholarly 
writing and an art object, it is neither one nor the other but always both, together: an art-
thesis. It is created to express a new sign of a feminine artistic problem of what a thesis may 
become. Making and submitting this art-thesis as an enfolded sculpture and thesis is my 
creative confrontation to the linear and binary textual apparatus of most academic writing 
and the mandatory format required of the presentation of theses. I would not be putting my 
proposal into practice if I argued for a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics in a style that 
remains confined to the restrictive lines of the standard flat A4 pages contained within a 
traditional book-thesis. Creating the traditional academic thesis as a melting sculpture is a 
call for different forms of expression and apparatuses for academic writing.  
 
By engaging in a feminist artistic practice of resistance, I explore a process of melting to 
convey a transformation of the mechanics of solids into the dynamics of fluids. This artistic 
process incorporates Irigaray’s idea that the ‘mechanics of solids’ is privileged by Western 
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phallogocentric culture and that it symbolises man’s isomorphic sexual imaginary, to the 
detriment of the dynamics of fluids which concerns the features of a female sexual imaginary 
(1985a, 106-7). The purpose of melting the traditional thesis follows Irigaray’s feminist 
relationship to the canon of Western philosophy, which aims to problematise and reinvent it 
by articulating and promoting a space for the feminine within it. This art-thesis does not 
leave all elements of the standard thesis behind, it works with them to offer a feminist 
reinvention of the standard hypermasculine thesis in relation to what it looks like in its 
physical and argumentative structure, as well as the purely theoretical/discursive nature of a 
thesis and how this is reported in practice. The submission of this non-standard thesis poses 
a challenge to the traditional process of examination by inviting the examiners to consider a 
thesis that does not follow the norms and expectations of a traditional hypermasculine 
approach. Through a feminine reimagination of both physical and textual practices employed 
in the hypermasculine discipline of political theory, I have melted the traditional thesis into 
the dynamics of fluids in order to destabilise and alter the rigid masculine systems, structures 
and content in which thesis-books are written and defended.  
 
It is important to note that I do not claim to write the feminine, because I am not a language 
specialist and this has already been done. I am nevertheless inspired by Irigaray who 
challenges the standard thesis by exploring the potential of écriture feminine. In her 
unfolding theory of the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and 
difference, Irigaray explains that it is from within the labial lips that women’s fluid mode of 
discourse is produced (1985a, 24). As a visual artist, I aim to make visible ideas around this 
labial language of plurality and difference and how women’s expression of fluidity might be 
made in political theory. This art-thesis introduces a fluid artistic expression to problematise 
and reinvent the masculine philosophical discourse in ways that explore a feminine 
philosophy. 
 
While the structure of this art-thesis is physically different, it is also intellectually different 
to the extent that my argument for a feminine reimagination of practices employed in the 
hypermasculine discipline of political theory is not analytical or synthetic in the traditional 
hypermasculine senses of those terms, but is constituted within and across the drips. The 
flowing structure of this argument can be melted together in different ways through the 
reader’s selection of the different drips. This process of selection aims to produce a method 
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of flowing connectivity within and across the arguments made. This structure can be likened 
to the nomadic style of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, in which the dated 
“plateaus” can be read in any order. According to Massumi’s foreword,  
 
A Thousand Plateaus is conceived as an open system. It does not pretend to have the final word. The 
authors’ hope, however, is that elements of it will stay with a certain number of its readers and will 
weave into the melody of their everyday lives (2004, xiv). 
 
The nomadic style of this art-thesis is an exploration into ways of thinking in an open system. 
In the drip, Ripple Effect, I explore this idea further in a feminist investigation into the closed 
system of hypermasculine knowledge production and propose opening it up through Le 
Doeuff’s suggested process of working in an open system, which involves philosophical 
thinking in relation to a multiplicity outside philosophy, including one’s own multiple 
geneses (2007, 171-2). This choice of nomadic style is not only an invitation to the reader to 
melt their readership, but to melt into the art-thesis too. Different in and of themselves, the 
drips function like fluid movements along a nomadic map. There is no specific order in 
which to read them, nor does this Delivery Note serve as instructions as to how to read them. 
The reader may find a DRIP within a drip that might lead them to another drip, or outside of 
the art-thesis to an entirely different connection altogether! The reader may simply wish to 
start with the drip positioned at the top left-hand corner, as this is how we have been taught 
to read thesis-books. Or, the reader may want to map a flight of resistance to the dominant 
order of reading. As an interruption to the implicit linearity and hierarchy underlying the 
reading process required in the mandatory thesis-book format, this melting art-thesis is an 
invitation to read with fluidity. In order to accept this invitation, the reader must accept the 
challenge to read a thesis that does not follow the norms and expectations of a traditional 
hypermasculine approach. By accepting this invitation, the reader can encounter the art-
thesis, activate the sculpture by opening it up, and read the drips they gravitate toward. And, 
if the reader experiences the urge to move to another drip or to the outside, do so! 
 
Although this nomadic narrative involves the risk of being incoherent, it enables connections 
to be made between conflicting thinkers and ideas in order to make new feminist ideas. 
Through a process of flowing connectivity, I have incorporated “incompatible” thinkers and 
ideas on a plane of proximity, not to produce a comparative analysis, but to incite a nomadic 
narrative that can render such conflicting encounters productive. I argue for the compatibility 
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of different ideas from these disparate thinkers because following and repeating the ideas of 
a single master would be a hypermasculine approach of working in a closed system. I am 
not suggesting we should stop employing the ideas of a single master, rather I propose they 
are (re)worked in a process that involves thinking about them in relation to many other things 
outside philosophy (Le Doeuff 2007, 171-2). This process introduces a plurality to thought 
which, according to Olkowski’s reading of Le Doeuff, creates a ‘polygenesis in which 
mastery fades away’ (2007, 90). This plurality is reflected in the art-thesis both sculpturally 
and in terms of its nomadic narrative. The plurality of feminist arguments contained in the 
different drips constitute a consistency which amounts to a schizo-revolutionary labial theory 
of knowledge production within a hypermasculine discipline. The importance of this strategy 
of producing knowledge in an open system is developed in the drip, Ripple Effect, as a 
process of learning to think à deux. I argue that (re)reading the mainstream political treatises 
à deux allows them to be read beyond the masculine discourse of philosophy towards a 
creative reading that enriches the reader, even to the point that the reader creatively reinvents 
the text. It is a feminist strategy insofar that the mainstream political treatises are (re)read in 
relation to the ‘feminine’. (Re)reading à deux enlivens women’s ways of knowing and 
restores the feminine into the text, making a difference to the same which sustains men’s 
knowledge as the ‘proper knowledge’. This process of thinking à deux can assert the 
positivity of feminine differences in thought in the love of others. 
 
Although the synthesis of Irigaray’s project of sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s nomadic philosophy may not appear as original, their respective theories have 
made possible the construction of this method of nomadic flowing connectivity. This 
productive encounter is featured throughout the art-thesis. In the drip, Labial Drip, it features 
in the idea of the feminine nomad as a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine 
within the process of becoming-woman. It is a model that agrees with Deleuze and Guattari 
to the extent that becoming-woman must be the starting point for molecular becoming (2004, 
306), but aligns with the feminist projects of Braidotti (1994) and Lorraine (1999) which 
incorporate Irigaray’s theory of the feminine (1985a). Through a synthesis of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s and Irigaray’s two models of subjectivity, I argue that becoming-woman should 
be posited not as a becoming-other or -elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the 
other, which supports the claim for a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-
woman. The feminine nomad is posited as a revolutionary escape artist who can continually 
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escape from her “self” as defined by the patriarchal systems of representation, from within, 
to touch upon the intensities of the feminine only to return to herself and express her “self” 
in ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). This feminist process of becoming-woman is 
summarised as an open-ended, never finished, ever-flowing, ever-folding, labial revolution 
of learning, creation and becoming with others.   
 
The productive encounter between Irigaray’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s different theories 
also features in the drip, Drizzle, in the form of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic 
practice. This drip explores the potential of a feminist aesthetics of resistance that can 
challenge the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation and thoroughly incite the 
practice of becoming-woman. I argue that we can develop this feminist aesthetics of 
resistance through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art 
(2013) and Irigaray’s concepts of the indifferentiated woman (1985b) and the labial lips 
(1985a). Such a synthesis has an enfolded purpose: 1) to formulate a new feminist and artistic 
theorisation of resistance; and 2) to propose a different feminist artistic practice of 
resistance. This enfolded approach produces not just political art nor an aesthetic approach 
within political theory, rather, an enfolded theory-practice of art and politics ‘without any 
possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched’ (Irigaray 1985a, 26); a 
labial art-politics (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 77). The feminist artistic encounters 
that are produced will introduce a new influx of labial cosmic energy capable of forcing the 
psychic system open to new ideas of subjectivity and judgement. The new ideas evoked will 
produce a new enfolded process of thinking that is à deux, which will enable us to explore 
the emancipation of images of woman as well as female imagination, pleasure and 
expression.  
 
Whatever order the reader selects the drips to read, this art-thesis is not finished. There is a 
strategic conclusion that does not determine an end-point, but rather becomes an invitation 
to continue this project of producing a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics. This strategic 
conclusion can be found in the puddle, Condensation, which outlines an account of a feminist 
artistic pedagogy I have put into practice in collaboration with Heaney in recent years in 
order to offer a response to the question of what can be done to challenge the hypermasculine 
institutionalisation of knowledge. I argue that this pedagogical approach develops a feminine 
practice that can challenge aspects of patriarchy and capitalism within the academic 
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institution. In particular, the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution that 
produces a subjectivity which is aligned with the interests of patriarchy, and the corporate 
institutional processes that capture social spaces and create the conditions for the production 
of a capitalistic subjectivity. I argue that new feminist artistic encounters can be created by 
individuals who are in a position to intervene and change the refrain of learning from within 
the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. This pedagogical task is posited as a 
process that reinvents the environment of the institution and incites different experiences of 
the institution that could change the way individuals are produced. However, it is not to be 
read as instructions to enforce a particular course of action to confront aspects of patriarchy 
and capitalism within the academic institution. It is formed from our own response and 
outlined in this art-thesis in the hopes that it will encourage readers to carve out their own 
possible ideas for inventing new pedagogies that promote existential production with the aim 
to generate conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers. In the same vein, this 
art-thesis has been produced as an example of a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics, but 
there are a number of different ways of experimenting to produce an enfolded practice of art 
and politics that are capable of disrupting and challenging the dominant patriarchal order. I 
will not outline a set of guidelines because it is important to understand that there are many 
responses to the question of what a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics might become. 
Melting the traditional thesis became my response to this question. The droplets I hope this 
art-thesis makes will leave ripple effects within readers that might incite them to continue 
the creative task of melting the physical and textual practices employed in the 
hypermasculine discipline of political theory, in order to explore possibilities for female 
imagination, pleasure and expression through processes of learning with fluidity. 
 
Following Braidotti’s pragmatic approach of practising nomadic feminism within the 
discipline of philosophy (2002, 7), I have situated myself as an ‘outsider within’ the 
hypermasculine discipline of political theory and academic institution. This feminist artistic 
reinvention of the standard hypermasculine thesis will enable us to rethink the way in which 
we produce, read, and examine theses. More particularly, it enables us to rethink the way in 
which we encounter, learn and teach knowledge. I make this claim explicit in the drip, Wave, 
where I propose an understanding of the process of learning as an artistic practice, in which 
the learner engages in a process of becoming-artist. I argue that an artistic approach aimed 
at experimentation can resist the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge. 
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This traditional approach is problematic because it divides knowledge and experience by 
determining the process of learning as the transmission of pre-existing facts or “truths”. 
There is nothing new to be learnt when knowledge is acquired in terms of recognition or 
instruction. This understanding of learning constructs a dualism between mind and body, 
where the mind is prioritised as the theatre from which the thinking subject views and re-
presents the world. The binary of mind/body not only engenders the opposition between 
disembodiment and embodiment, it also fuels the mapping for a series of other oppositions, 
the most relevant for this project being man and mind against woman and body. An artistic 
process of learning can transform the given processes of thought that is taught by rote 
learning and instead can bring about new ways of thinking through artistic encounters. I 
argue that an artistic experiential pedagogy leads to a process of learning from experience 
and becoming-artist, to the extent that the learner engages in an artistic practice of 
experimentation to make sense of her or his experience incited by an encounter, by 
translating it into art. I have submitted this art-thesis with the desire that it might incite in 
the reader processes of becoming-woman and becoming-artist.  
 
This problematic binary of mind/body corresponds to Deleuze’s critique of the modern 
image of thought as representational. According to Deleuze, thought loses its creative force 
when it is conceived in terms of recognition (1994, 143). For Deleuze, “thought” is 
understood as that which is first of all non-representational thought (and therefore against 
most of the history of philosophy), and aesthetic rather than conceptual. I explore this 
creative potential of thought in the drip, Mist, by developing Deleuze’s proposal to 
understand thought as the expression of ideas. The tension of this drip however lies in the 
challenge of the modern image of thought that representationally aligns man and mind 
against woman and body, whist resisting the pull towards establishing a dominant ‘woman-
centered’ image of thought. By incorporating Braidotti’s creative processes of nomadic 
remembering and the virtual feminine, I argue that we can produce a female thought capable 
of de-programming thought out of its dominant mode and opening it up to feminine 
difference. I explore the potential for female thought as a practice of learning how to express 
the problems that reside within patriarchal ideas of women by asking questions of difference 
such as, “how much will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” 
“In what cases will women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”. These questions 
of difference will evoke processes of nomadic remembering which will engender processes 
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of thinking differently, not traditionally, of and about women. I argue that this process will 
produce a female thought because it engenders a process of individuation fuelled by the 
virtual feminine and becoming-other of the other.  
 
In order to avoid recuperation within a dogmatic masculine image of thought, I argue that 
these questions of difference will be asked in feminist dwellings. In the drip, Ripple Effect, 
I develop Irigaray’s suggestion for a sexuate education (2008b) by arguing for the 
construction of feminist dwellings in modern political thought as a feminist approach to 
teaching and learning to think à deux, which thinks of two, for two. Through a synthesis of 
Irigaray’s proposal to build one’s dwelling using our bodies, imagination and intelligence 
(2008b, 235) and Ahmed’s description of feminist dwellings as assembled from materials 
such as citations (2017, 16), I propose that the process of thinking à deux is the activity of 
building a feminist dwelling. I would argue that when writing and sculpting this art-thesis, I 
engaged in a process of building a feminist dwelling in the discipline of political theory. 
Feminist dwellings cannot be constructed in the same way as the master’s house as that will 
reproduce the same structures and, as a result, will reproduce the same betrayal of thought. 
Therefore, this art-thesis had to be constructed through a feminine reimagination of both 
physical and textural practices employed in the hypermasculine discipline of political theory, 
with the aim to create a feminine difference. This artistic process of building a feminist 
dwelling can be understood as a feminist methodology of creating art within the patriarchal 
structures that condition our experience of learning in a hypermasculine discipline and 
academic institution. By enlivening the feminine within political theory through art, I argue 
that we can create feminine innovations capable of disrupting the social overcoding of the 
dominating phallic symbolic order, its judgemental, dogmatic, linear and binary system, and 
therefore overcome its patriarchal limits. In doing so, feminine innovations can be 
recognised, not as unworthy secondary knowledge, but as worthy contributions to political 
theory. 
 
The nature of this proposal for a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics can now be 
summarised as an ongoing, never-complete, ever-folding, ever-flowing learning process of 
creating and becoming with the feminine. This pedagogical proposal is a call to teachers and 
students of modern political thought to become feminist builders and create a space for 
feminine difference by teaching and learning from / in / within feminist dwellings. The 
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invitation to practise a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics therefore shares the sentiment 
of an ‘optimistic, rolling-your-sleeves-up-and-getting-things-done feminism’ (Aune and 
Redfern 2010, xii). So, join this call to creatively confront the hypermasculine 
institutionalisation of knowledge; let’s roll our sleeves up and participate in this process of 
building feminist dwellings to melt the hypermasculine house down!   
 































There are many people I would like to thank for inspiring, empowering, supporting, and 
enriching the process of writing and making this art-thesis. This art-thesis has been 
constructed with their support, and I am proud to call each of them participating-artists and 
co-creators. Although this art-thesis challenges the hypermasculine environment of the 
academic institution, I would like to acknowledge the empowering friendships, 
collaborations, networks, and solidarities that formed within that environment and which 
became a source of affirmation, learning, creativity and transformation. To start, I am 
immensely thankful to Iain MacKenzie and Anna Cutler for their encouragement and 
generosity throughout this project, and most of all for their stimulating teachings, 
conversations, and guidance. I am also extremely grateful to Stephen Zepke for all the 
insightful and empowering conversations, and for his critical but always constructive reading 
of my work. I feel very privileged to have spent some of this degree collaborating with Conor 
Heaney in processes of play, risk taking and creativity in our pedagogical project, Learning, 
Exchange and Play (LEP). I also thank Ben Cook for his creative collaboration with us in 
producing two experimental films on the LEP experience. I would like to thank a number of 
people who also sparked wonder, joy, and affirmation throughout this journey in and through 
academia: Jonjo Brady, Alice Colquhoun, Nicola Huxtable, Gerard McGill, Amelia Roberts, 
Stefan Rossbach, Erzsébet Strausz, the “badass theorists” Hannah Richter and Lina Soukara, 
and the Joyful Nomads, especially Patricia de Vries and Diana Teggi.  
 
Ultimately, creating this art-thesis would not have been possible without the love and support 
of my family and close friends. I owe an immeasurable heartfelt thanks to my Mum and Dad 
for their unconditional love, patience and generosity, for raising me to become an 
independent and courageous woman who thinks for herself, and for empowering me to 
believe I can do it. To my niece and nephews for their joyful reminders of the importance to 
imagine, wonder and play. To my “slay” sisters, Tori and Lisa, for their many encouraging, 
empowering and motivational pep talks, for their guidance in teaching me how to slay all 
day every day, and for the knowledge that sisterhood is powerful. My brother-in-law, Chris, 
for his lessons in determination. My two nans and great aunt, Gloria, Jean, and Anne, who 
continue to build our uplifting matriarch. Auntie Lorraine and Uncle Martin for listening to 
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and supporting me. Tyler and Tiggy for their furry but devoted companionship. My friends, 
Alicia, Emma and Lea, for being there. And my partner, Crisi, for her affection, generosity 
and patience, whose empowering love, support and encouragement helped me write this 
chapter of my life.  
 
Dedication 
This art-thesis is dedicated to the memory of my Auntie Debbie, who finally escaped the 
cruel patriarchal world she lived in. May she rest in peace.  
 
A schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics is devoted to the futures of Isla, Noah, Ralphie 
Joshua, and to all those surviving in hypermasculine environments; let’s learn to make a 
feminine difference. 
 
Reference Note:  
 
To build feminist dwellings, we need to dismantle what has already been assembled; we need to ask 
what it is we are up against, what it is we are for, knowing full well that this we is not a foundation 
but what we are working toward. By working out what we are for, we are working out that we, that 
hopeful signifier of a feminist collectivity (Ahmed 2017, 2).  
 
You are also enriched by one another; you should have little networks, assemblages, kindred spirits. 
So draw on the resources of the group! (Braidotti, 2014). 
 
“we” are indeed in this together (Braidotti 2006, 93). 
 
This research was funded by a University of Kent 50th Anniversary Scholarship. Thank 













Becoming-woman, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a process of becoming-other, in which 
becoming-woman is the key to all other becomings (2004, 306). Although I agree that 
becoming-woman must be the starting point for molecular becoming, my argument for 
becoming-woman will align with the feminist projects of Braidotti (1994) and Lorraine (1999) 
which incorporate Irigaray’s theory of the feminine (1985a). Through a synthesis of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s two models of subjectivity, I will propose the idea of the feminine 
nomad as a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-
woman. I will argue that becoming-woman should be posited not as a becoming-other or -
elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the other, which supports the claim for a 
female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman. Building upon Riordan’s 
concept of the labial machine (2011, 85), I will argue that the becoming-woman launched at 
the threshold of the labial machine explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and 
sexuality as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities because it cuts and draws both 
molar and molecular lines of flights. The feminine nomad will be posited as a revolutionary 
escape artist who can continually escape from her “self” as defined by the patriarchal systems 
of representation, from within, to touch upon the intensities of the feminine only to return to 
herself and express her “self” in ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). This feminist 
process of becoming-woman will be summarised as an open-ended, never finished, ever-
flowing, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and becoming with others.   
 
Irigaray claims that the West is built on a phallic economy, in which the phallus is the ultimate 
signifier that permeates all discourse and logos (1985a, 86). She explains that this dominant 
phallocentric model ‘shares the values promulgated by patriarchal society and culture’ to the 
extent that ‘the feminine occurs only within models and laws devised by male subjects. Which 
implies that there are not really two sexes, but only one’ (86). As Halsema explains, for Irigaray 
‘the feminine cannot articulate itself as feminine within a phallocentric symbolic’ (2013, 28). 
Therefore, Irigaray proposes the creation of a feminine symbolic space that intervenes in the 
phallocentric symbolic system in order to explore different forms of expression that are not 
subjugated to the phallic signifier. Irigaray explores the labial as the potential for a counter-
discourse of plurality and difference that can produce alternative modes of thinking and being. 
In her proposal for a labial language of difference, Irigaray argues that women can reclaim 
morphology, that ‘has always in practice been used against them’ (Whitford 1991, 12), and 
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explore ways of articulating the feminine as ‘the other of the other, rather than “not-man”’ 
(Richardson 1998, 104). By inventing a language in which women can speak as women (1985a, 
135), Irigaray argues that women can express themselves on their own terms and not those 
imposed by the dominant phallocentric model.  
 
By working from within philosophical discourse, Irigaray intervenes in the masculine discourse 
of philosophy as a woman in order to create a space from which women can speak as women 
(1985a, 135; Whitford 1991, 13). She explains that ‘[i]f language does not give both sexes 
equivalent opportunities to speak and increase their self-esteem, it functions as a means of 
enabling one sex to subjugate the other’ (1994, xv). It is not only that ‘[w]omen have been 
physically and symbolically dispossessed’ of the discipline of philosophy (Braidotti 1994, 
119), women have been physically and symbolically subjugated; ‘[a]nd yet that woman-thing 
speaks’ (Irigaray 1985a, 111). Irigaray explains that she does not speak through subjugation 
insofar as ‘[s]peaking [as] woman is not speaking of woman. It is not a matter of producing a 
discourse of which woman would be the object or the subject’ (135). Such a discourse, Irigaray 
explains, would (re)produce another ‘phallocratic model’ (128). Whitford says that Irigaray 
warns against entering the political arena as women because this is to risk the danger of 
‘accepting the terms of the system currently in force,’ in which ‘women will become “men”’ 
(1991, 12). She explains that Irigaray’s aim is not to become part of the “boys club” by making 
philosophy more inclusive to the extent that ‘women become assimilated to the world of men 
and then have nothing to contribute as women’ (12). Irigaray’s project should not, however, be 
mistaken for that of creating a female version of philosophy or a “girls club”. Irigaray tells us 
that such a project can only attempt to  
 
reverse the order of things, even supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run, 
would revert to sameness: to phallocratism. It would leave room neither for women’s sexuality, nor for 
women’s imaginary, nor for women’s language to take (their) place (1985a, 33).  
 
The aim of Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference can therefore be understood as a 
process of constructing a new and non-phallic model of difference. It is an approach of 
revealing philosophical discourse ‘as a discourse for and between men’ (Richardson 1998, 92) 
which paralyses her, stops her flow (Irigaray 1992, 18), and intervening in it in order to 
construct a space for the emergence of woman in philosophical discourse that can free her flow 




she reads, or rather un-reads, the texts in terms of their representation of and relations to the “feminine”: 
it is a game of specular/speculative reflection of the inner logic of phallogocentric discourse. This game 
of strategic repetition of throwing back to the text what the text does to the “feminine” becomes a highly 
subversive practice of the critique of discourse (1994, 131).  
 
Given her subversive approach, Jenkins says that Irigaray’s  
 
work cannot be read without constant reference to the “canon” of Western philosophy, but which 
nonetheless aims to subvert its premises to a degree that means her writing cannot be included “within” 
it (2014, 167).  
 
That is to say, Irigaray’s work cannot be included ‘within’ the ‘canon’ because it is expressive 
of ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). I understand that Irigaray’s contested 
relationship to the canon is due to the ‘feminine’ she promotes within it. Which is not to be 
understood as the feminine represented in models and images designed by and for men (Grosz 
1989, xx), but as the other of the other. To this extent, I understand Irigaray’s work as 
expressive of ‘an “other meaning”’ insofar as it expresses the feminine as the other of the 
other. Irigaray builds this relationship to the canon through her feminist critique, which situates 
her work outside the canon yet creates a space for the feminine that intervenes within it. By 
articulating a feminine philosophy in terms of sexual difference, Irigaray creates a way for this 
canon to express ‘an “other meaning”’ (29). That is to say, she problematises and reinvents 
this masculine philosophical discourse to create a different discourse that expresses a feminine 
philosophy. 
 
According to Joy, it is important to recognise that in describing this labial language as a 
counter-discourse, we resist regarding Irigaray’s proposal ‘as merely the female counterpart of 
the phallus’ (2013, 77). In agreement with Joy, Irigaray’s project needs to be acknowledged 
for ‘being far more ingenious than proposing any such simplistic reversal’ (77). What I argue 
is so ingenious about Irigaray’s project is quite simply her desire to promote the feminine as 
the other of the other, which offers possibilities for creating an alternative discourse and 
subjectivities that proceed from woman’s own sexually specific cartography. That being said, 
by focusing on a form specific to (biological) women, Whitford acknowledges the critiques of 
Irigaray’s work that demarcate it as essentialist, inaccessible, elitist, ignorant of other 
differences such as race, sexuality, disability, and class, and also of the contributions of other 
women; therefore, homogenous, and anti-feminist (1991, 4; for critiques Whitford 
acknowledged see Bowlby 1983, Cameron 1985, Jones 1986, Le Doeuff 2007, and Plaza 
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1978). However, contrary to these critiques, I understand Irigaray’s work aims to build a 
positive sense of, and a pluralistic approach to, sexual difference. By focusing on woman’s 
morphology, I argue that Irigaray reclaims feminine difference from the patriarchal images and 
models that represent it as a negative by situating it as the source of women’s creativity. 
Braidotti describes this ‘assertion of the positivity of sexual difference’ as a ‘discursive 
strategy’ in which ‘women must speak the feminine – they must think it, write it, and represent 
it in their own terms’ (1994, 118). That is to say, this ‘feminine’ difference that Irigaray is 
promoting is ‘the other of the other’ (Richardson 1998, 104) insofar as it ‘is a woman-defined-
feminine and as such it is still a blank, it is not yet there’ (Braidotti 1994, 131). By inviting 
women to create their feminine difference in their own terms, Irigaray’s feminist project of 
sexual difference does not adhere to the critiques described by Whitford that hypostasize 
‘woman’ or reduce them to ‘a falsifying unity’ (1991, 4), but instead aims to engender feminine 
differences. It is in this sense, therefore, Whitford says that Irigaray ‘does not intend to tell us 
what “woman” is’ because this is a creative and inventive call for change that needs to be 
approached by women collectively (9-10). 
 
That being said, Irigaray does state that ‘[w]hatever inequalities may exist among women, they 
all undergo, even without clearly realizing it, the same oppression, the same exploitation of 
their body, the denial of their desire’ (1985a, 164 my italics). This would seem to be 
problematic insofar as women experience different forms of oppression and exploitation. In an 
attempt to defend this generalisation, Irigaray argues that ‘men have organized a de facto 
rivalry among women’ to the extent that women ‘have been assigned and taught’ their ‘form 
of “social existence”’ by ‘the society of men’ (164). This rivalry among women is therefore 
constructed as a patriarchal model in which women are not only positioned within the gender 
dichotomy of masculine/feminine but also within a hierarchical scale of homosocial power 
relations between women. In re-presenting this reality, women unwittingly submit themselves 
to think and live through the patriarchal systems of representation. To this extent, the rivalry 
between women is a result of our patriarchal habits of thought that condition us to think in 
terms of identities as established categories. This rivalry among women, Irigaray argues, is in 
fact a consequence of the patriarchal social structure. Therefore, Irigaray’s generalisation can 
be understood as a call for women to collectively find ways to free themselves from this 
masculine imposed ‘social existence’.  
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In order to contest the homogenising critiques of her feminist project, as she is clearly wary 
about the danger of this patriarchal conditioning, Irigaray states that she prefers ‘to speak, in 
the plural, of women’s liberation movements’ because  
 
there are multiple groups and tendencies in women’s struggles today, and to reduce them to a single 
movement involves a risk of introducing phenomena of hierarchization, claims of orthodoxy, and so on 
(164).  
 
Irigaray further recognises that the task to make a (feminine) difference is ‘obviously not 
simply an “individual” task’ (164). Whitford explains that one woman alone cannot ‘bring 
about change in the symbolic order’ (1991, 5). Irigaray argues that it is, rather, a task of the 
‘multiple groups and tendencies in women’s struggles today’ to make (feminine) differences 
(1985a, 164). Irigaray proposes that this task not only involves women learning to love 
themselves but also, given men’s organised rivalry among women, learning to love each other 
in the step towards freeing themselves from this patriarchal ‘social existence’ (164).  
 
I would add that the task of resisting patriarchal society does not only concern women, but men 
as well. According to Boothroyd, ‘it is not for women only to accomplish … but for men, too, 
to discover processes of identification which will lead to the withdrawal of their cultural 
Phallus’ in order to pass ‘a non-nihilistic ethical future for both women and men’ (1996, 67-
77). Boothroyd suggests a task for men that is similar to the one proposed by Irigaray for 
women (1985a, 164), which involves ‘a new kind of responding to the other; a listening which 
works at forestalling the ongoing phallocratic appropriation of the thought of sexual difference’ 
(1996, 67). Given the focus on woman’s morphological difference in Irigaray’s feminist 
project, he explains that women have ‘a strategic advantage’ (67) in the ‘rethinking of sexual 
difference’ (77) and, therefore, towards freeing themselves from patriarchal social structures. 
I agree that woman’s morphological difference gives them an advantage to the extent that 
Riordan explains they are already connected to the intensities of the feminine through their 
own labial machines (2011, 85-7). Whereas this process will be different for men insofar that 
they are the majority subjects within patriarchal society and are assumed not to have any labial 
machines. That being said, Riordan posits that labial machines can be located on all bodies: on 
the face, female genitals, and cuts etc., therefore, every body has the potential to connect to the 
intensities of the feminine (85-7).  
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(DRIP: By employing the term labial machine, Riordan invokes the concept of an abstract 
machine from Deleuze and Guattari. According to Deleuze and Guattari, abstract machines are  
 
defined by the fourth aspect of assemblages, in other words, the cutting edges of decoding and 
deterritorialization. They draw these cutting edges. Therefore they make the territorial assemblage open 
onto something else, assemblages of another type, the molecular, the cosmic; they constitute becomings 
(2004, 562).   
 
Riordan makes the connection between Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of an abstract machine 
and the labial lips through ‘Irigaray’s argument that the feminine is coded within masculine 
parameters in two contradictory but related ways – as lack and leak’ (2011, 83). Riordan argues 
that ‘[w]ithin this code, cutting would create lack and leak, tomb and womb simultaneously’ 
(83). To this extent, ‘[c]astration creates two edges. One borders a territory, the 
organism/subject, whilst the other borders the feminine’ (84). The labial machine, according 
to Riordan’s argument, cuts and ‘draws both molar and molecular lines’ creating a ‘becoming-
woman via contagion with the microfeminine [that] need not subtract from woman, whose 
becoming-woman proceeds from her own sexually specific cartography’ (85). This process 
could provide feminists with the tools to enact Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of feminist 
politics (see Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 304) as a ‘double-edged politics’, that is, a molar and 
molecular politics: to claim a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman 
(Riordan 2011, 85).) 
 
By connecting Boothroyd’s proposal for men to withdraw from their cultural Phallus, to 
Riordan’s argument that labial machines can be located on all bodies, I propose that men can 
also locate labial machines on their bodies. We must remember that like the labia, penises have 
folds too, of course, but are culturally striated in the symbolic world as the phallic. Therefore, 
in a process of withdrawing from their cultural Phallus, I argue that Boothroyd’s task of 
‘rethinking of the masculine’ for men (1996, 68) can be a task of rethinking the masculine body 
in ways that can locate labial machines. Such a process could be understood as that which is 
described by Braidotti as ‘de-essentialized embodiment’ for majority subjects (1994, 171). By 
locating labial machines on their bodies, I propose that men can too connect to the intensities 
of the feminine that can promote possibilities of difference for subjectivity that can free 
themselves from patriarchal modes of being.  
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(DRIP: Transwomen, a hot debate in sexual difference feminism of late (see Greer 2016), I 
argue also have an advantageous starting point in rethinking sexual difference because they are 
connected to the intensities of the feminine through their own labial machines. The reason I 
employ feminine and masculine pronouns throughout this art-thesis instead of using “they” as 
a singular pronoun, is not because I disagree with transgender or gender non-conforming 
pronoun preferences, it is instead to avoid the “neutral” positioning of the subject that has 
always been presupposed as masculine throughout the history of Western philosophy of 
thought.)  
 
With the aim to connect to the intensities of the feminine, it will be useful to turn to Irigaray’s 
investigation into fluids. Irigaray claims that women’s expression flows in a style that 
symbolises the female sexual imaginary, which she associates with a ‘mechanics’ of fluids 
(1985a, 106). By approximating the ‘properties of fluids’ (106), Irigaray describes women’s 
process of enunciating as ‘continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, diffusible 
… unending’ (111). Emphasising these as feminine features, Irigaray describes women’s mode 
of discourse as fluid in its difference to the dogmatic rigidness of the phallocentric symbolic 
order, which privileges the one (phallic) signifier (26). Irigaray explains that this phallocentric 
mode of discourse symbolises man’s isomorphic sexual imaginary to the extent that it 
privileges a ‘mechanics of solids’ (107), which emphasises the masculine features of 
‘[p]roduction, property (proprieté), order, form, unity, visibility, erection’ (1985c, 77). It is in 
this sense that his words have been able to fix themselves like bricks to form a wall against her 
expression, ‘paralysing her, stopping her flow’ (1992, 18). To this extent, Irigaray claims that 
‘[s]olid mechanics and rationality have maintained a relationship of very long standing, one 
against which fluids have never stopped arguing’ (1985a, 113).  
 
In her unfolding theory of the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and 
difference, Irigaray explains that it is from within the labial lips that women’s fluid mode of 
discourse is produced (24). She says that the labial designates the ‘two’ labial lips, which are 
not to be understood as a complementary dyad, but rather as the embodiment of irreducible 
plurality and difference (28). By sacrificing no lip over the other, no one of her pleasures to 
another, she is able to identify herself with none of them in particular, but rather always an 
ever-folding becoming ‘of never being simply one’ (31). Each in ‘continuous contact’, Irigaray 
explains that the ‘self-caressing’ labial lips are in a ‘ceaseless exchange’ with each other, which 
is taking place ‘all the time’ (24-31). What is expressed between them has ‘an “other 
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meaning”’ that makes her ‘whimsical, incomprehensible, agitated, capricious ... leaving “him” 
unable to discern the coherence of any meaning’ to the extent that she continuously enunciates 
involuntarily what she feels:  
 
She steps ever so slightly aside from herself with a murmur, an exclamation, a whisper, a sentence left 
unfinished ... When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. From another point of pleasure, or 
of pain (29).  
 
Hence, Irigaray argues, it is useless to ask a woman to repeat herself in order to make sense of 
what she is saying, as when she does she would be repeating herself from another place in her 
mode of discourse:  
 
They have returned within themselves... within the intimacy of that silent, multiple, diffuse touch. And 
if you ask them insistently what they are thinking about, they can only reply: Nothing. Everything (29).  
 
This labial language of difference cannot be understood by the phallic symbolic order because 
it ‘sets off in all directions’ making her enunciate ‘contradictory words,’ that cause her to 
appear ‘somewhat mad from the standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever listens to them 
with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in hand’ (29). Such misunderstanding, 
Irigaray further explains, is what makes her  
 
access to a signifying economy, to the coining of signifiers, to their exchange, … difficult or even 
impossible for her because she remains an outsider, herself (a) subject to their norms. She borrows 
signifiers but cannot make her mark, or re-mark upon them. Which all surely keeps her deficient, empty, 
lacking, in a way that could be labelled “psychotic”: a latent but not actual psychosis, for want of a practical 
signifying system (1985b, 71).  
 
It is outside of the phallocentric symbolic space that we find the ‘psychotic’ (71) or ‘hysteric’ 
(61) trying to express her-self, her womanliness, and her pleasure. Women’s expression is 
therefore labelled hysterical because there is no female syntax appropriate to use. However, 
Irigaray suggests that it is her hysterical expression that provides the potential to express herself 
in a labial language of plurality and difference. Irigaray confesses that there is no simple way 
of providing instructions or an account of ‘speaking (as) woman’, because ‘it is spoken, but 
not in meta-language’ (144). But she does admit elsewhere that it is ‘possible to start to create 
it with everyday language’ (1993c, 49). To this extent, she argues that  
 
It is still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables. Even if asked to clarify a few points. 
Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, they never have understood (1985b, 143).  
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By taking on this task, Irigaray challenges us to push the limits of exasperation,  
 
[u]ntil the ear tunes into another music, the voice starts to sing again, the very gaze stops squinting over 
the signs of auto-representation, and (re)production no longer inevitably amounts to the same and returns 
to the same forms, with minor variations (143). 
 
Therefore, in order to understand this feminine expression ‘[o]ne would have to listen with 
another ear’ because her expression is fluid to the extent that it is 
 
always in the process of weaving itself, of embracing itself with words, but also of getting rid of words 
in order not to become fixed, congealed in them. For if “she” says something, it is not, it is already no 
longer, identical with what she means. What she says is never identical with anything, moreover; rather, 
it is contiguous. It touches (upon). And when it strays too far from that proximity, she breaks off and 
starts over at “zero”: her body-sex (1985a, 29).  
 
By speaking from a space of fluidity, Irigaray argues that woman can borrow rigid signifiers 
from the phallocentric symbolic order and liquefy them into a flow of ‘contradictory words’ in 
order to express ‘an “other meaning”’ (29). Still, she cannot ‘mark, or re-mark upon them’ 
(1985b, 71), and nor would she want to because that would only result in more dogmatic claims 
to verity that would reproduce another ‘phallocratic model’ (1985a, 128). She can however 
touch upon them in a process that keeps her open to other flows (29), or, I will argue, lines of 
flight (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 305). What she expresses, therefore, can never be fixed 
because her expression is in a continuous flow of touching upon. Moreover, it is a fluid 
language that speaks from her morphological difference and so is expressed from a continuous 
process of touching, within. To this extent, she cannot be asked to repeat herself because she 
has already returned within herself. According to Braidotti, it is her morphological difference 
that makes her ‘troublesome’ because she cannot be fixed (1994, 80). It is in this sense that I 
argue that she can cause ‘runoffs’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 204); which is not to flee from 
her flow of ‘contradictory words’, but to re-create or resist from within the dominant 
phallocentric symbolic order by touching upon a different flow of ‘contradictory words’ that 
expresses ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). It is a process of enunciating feminine 
difference in which its meaning expressed is the other of the other. 
 
Speaking as woman does not, however, determine woman’s sexuality as the only conditions in 
which we can express feminine difference. Following Riordan’s argument, everybody who 
locates their own labial machines is forced to rethink their enfleshed bodies to the extent that 
the connection to feminine intensities enables them to explore possibilities of difference for 
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subjectivity as well as discourse. Instead of thinking of subjects with labial machines as not-
men because their enfleshed bodies present ‘the horror of nothing [no phallus] to see’ (26), I 
argue that subjects with labial machines can be thought of according to Braidotti’s term, as 
‘not-one’ (1994, 171). Braidotti describes this subject who is not-one ‘as a subject that is split 
time and time again, over multiple axes of differentiation’ (171). Labial machines split the 
subject through its ‘two’ labial lips, which are not the same in themselves, but are different in 
that their folds are plural, have no center, and are different in and of themselves. The subject 
with a labial machine therefore cannot sacrifice one lip over the other, no one of her pleasures 
to another, and it is to this extent that Irigaray describes that she is able to identify herself with 
none of them in particular, but rather always an ever-folding becoming ‘of never being simply 
one’ (1985a, 31). Without knowing (never “knowing”), she is already ‘several,’ but these are 
identities that cannot be dispersed because the other within her is already becoming something 
else through her labial machine (31).  
 
According to Riordan, this process of experiencing the intensities of the flesh can ‘transport 
the flesh toward that other place, simultaneously within and outside our enfleshed selves’ and 
because ‘intensities are virtual they are like waves, events wherein the flesh exceeds itself, 
escapes from itself. As in Francis Bacon’s de-formed heads, which escape the face in 
convulsive becoming-animal’ (2011, 80). Invoking Spinoza, Riordan claims that the enfleshed 
body is ‘no longer a question of form. It is a question of velocities’ (81). To this extent, I 
propose that everybody can find in their labial machines a movement of escape from their 
“self” as defined by patriarchal systems of representations, from within. That is to say, labial 
machines can cut across the territory of the body represented in patriarchal systems of 
representation, and open the flesh up to the feminine differences. Irigaray explains that there is 
no single model of female sexuality, there is no one in which our enfleshed selves can become, 
because it is through her sexual multiplicity that the/a woman is indifferentiated (1985b, 227). 
Neither open (undifferentiated) nor closed (differenciated), her morphology is determined as 
indeterminate (indifferentiated) (229). Lost in the movement of escape within a labial machine, 
the subject becomes indiscernible because she is in her ‘zone of … indifferentiation where one 
can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule…’ (Deleuze 1997b, 
1). A labial machine can therefore be understood to incite a process of becoming-woman.  
 
(DRIP: Employing the term becoming-woman invokes the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who 
introduced it in A Thousand Plateaus (2004). In forging a link between Irigaray’s feminist 
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processes of becoming and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman, I situate my 
feminist project within the now well-established literature on feminist interpretations of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s singly and co-authored works (for an overview of, and contribution to 
this literature see the essays collected in Buchanan and Colebrook 2000). Typically this 
literature has focused on the conceptual compatibility of Irigaray’s project of sexual difference 
feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of difference (for an understanding of the 
arguments for this alliance, I recommend reading Braidotti 1994, Colebrook 2000, Grosz 
1994b, Lorraine 1999, Olkowski 2000, and Riordan 2011. For an overview of the arguments 
against it, see Goodchild 1996, and Ungelenk 2014).)  
 
According to Riordan, men who escape from within their labial machines produce a 
‘becoming-woman of man’ that forces them to rethink their enfleshed bodies as their labial 
machine ‘perverts his phallic flesh, opens it out, connects it to the intensities of a feminine’ 
(2011, 85). For women, Riordan says that labial machines ‘need not subtract from woman, 
whose becoming-woman proceeds from her own sexually specific cartography’ (85). Riordan 
explains that the lips of the labial machines (which can be located on every body) are the 
thresholds which can launch such becomings-woman, and it is to this extent that she describes 
them as ‘the intermezzo’ (86-7). Riordan draws upon Deleuze and Guattari to propose that men 
and women can escape their positions of duality through their labial machines, as Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that ‘[t]he only way to get out of the dualism machines is to be-between, to pass 
between, the intermezzo’ (2004, 305). Although I agree that the labial machine should be 
considered as the threshold for becomings-woman, my argument for becoming-woman begins 
to differ from Riordan’s at this point.  
 
Riordan follows Deleuze and Guattari by saying that ‘all becomings proceed through, but by 
no means finish with, becoming-woman’ (2011, 87). For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-
woman is a process of becoming-other, in which becoming-woman is the key to all other 
becomings (2004, 306). Although I agree that becoming-woman must be the starting point for 
molecular becoming, there is an emphasis on leaving woman behind in the becomings outlined 
by Riordan, Deleuze and Guattari. In agreement with Jones, becoming-woman seems to be 
posited as just a ‘vector one moves through and leaves behind on the way to becoming-
elsewhere’ (2011, 385). This seems at odds with Riordan’s initial argument that the labial 
machine cuts and ‘draws both molar and molecular lines’, producing a becoming-woman that 
keeps woman intact (2011, 85). In picking up Riordan’s initial argument, I argue that the 
 25 
becoming-woman launched at the threshold of the labial machine explores the assertion of a 
female subjective identity and sexuality as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities. I 
propose that becoming-woman should be posited not as a becoming-other or -elsewhere, but 
as a process of becoming-other of the other, which supports the claim for a female subjectivity 
as part of the process of becoming-woman. In order to further clarify the difference between 
these two arguments, I will posit the idea of the feminine nomad as the subjectivity that is 
produced through a process of becoming-other of the other.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the ‘life of the nomad is the intermezzo’ (2004, 419). They define 
nomads in terms of ‘movement’ insofar that the ‘nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; 
he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial principle’ (420-1). Yet, Deleuze 
and Guattari explain that ‘nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all 
appearances’, instead they ‘are there, on the land, wherever there forms a smooth space that 
gnaws, and tends to grow, in all directions’ (421). The movement of the nomad is therefore 
primary and non-hierarchal. Deleuze and Guattari describe this space on which the nomad 
roams as a ‘smooth space’ of the nomos, which derives from the combination of the Greek 
words nem, which means ‘to distribute’, and nemô, which translates as ‘pasture livestock’, to 
explain the unstructured movements of unguided animals on an unbounded pasture (420). They 
contrast this understanding of the nomos with another Greek word, logos, which is usually 
understood to mean ‘law’ and is used to depict a ‘striate space’ that is well-ordered and 
structured (408). In this contrast, Watson explains that Deleuze and Guattari posit that the 
nomads ‘operate in opposition to the State’, and are capable of producing ‘revolutionary 
innovation’, such as ‘following lines of flight’ and ‘forming war machines’ (2010, 174). This 
revolutionary ability is described by Conley as the nomad’s capability to create  
 
spaces through the trajectories of their passages that move from one territory to another and from given 
striations on the surface of the world to smooth and intensive areas, areas that are tantamount to the folds 
and creases of events that vibrate in the body, itself a place that can be affectively spatialised in infinite 
ways (2010, 262).  
 
The life of the feminine nomad is the intermezzo of the lips of the labial machines. To the 
extent that the labial machine incites a becoming-other of the other, the becoming(s) occurs on 
the smooth space accessed by a labial machine. I posit this smooth space as the smooth labial 
space in order to connect Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the smooth space to Irigaray’s 
description of women’s sexual multiplicity, which can only be accessed through touch (Irigaray 
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1985a, 29). Building upon Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the nomad, I will unfold the 
feminine nomad as a she who distributes herself in her smooth labial space; she occupies, 
inhabits, holds that space; that is her territorial principle (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 420, my 
revision). I propose that the movement of the feminine nomad explores women’s sexual 
multiplicity, as described by Irigaray, by approaching her pleasure not as a ‘choice’ between 
‘clitoral activity and vaginal passivity,’ but instead as a movement between the multiple 
different ‘caresses’ that can invoke ‘the hystericization of her entire body’ (Irigaray 1985a, 28). 
Moving between her multiple sex organs avoids focusing on one sex organ that ends the process 
in one climax, and instead explores her body sex as ‘a thousand tiny sexes’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 235). I argue that this approach of the feminine nomad overturns the patriarchal 
approach that judges her body sex as ‘zero,’ because she ‘has sex organs more or less 
everywhere’ (Irigaray 1985a, 28). 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, in order to create this ‘smooth space’ (2004, 421), we must 
destratify the territories of representation. The labial machine provides an escape from the 
patriarchal territories of representation because it presents ‘the horror of nothing to see’ 
(Irigaray 1985a, 26). By escaping the territories of representation through the labial machine, 
we can discover a destratified space that I have described elsewhere as ‘the smooth labial space 
of pure difference’ (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 74). I propose that this smooth labial 
space of pure difference can therefore serve as the basis for the critique of the well-ordered, 
rigid and static patriarchal logos of social formations. The process that ‘occurs’ on the smooth 
labial space of pure difference can be understood as ‘the becoming-imperceptible of women 
becoming-women’ insofar that it involves ‘the transformation from one territory to another’ 
within (74). The new territory that is created, however, occurs on the enfleshed body to the 
extent that Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘all progress is made by and in the striated space’ 
(2004, 536-7). I argue that the intensities of the feminine differences experienced on the smooth 
labial space of pure difference are introduced to the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed 
body, inciting a process that explores her morphology as definite and defined as difference. It 
is in this process that she marks her territory and expresses her morphological difference.  
 
It is important to note that war machines can be appropriated by the state. Deleuze and Guattari 
explain the State’s war machine as that which ‘takes war for its object and forms a line of 
destruction prolongable to the limits of the universe’ (2004, 466). The feminine difference 
introduced by a labial machine is at risk of appropriation, from which she is (re-)submitted to 
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the patriarchal territories of representation. Insofar as the labial machine cuts and draws molar 
and molecular lines of flights, the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality runs 
the risk of forming a molar identity that can be appropriated by patriarchal models and images. 
However, I argue that inasmuch as the labial machine also cuts and draws molecular lines of 
flight, she has already escaped her molar identity to become-other of the other. That is to say, 
by expressing her morphological difference, she produces herself as indifferenciated because 
she is still indifferentiated to the extent that her morphology is always in the process of 
becoming other (Irigaray 1985b, 227). What she becomes can never be “finished” because her 
expression is in a continuous process of touching within. She cannot be asked to repeat herself 
because she has already returned (to the indifferentiated) within herself. When asked who she 
is, or more precisely to explain her indifferenciation, she ‘can only reply: Nothing 
[(differenciated)]. Everything [(undifferentiated)]’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). Therefore, I argue that 
she is always in a process of becoming-other of the other to the extent that she is indifferentiated 
and indifferenciated. To this extent, the indifferent/ciated woman is a line of flight (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004, 305). She does not, and cannot, belong to patriarchal territories of 
representation because she is enfolded; always moving between the intermezzo of her labial 
lips. I propose that her revolutionary ability can therefore be thought of as her ever-folding 
capacity to escape the patriarchal territories of representation and open her flesh up to the 
multiple possibilities of feminine differences from within her labial machine.  
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for an understanding of the process of indifferent/ciation I posit 
as the indifferent/ciated organisation of the Cosmos. Although Deleuze employs these terms 
to describe the virtuality and actuality of an Idea, I use them to describe the approach of an 
artistic process that is a dynamic between the differenciated order and the undifferentiated 
chaos that has an organisation to it through a selection of the, in principle, infinite possibilities 
of the Cosmos.) 
 
I have consolidated Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the nomad with Irigaray’s notion of the 
feminine because both concepts function in opposition to the logos of social formation in order 
to create alternative subjectivities. However, the critical reason for this consolidation is based 
upon Lorraine’s account of the ‘dilemmas raised for personal identity by the receptivity to 
dynamic becoming advocated by Irigaray and Deleuze,’ constituted by her argument that 
Deleuze ‘does not insist on recognition of the feminine other in the way that Irigaray does’ and 
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Irigaray ‘does not allow, perhaps, the same range of lines of flight as Deleuze’ (1999, 19). 
Lorraine goes on to say,  
 
At the same time that Deleuze’s notion of becoming-imperceptible has revolutionary potential for those 
trapped in molar selves, the emphasis on the prepersonal forces running through individuals renders it 
difficult to acknowledge the constitutive power of personal others. Irigaray also wants to open up the 
subject to such becomings. But she is equally interested in establishing a new foundation for identity – 
one more adequate to contemporary times. If for Deleuze the problem is how to map out lines of flight 
from the molar identities we currently have, the problem for Irigaray is how to stabilize a molar identity 
that will allow us to live more ethically (163).  
 
The dilemmas that Lorraine brings to the forefront of the two philosopher’s discussions of 
becoming does not entail an argument that prioritises one theory over the other. Rather, she 
suggests ‘a synthesis of the two that compensates for the weaknesses and brings out the 
strengths of each’ (164). In finding nothing in Deleuze’s work that is incompatible with this 
‘mutual implication of lines of flight’, but rather much to support it, Lorraine proposes that this 
synthesis produces a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of 
becoming-woman (164). She argues that this synthesis ‘allows a “personalized” approach to 
destratification, with important ethical and political implications’ (228).  
 
Starting with what Lorraine deems as the weaknesses of Irigaray’s project from a Deleuzian 
perspective, she says ‘one might say that Irigaray’s project involves a deterritorialization from 
traditional molar identity, only to reterritorialize onto the oedipalized counterpart of traditional 
molar identity’ (163). According to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of feminist politics, it 
seems to be the case that they would warn against any processes of establishing a female 
personal identity:  
 
It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their 
own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity … But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such 
a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow (2004, 304). 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, establishing a female personal identity would therefore block 
becomings. However, my understanding of Irigaray’s project is not to establish a female 
oedipal identity as a claim to “know” the nature of woman (Irigaray 1985a, 135). It is not about 
creating an idea of the ‘feminine’ that limits thought to a presupposed image of the woman, I 
think therefore I am a one, whole, unified individual female Being. Rather, it is to establish a 
space from which to speak as woman, so that ‘one may attempt to provide a space for the 
“other” as feminine’ (135). I agree with Lorraine that Deleuze and Guattari need to delineate 
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more carefully between personal identity and oedipal identity, as they seem to imply that both 
are interchangeable (Lorraine 1999, 181).  
 
In reading Deleuze’s theory of becomings with Irigaray’s notion of the feminine, Lorraine 
deems the weaknesses of Deleuze’s project by emphasising that the  
 
images of a line of flight and the highly populated desert are oddly solipsistic. They suggest that it is 
through nomadic movement that one can retain one’s individuality; it is by leaving the molar identities 
of one’s self and others behind that one can preserve one’s own creative power (163).  
 
Although Lorraine notes that ‘Deleuze nowhere advocates anything like being “yourself” or 
preserving one’s individuality’ (251), she is arguing that Deleuze’s notion of mapping does not 
acknowledge the feminine other and therefore the lines of flight followed cannot preserve her 
creativity. From a Deleuzian perspective, this does not seem to be a problem because the line 
of flight overcomes such personal identities and therefore does not need to acknowledge the 
feminine other or preserve her creativity in the process of becoming. However, Lorraine argues 
against this perspective by saying that ‘failing to map the terrain of sexual difference’ in the 
process of becoming-woman ‘carries the risk of the masculinist appropriation of feminine 
power which Irigaray is so concerned with circumventing’ (186). Lorraine claims that in failing 
to recognise sexual difference, Deleuze and Guattari appear to assume the masculine 
perspective that the standard for the major identity is the ‘man-standard’, which ‘thus becomes 
a kind of point of origin, or worse, a point of reference required for orienting the direction of 
deterritorializing lines of flight’ (186). To this extent, Lorraine proceeds to argue, Deleuze and 
Guattari appear to only concern themselves with a masculine sexuality, which she suggests will 
only propose a masculine kind of becoming that has ‘a masculine bias’ (186). She claims that 
their project to escape practices of self-representation and create alternative subjectivities fails 
because premising their notion of becoming-woman ‘on destratification from the man-standard 
… threatens to leave that man-standard intact’ (187). She goes on to say, 
 
until or unless we are prepared to abandon personal identity, depersonalizing lines of flight can only 
evade the man-standard, leaving the contemporary economy of subjectivity intact rather than 
transforming it. Mapping a new kind of personal identity – an identity that is an open-ended process 
rather than a molar entity – could be more effective (188).  
 
In turning to Irigaray, Lorraine argues that,  
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For Irigaray to follow a line of flight, she needs to overcome an aspect of the social field that renders her 
creativity invisible and that regularly steals her creative capacities in order to appropriate them for its 
own (142-3).  
 
What Irigaray seeks to overcome is the patriarchal logos of social formations in order to follow 
a line of flight that will recognise and render visible her creativity in a process of becoming-
woman. That is, women need to establish a stable form of subjectivity as part of the process of 
becoming-woman that seeks to create alternative subjectivities. To do this, Lorraine goes on to 
say, ‘Irigaray destratifies oedipalisation by mapping femininity onto the social field’ (187). In 
agreement with Lorraine’s synthesis of these two models of subjectivity, I argue that the 
concept of the feminine nomad can succeed in its attempts to escape territories of representation 
through labial machines, and create alternative subjectivities by introducing feminine 
differences into the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body. I propose that the feminine 
nomad can pursue an Irigarayan kind of becoming that not only focuses on woman’s 
possibilities for transformation, but also concerns the possibilities for transformation of others. 
According to Lorraine, 
 
Irigaray wants to incorporate the participatory communion of mutually constitutive creativity into her 
model of subjectivity. Her model posits a becoming-subject as a becoming in which two or more subjects 
emerge from encounter with the others transformed, a becoming in which a subject not only pursues her 
own line of flight but also attends to how her line of flight implicates and forms a web with the lines of 
flight of others (163-4). 
 
The concept of the feminine nomad is a proposal for a feminist practice of becoming-woman 
that does not propose the abandonment of personal identity until we all have a personal identity 
that we can abandon. It is a feminist proposal for a becoming-other of the other which supports 
the assertion of a female personal identity as part of the process of creating alternative 
subjectivities that leave all territories of patriarchal representation behind. 
 
(DRIP: In this critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the nomad, it may be better to look 
at the figure of the ‘schizo’ from Anti-Oedipus (2013). In fact, in the following excerpt about 
the schizo, we can see how similar Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the schizo is to 
Irigaray’s description of the feminine other: 
 
The schizo has his own system of co-ordinates for situating himself at his disposal, because, first of all, 
he has at his disposal his very own recording code, which does not coincide with the social code, or 
coincides with it only in order to parody it. The code of delirium or of desire proves to have an 
extraordinary fluidity. It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he 
deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions 
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asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same 
genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way. When he is more or less forced into it and 
is not in a touchy mood, he may even accept the banal Oedipal code, so long as he can stuff it full of all 
the disjunctions that this code was designed to eliminate (2013, 27). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari posit the figure of the schizo because it is closest to ‘desire’ in its pure 
state; the schizo escapes the Oedipal codes through his ‘deterritorialized flows’ of desire (85) 
and is therefore capable of thinking ‘beyond the anthropomorphic representation that society 
imposes on this subject, and with which it represents its own sexuality’ (337). They focus on 
‘desire’ more than ‘sexuality’ because they describe that desire is capable of ‘demolishing 
entire social sectors’, whereas sexuality is present throughout these social sectors (139). The 
sexuality they seek to demolish is based on the Oedipus complex, in favour of a nonhuman 
sexuality that is concerned with ‘n sexes’ (337).  
 
(drip: for an account of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, see the drip, Drizzle.) 
 
Although I believe that Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal that the schizo has the potential to 
demolish the phallic and capitalist signifiers, I agree with Lorraine that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
proposal for a nonhuman sexuality does not take into account the possibility that women’s 
desire could offer a process to challenge capitalism and destratisfy oedipalisation which would 
be less dangerous for women who do not have a stable molar identity to leave behind (1999, 
186-7). The reason that I will continue to employ the figure of the nomad rather than the figure 
of the schizo for my proposal for a feminine nomad is because the concept of the nomad enables 
me to apply Irigaray’s feminist project of obtaining a female personal identity by focusing on 
the embodied experience of an individual, rather than Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal for a 
nonhuman sexuality by employing the figure of the schizo that focuses on the schizophrenic’s 
conceptual persona. According to Lorraine,  
 
Whereas one could say that Deleuze is motivated by the fear of stagnancy and the death of desire of the 
overly molarized subject (or, as Irigaray might put it, the entombed masculine subject who has lost his 
body), Irigaray is motivated by the need to become a nomadic subject rather than a schizophrenic (or, as 
Irigaray might put it, the need to integrate the corporeally loaded effects of femininity into a fully formed 
feminine subjectivity) (125).  
 
By mapping the feminine other into the social field, we will enable an alternative approach 
toward subjectivity that will provide us with a different range of social identities liberated from 
the patriarchal logos and capitalist form of social formations. According to Irigaray, women’s 
desire is already ‘always something more and something else besides that one – sexual organ, 
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for example – that you give them, attribute to them’ (1985a, 29). Her description of women’s 
desire could be understood as already schizo-revolutionary because  
 
it really involves a different economy more than anything else, one that upsets the linearity of a project, 
undermines the goal-object of a desire, diffuses the polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts 
fidelity to a single discourse … (29).  
 
Feminine desire therefore already escapes the Oedipal codes that society imposes on women 
because the feminine other escapes the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. 
Instead of pursuing a process of deoedipalisation by demolishing entire social sectors and the 
territory of the individual, I propose that a nomadic process allied with Irigaray’s notion of 
feminine difference will enable us to map feminine differences into the social sectors and the 
territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body. The feminine nomad will unleash feminine flows 
that will destratisfy the capitalist production of subjectivity and oedipalisation to the extent that 
the feminine difference described by Irigaray is a new and non-phallic model of difference.) 
 
(drip: Although I do not employ the figure of the schizo for my proposal for a feminine nomad 
in this drip, I do employ Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art (2013) in 
the drip, Drizzle, to form a synthesis with Irigaray’s concepts of the indifferentiated woman 
(1985b) and the labial lips (1985a). Such a synthesis is pursued to develop Zepke’s account of 
schizo-revolutionary artistic practice (2014) to posit an artistic process of escaping the 
patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation to open up new possibilities for thinking 
and being. I explore the potential of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of art that I propose 
can provide a resistance to the representational image of thought that Braidotti describes is 
based on the phallogocentric system (1994, 101), and engender processes of transformation 
that can explore the emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression. According 
to Lorraine,  
 
maybe it is to “art” that we need to turn for a model of how an embodied subject could go about finding 
creative solutions to the specific problems faced by those with physical as well as mental selves (1999, 
217).  
 
This labial formula for a schizo-revolutionary artistic process engenders new feminist artistic 
encounters capable of forcing us to think differently about women, for women, (men and 
others) becoming-women, and as women, (men and others) becoming-women. It is within this 
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schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice that we can therefore explore processes 
of becoming-woman which can engender feminine nomads.) 
 
Irigaray expresses her critique of Deleuze as follows; 
 
I can imagine why Deleuze wanted to become a woman, but also an animal, to shake his traditional 
masculine identity. But I would like to stress that he adopted such an idea at the successful time of 
women’s liberation. I thus have some doubts about the intention of such a becoming feminine. Could it 
not happen to appropriate the success that women were gaining? Is it not then the same gesture as men 
made during our whole tradition? Why, in this time, have some distinguished thinkers suddenly wished 
for becoming women or feminists instead of trying to reach a neither neutral nor universal but masculine 
identity? The least one could say is that they have created a great confusion in relation to a budding 
culture in the feminine. It was not really respectful of the efforts of women to liberate themselves from 
the subjection to a culture in the masculine! (2008a, 79).  
 
She argues that Deleuze’s proposal to abandon personal identity runs ‘the risk once more of 
taking back from women those as yet unterritorialized spaces where her desire might come into 
being’ (1985a, 141). Irigaray considers Deleuze’s proposal for sexual multiplicity as a 
‘pleasure which constitutes a discovery for men, a supplement to enjoyment, in a fantasmatic 
“becoming-woman,” but which has long been familiar to women’ (141). By employing 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the body without organs, Irigaray describes it as already 
women’s ‘historical condition’ insofar as ‘women have long been assigned to the task of 
preserving “body-matter” and the “organless,” [therefore] doesn’t the “organless body” come 
to occupy the place of their own schism?’ (141). What Irigaray means is neatly summarised by 
Braidotti:  
 
that the signifier woman be both the concept around which feminists have gathered in the recognition of 
a general practical identity, and that it be also the very concept that needs to be analysed critically and 
eventually deconstructed, is no contradiction, but rather a suitable description of the historical condition 
of women in postmodern late capitalism (1994, 118).  
 
In considering the question: ‘do women rediscover their pleasure in this “economy” of the 
multiple?’, Irigaray articulates the answer that ‘women’s pleasure does not occur without 
[multiplicity]’, however, she argues that ‘a multiplicity that does not entail a rearticulation of 
the difference between the sexes [is] bound to block or take away something of woman’s 
pleasure’ (1985a, 140). She goes on to say that for women to carry out Deleuze’s proposal to 
turn their ‘body without organs’ into ‘a “cause” of sexual pleasure, isn’t it necessary to have 
had a relation to language and to sex – to the organs – that women have never had?’ (141). 
Irigaray is suggesting that women must claim their sexual multiplicity and pleasure, which has 
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long been familiar to them but unable to be expressed within a masculine discourse, in order 
to territorialize a space where her desire might come into being. In accord with Irigaray’s 
critique, I believe that becoming-woman must entail the assertion of a female subjective 
identity and sexuality as part of the process for creating alternative subjectivities so as to not 
pursue a masculine line of becoming.  
 
In explaining that Deleuze’s concepts are already familiar to women, Irigaray asserts that 
Deleuze’s concepts ‘still partly take the place of woman or the feminine’, and, as a result, are 
metaphors ‘for her/it, that men can use’ (140-1). Richardson defends Irigaray’s claim by further 
explaining that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman can all too easily ‘be 
understood in the context of [the] image of women’s bodies’ (1998, 109). She says that  
 
In using the term “woman” to signify a process of becoming deterritorialised they fit too easily into a 
tradition which views women as subject to dissolution and disintegration; unable to defend the 
boundaries of our bodies or the state (109).  
 
That is to say, by claiming the concept of becoming-woman, Deleuze and Guattari signify that 
women are already non-subjects as not-men. Although this means that women have more 
options because their starting point is from the position of an empirical minority (Braidotti 
2002, 85), it also means they have once again been subject to an ‘objectivization in discourse’ 
(Irigaray 1985b, 133). Subjectivity is thus denied to women again, as she becomes the object 
of his concept (133). By appropriating the woman in becoming-woman, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory of the nomad becomes ‘appropriated by the “masculine”’ (Irigaray 1985b, 133). Pereira 
argues that it is only when such feminine concepts are appropriated by male theorists in a 
masculine discourse that they are validated as ‘proper’ theory (2012, 296). This masculine 
appropriation, Code explains, locates and contains feminist theory to ‘limit the discussion, 
[and] control the work’s possible reception’ (1995, 10). Deleuze and Guattari’s failure to 
recognise sexual difference therefore results in what Richardson describes as a ‘language of 
the nomads or packs [that] take[s] the male subject as norm’ (1998, 109). As a consequence, it 
could be argued that women who claim to identify themselves as a “nomad” are re-
objectivizing their own selves because they are identifying ‘“as” a masculine subject’ (Irigaray 
1985b, 133). 
 
According to Braidotti’s feminist critique,  
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Deleuze’s theory of becoming is obviously determined by his location in an embodied male subject for 
whom the dissolution of identities based on the phallus results in by passing gender altogether, toward a 
multiple sexuality. This, however, may not be the option best suited to female embodied subjects. How 
can Deleuze fail to see that this neutralization of sexual differences can only damage the process of 
reclaiming a political subjectivity for women? (1994, 122). 
 
Braidotti’s claim that Deleuze’s theory of becoming entails a neutralization of sexual 
differences is based on her argument that it ‘suggests a symmetry between the sexes, which 
results in attributing the same psychic, conceptual, and deconstructive itineraries to both’ 
(2011b, 253). Claiming a female specific subjectivity was never one of the intentions of 
Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) project. However, I agree with Braidotti that they are ‘close enough 
to the feminist claim to the empowerment of alternative female subjectivity, but distant enough 
to solve it by avoidance’ (1994, 122). Braidotti claims that Deleuze and Guattari proceed in 
this ‘contradictory manner’ in which they are both aware and hesitant with regard to the 
feminist implication of becoming-woman (117). She explains that their ‘position of “yes, but 
…,” or “I know what you mean, but …,”’ is a ‘mode of denial’ that functions as a ‘structural 
and systematic indecision’ (118). This approach allows them to make a ‘wailful choice or 
judgment’ that is determined by their politics of location insofar as, Braidotti argues, when 
‘doing philosophy, the moment inevitably comes when selection and priorities occur, and at 
that particular point sexual difference plays a major role’ (123). Their politics of location is 
clarified by Braidotti as having nothing ‘to do with biological but with sociosymbolic 
differences’, that is, it has been determined by the social field that is aligned with the interests 
of patriarchy (122). Deleuze and Guattari’s mode of indecision enables them to deny the 
‘indispensable’ work of feminism by outlining its ‘dangerous’ limitation (2004, 304), and as a 
result, enact a blockage that paralyses her, stops ‘her flow’ (Irigaray 1992, 18). Braidotti’s and 
Lorraine’s feminist critiques are in alignment to the extent that they both argue that Deleuze 
and Guattari’s theory of becoming denies the possibilities of different sexualised becomings, 
and they both also turn to Irigaray’s theory of the feminine to inform their respective arguments 
for a feminist project of becoming.  
 
In turning to Irigaray, Braidotti incorporates her line of argument to argue ‘that the dispersal 
of sexuality into a generalized “becoming” results in undermining the feminist claims to a 
redefinition of the female subject’ (1994, 116). From this feminist perspective, Braidotti says 
that she feels ‘quite unconvinced by [Deleuze and Guattari’s] call for the dissolution of sexed 
identities by neutralization of gender dichotomies, because I think that this road is historically 
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dangerous for women’ (116). In Irigaray’s defence of the feminine against Deleuze’s ‘hasty 
dismissal or deconstruction of the postmetaphysical subject’ (116), Braidotti argues that  
 
one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never controlled. Self-determination is the first step 
of any program of deconstruction. I concluded that Deleuze gets caught in the contradiction of 
postulating a general “becoming-woman” that fails to take into account the historical and 
epistemological specificity of the female feminist standpoint. A theory of difference that fails to 
take into account sexual difference leaves me as a feminist critic in a state of sceptical perplexity 
(117). 
 
By enlivening the feminine within Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman, we 
can transform its process that Lorraine claims is a ‘solipsistic’ task in which the philosophical 
problem of thinking beyond molar subjectivities and sexual identities ‘threatens to leave that 
man-standard intact’ (1999, 187); and instead posit a process that is a collective feminist task, 
in which Braidotti argues ‘the focus is more on the experience and the potential becoming of 
real-life women, in all of their diverse ways of understanding and inhabiting the subject 
position of “woman”’ (1994, 115). It is for this reason that Braidotti states that ‘it is unthinkable 
that the question of the deconstruction of phallogocentrism could be disconnected from the 
concrete changes taking place in women’s lives’ (115). Colebrook defends this feminist claim 
by asking this rhetorical  
 
Just what are Deleuze and Guattari doing when they take Woolf and the women’s movement away from 
the concepts of identity, recognition, emancipation and the subject towards a new plane of becoming? 
(2000, 3).  
 
Braidotti claims that  
 
Deleuze [and Guattari] proceeds as if there were clear equivalence in the speaking positions of the two 
sexes, as if – all other differences notwithstanding – the masculine or feminine speaking positions shared, 
if not the starting point, the same point of exit from the phallogocentric mode (1994, 117-8).  
 
However, she explains that if women proceed in Deleuze’s direction of becoming, without 
setting off on an equal footing, the task of ‘[u]ndoing [their] difference is not a task that can be 
dissolved easily without causing psychic and social damage’ (2011a, 40). To avoid this 
damage, Braidotti proposes instead the reassertion of ‘difference as the nomadic principle of 
non-one and not as a sexuate universal’, which she argues would produce a becoming-woman 
that ‘starts from the recognition of the dis-symmetry between the sexes’ and places an 




For this process of becoming to recognise the feminine and resist becoming masculine, it is 
important to differentiate the appropriation of women’s constitutive creativity by the dominant 
subjects who operate with a ‘masculine bias’ (Lorraine 1999, 186) and the dominant subjects 
who desire connecting to the intensities of the feminine (Riordan 2011, 85). The operation of 
the dominant subjects with a ‘masculine bias’ dispels the feminine signifier so that they can 
preserve their own creative power by appropriating feminine creativity. Whereas, the dominant 
subjects who desire connecting to the intensities of the feminine, I argue, do not aim to dispel 
woman, but, rather, participate in the process of becoming-woman with her in order to preserve 
her creativity in the process of creating alternative subjectivities. I propose that attending to 
this becoming with the other is a process of recognising her, not as the other to man, but as the 
other of the other. By recognising her, the dominant subject is forced to think her difference, 
engendering a process of becoming-woman that starts with the recognition of the feminine. 
The location that is composed is, therefore, constructed together with woman. Connected to the 
intensities of the feminine in this way, the location constructed can be understood as an 
affirmation of her difference. This process of becoming-woman can resist becoming masculine 
because it affirms her feminine difference as a source of creativity and, therefore, preserves her 
creative power in the becoming. As a result, not one, but ‘two or more subjects emerge’ from 
this process of becoming, ‘transformed’ (Lorraine 1999, 163). 
 
My proposal for the idea of a feminine nomad draws inspiration from Braidotti’s feminist 
argument for nomadic subjects, insofar as both propose the assertion of female personal 
identity as part of the process of creating alternative subjectivities that leave all territories of 
patriarchal representation behind. Although unlike my description of the feminine nomad, 
Braidotti does not describe her idea of nomadic subjects in a way that makes explicit the link 
to Irigaray’s theory of the labial lips. That is to say, I have argued that the feminine nomad’s 
process of becoming-woman is launched at the threshold of the lips of a labial machine, and 
entails two different processes of becoming for men and women that forces them to rethink 
their enfleshed bodies as the labial machine opens their flesh up to the possibilities of the 
feminine differences. That being said, my idea of the feminine nomad is developed from 
Braidotti’s ‘conceptually plausible notion’ that the process of becoming ‘may itself be sex-
specific, sexually differentiated, and consequently take different forms according to different 
gendered positions’ (1994, 121). Braidotti posits a process of becoming that would not dissolve 
all sexual identities and subjectivities, but one that could engender possibilities of different 
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sexualised becomings. She describes this process of becoming-woman as ‘nomadic’ to the 
extent that ‘this emphasis on the difference that women embody provides positive foundational 
grounds for the redefinition of female subjectivity in all of its complexity’ (149). In other 
words, her feminist nomadism focuses on asserting the positivity of sexual difference so that 
woman can be freed  
 
from the subjugated position of annexed “other” so as to make her expressive of a different difference, 
of pure difference, of an entirely new plane of becoming out of which differences can multiply and differ 
from each other (115). 
 
From Braidotti’s perspective, we can find in Deleuze’s work ‘a great empathy with the feminist 
assumption that we have to start from the critique of phallocentrism’, but given that ‘woman is 
positioned dualistically—as the other—in this system, she is annexed to the phallus, albeit by 
negation’ (2011a, 37). Braidotti argues, and I agree, that ‘[i]n this sense, and in this sense only, 
can it be said that sexual difference is the primary axis of differentiation and therefore must be 
given priority’ (37).  
 
In prioritising sexual difference, we must be wary not to produce a reversal of the hierarchical 
mode of differences. Such a concern has been expressed by many in critiques of the alliance 
between sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy (Ungelenk 2014, 
55; and Goodchild 1996, 177). In thinking that the sexual difference feminist task is to affirm 
a bifurcation of thought through the ‘concept of dual sexual difference’ (Ungelenk 2014, 66), 
most critics deem sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy 
“incompatible”. However, given that Irigaray explicitly warns us that her feminist project of 
sexual difference is not to ‘reverse the order of things’ (1985a, 33), I agree with Braidotti that 
Irigaray ‘is the most obvious term of comparison for Deleuze [and Guattari]’ for escaping the 
dualisms and thinking difference (2002, 92). These critiques argue that Irigaray’s feminist 
project of sexual difference is too “essentialist” for an alliance with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
idea of difference, however, given Lorraine’s account of the ‘masculine perspective’ of their 
work (1999, 186), such an argument could be understood as a gesture that is itself Oedipalized. 
Although the introduction of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy seemed to renew the threat 
against sexual difference feminism, I argue that both of their promising possibilities for 
difference is exactly what makes them compatible. According to Grosz, Deleuze and Irigaray 
are ‘most directly linked through the preeminence they grant to difference as force, to the force 
of difference, to the forces of differentiation and the differentiation of forces’ (2005, 172). It is 
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a difference understood not in terms of opposition, identity or comparability, but as ‘an 
ontological force’ that can provide ‘other ways of knowing, other ontologies and 
epistemologies that enable the subject’s relation to the world, to space and to time, to be 
conceptualized in different terms’ (172-3). I propose that it is in these promising possibilities 
of difference that we can render the “incompatible” encounters productive and (re)think both 
Deleuze and Guattari with feminism and sexual difference feminism with Deleuze and 
Guattari. In accord with Braidotti’s conclusion on the matter, ‘the whole discussion about the 
compatibility between Deleuze and feminist theory can be laid to rest at long last and a more 
pragmatic approach can be adopted’ (2002, 90). 
 
The pragmatic approach adopted by Braidotti develops Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion to 
start with becoming-woman by arguing the necessity of starting ‘from the recognition of the 
dissymmetry between the sexes and the emphasis on female specificity as the starting point for 
the process of redefining subjectivity’ (2011a, 41). It is not about creating a representation of 
woman or constructing a female oedipal identity to which we can imitate or transform oneself 
into (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 304). As I have discussed, both Irigaray and Deleuze and 
Guattari respectively agree on this (Irigaray 1985a, 135; Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 304). They 
each promote a subjectivity that offers possibilities of difference: for Irigaray this points to a 
female subjectivity as the other of the other (Richardson 1998, 104), for Deleuze and Guattari, 
this points towards a ‘molecular woman’ (2004, 304). Given that woman has never had a 
subjectivity to begin with, the process of ‘emitting particles that enter the relation of movement 
and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a micro femininity, in other words, that produce in us a 
molecular woman’ (304) has, in Irigaray’s words, ‘long been familiar to women’ (1985a, 141). 
Yet, Deleuze and Guattari failed to take this into account when suggesting ‘a micro femininity’, 
and therefore dismissed women’s potential for feminine differences. However, having brought 
together a composition of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s concepts, we can find a place 
for female subjectivity in Braidotti’s description of the feminine: 
 
the “feminine” is neither one essentialized entity, nor an immediately accessible one: it is rather both an 
embodied and embedded location and a virtual reality. It is the effect of a project, a political and 
conceptual project of transcending the traditional (“Molar”) subject position of Woman. This 
transcendence, however, occurs through the flesh into embodied locations and not in a flight away from 
them (2011a, 43, my italics). 
 
Braidotti posits the process of becoming-woman as a process of accounting for one’s politics 
of location which, as she explains, ‘is not a one-way street, but a multifaceted circuit’ to the 
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extent that each location is different (21). Braidotti further explains that this may entail a 
process of ‘claiming a fixed location’ for empirical minorities because, unlike majority 
subjects, minorities cannot account for a location they never had (42). I would add that 
constructing a location for the feminine nomad entails locating, or creating, a labial machine 
on one’s enfleshed body in order to initiate a becoming in the flesh. The differences between 
locating or creating a labial machine depends upon one’s politics of location, that is, if one 
already has ‘her own sexually specific cartography’ or if one has ‘phallic flesh’ (Riordan 2011, 
85).  
 
For women, Braidotti argues that the process of grounding one’s politics of location begins 
‘from the recognition of herself as not-one; as a subject that is split time and time again, over 
multiple axes of differentiation’ (1994, 171). These multiple axes of differentiation are clarified 
by Braidotti in terms of three different phases that ‘spell out different structures of subjectivity 
but also different moments in the process of becoming-subject’ (158). In relation to the 
complexity of female subjectivity, they are introduced as the ‘“difference between men and 
women,” “differences among women,” and “differences within each woman”’ (158). These 
three different phases are not to be taken as categorical distinctions in a paradigmatic model 
(158), but a nomadic map that corresponds to ‘different moments, … different locations in 
space, … [and] different practices’ (171). The nomadic subject that Braidotti proposes ‘is a 
figuration that emphasizes the need for action both at the level of identity, of subjectivity, and 
of differences among women’ (171). By focusing on the female bodily multifaceted 
complexities and multiple female feminist embodied voices, Braidotti explains that we can 
‘pay attention to the level of identity, of unconscious identifications, and of desire’ in order ‘to 
conjugate those levels with willful political transformations’ (170). That is to say, with an 
explicitly feminine focus, we will be able to identify the steps, shifting locations and points of 
exit from our phallogocentric mode of thinking, acting and speaking and push us towards a 
mode of thought, being and expression that can open up possibilities of difference, or rather, 
feminine differences. It is a transformational process that, Braidotti explains, ‘can only be 
achieved through de-essentialized embodiment [if one is a majority subject] or strategically re-
essentialized embodiment [if one is a minority subject]: by working through the multilayered 
structures of one’s embodied self’ (170). Which is, I suggest, in the creation of a labial machine 
if one is a majority subject or in its location if one is a minority subject. In working through 
the processes of becoming-woman which is launched at the threshold of the lips of a labial 
machine, the feminine nomad is constantly engaged in an ever-folding becoming ‘of never 
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being simply one’ (Irigaray 1985a, 31). She expresses herself in fluidity so that her becomings 
can touch upon a location only to move on from it ‘in order to not become fixed, congealed in 
them’ (29). According to Braidotti, such a movement of becoming maps ‘a zigzagging path’ 
through the multilayered structures of one’s politics of location (2011a, 35-41). I suggest that 
this mapping “zigzags” insofar that the becoming occurs in-between the two labial lips, 
drawing both molar and molecular lines that assert female subjective identity and sexuality as 
part of the process for creating alternative subjectivities. Braidotti proposes that her nomadic 
strategy of sexual difference ‘allows for the affirmation of alternative forms of feminist 
political subjectivity’ in which ‘feminists are the post-Woman women’ (1994, 169). Within 
these new feminist nomadic constructions, Braidotti explains that ‘[w]hat matters is to be able 
to name and to represent areas of transit between them; all that counts is the going, the process, 
the passing’ (170). I propose that this feminist nomadic process conveys the life of the feminine 
nomad that is the intermezzo, because she experiences the world by opening her flesh up to it 
through her labial machine.  
 
The process of zigzagging a path through the multilayered structures of one’s politics of 
location, according to Braidotti,  
 
requires as a preliminary method the working through of the stock of cumulated images, concepts, and 
representations of women, of female identity, such as they have been codified by the culture in which we 
live (169).  
 
Such a method has been proposed by Irigaray in order to transform the social form specific to 
women. Irigaray argues that women should introduce ‘valid representations of themselves in 
actions, words, and images in all public spaces’ (1993c, 86) that can resist patriarchal 
representations. Irigaray criticises the ways in which patriarchal images tend ‘to portray men 
as respectable citizens, as civil and religious authority figures, and consider women to be sexual 
property at the disposal of men’ (1994, xvi). Portrayed as respectable authority figures, I argue 
that ‘the image of the masculine subjectivity sitting in sovereign judgement’ is enabled, 
entitling men to preside over women’s experience (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 72). As 
a result, Grosz explains that there has been no feminine space in ‘culture, in representation, 
exchange, ethics, politics, history, or writing … only the one sex and its counterpart’ (2005, 
174). Therefore, the process of claiming a feminine location from which women can speak as 
women (Irigaray 1985a, 135), will enable women to speak, think, write, and represent the 
feminine on their own terms (Braidotti 1994, 117). In order to do this, women need social status 
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within patriarchy so that they can develop their own interests and rights; to become-women as 
determined by their own direction of becoming, not one with a ‘masculine bias’ (Lorraine 1999, 
186). Irigaray states: 
 
My purpose in demanding these rights for women is to make them take responsibility for 
themselves socially, make them responsible adult citizens. It is up to them to protect their virginity, 
their motherhood, their bit of nature, their house, their images, languages, god(s) or goddess(es). 
It is therefore up to them to become subjects capable of sublimating their sexual drives, cultivating 
their sexuality, giving it rhythm, temporality, stakes. To do this women need rights (1994, 81). 
 
The rights demanded by Irigaray are rights to human dignity, identity, motherhood, systems of 
exchange and representation in equal numbers (1993c, 86-9). Once these rights have been 
achieved, the next rights in the list will also follow: the legal encodification of rape, forced 
prostitution and pornography, a right to defend their own and their children’s lives, a right to 
equivalent exchange for men and women, and equal representation in civil and religious 
decision-making bodies (86-9). In promoting and progressing upon women’s social form in the 
way suggested by Irigaray, women can create a space in which women can speak as women 
(1985a, 135). From this space, women can explore different forms of expression that are free 
from the ‘hysteric’ restraints of the phallic signifier. In discovering herself away from the 
phallic signifier, I argue that women can consider what it means to think from within the labial, 
rather than from the position of the dominant phallic symbolic order, and can therefore explore 
different world-perspectives that would suit them in which they can develop new 
representations of themselves defined by themselves.  
 
Irigaray cautions us against claiming an image of the feminine for women to submit themselves 
to in order to claim to “know” the nature of woman, or to claim that there is one, because such 
a claim allows ‘oneself to be caught up again in a system of “masculine” representations’ 
(1985a, 122). That being said, perhaps the risk of becoming-phallic is one women must take 
when promoting and progressing women’s social form within this patriarchal society in order 
to create a space to explore different representations of themselves that are defined by 
themselves. It seems that Braidotti is willing to take such a risk as she promises us that ‘[u]ntil 
we have worked through the multiple layers of signification of Woman – phallic as it may be 
– I am not willing to relinquish the signifier’ (1994, 171). Given the failure on the part of 
dominant subjects to recognise and support the other throughout Western history (Lerner 1987, 
4), I am sympathetic to Braidotti’s argument that women must insist on the recognition of their 
signifier. That is not to say, however, that I am proposing that women must therefore become 
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phallic because we live in a patriarchal society. The risk of becoming-phallic can have 
disastrous results, as Braidotti points out in her example of Thatcher (2011a, 43; 2006, 45; and 
2002, 85). In order to resist this risk of becoming-phallic within a phallogocentric culture that 
will always perceive women as his counterpart (Grosz 2005, 174), I argue that women 
becoming-woman must also follow the molecular lines drawn through their labial machines. 
This process of becoming-woman continuously recognises her as not-one. That is to say, by 
recognising her as one, whole, unified individual female Being, an image of woman is fixed as 
a molar identity which limits her forms of representation to a presupposed image. By 
recognising her as not-one, however, she is freed from a presupposed image which enables us 
to create new and different images.  
 
(DRIP: For an example of these new images of women, I suggest looking at the 
reinvention of femininity offered in the feminist interventions of Pussy Riot. Braidotti 
neatly summarises this process of becoming-Pussy Riot as that which  
 
works actively towards the transformation of the signs, the social practices and the embodied 
histories of white institutionalized femininity, of resisting citizenship, of human rights 
campaigning, feminist and gender politics and art practices (2015, 247-8).  
 
By donning the Pussy Riot balaclava, I argue that we can locate a labial machine, which 
is produced from the cuts in the fabric around the wearer’s lips and eyes, in which we 
can perform deterritorializations of reterritorialized identities by expressing ourselves in 
a different feminine subjectivity.) 
 
I propose that this feminist nomadic task can be understood as living the life of a feminine 
nomad that is the intermezzo, as she approaches the world in a movement that is an open-
ended, never finished, ever-flowing, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and 
becoming with others. It is a process described by Grosz that is ‘without end, without definitive 
goal, without pregiven aims or objects’ (2005, 183) because, according to Irigaray, she does 
not allow herself ‘to be caught up again in a system of “masculine” representations’ (1985a, 
122). I have argued that she risks her flesh in order to engage with the outside, from within. 
That is to say, she cuts a line of flight from the phallocentric order in order to escape from her 
“self” as defined by the patriarchal systems of representation. She evades the risk of becoming-
phallic each time by making a feminine difference and affirming the positivity of that 
difference. The feminine nomad is a revolutionary escape artist; she can escape from her “self”, 
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from within, to touch upon the intensities of the feminine only to return to herself and express 
her “self” in ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). She marks her new territories in the 
flesh by introducing feminine differences that incite becoming-other of the other. The feminine 


































Truth is necessary for those who are so distanced from their body that they have forgotten it. But their 
“truth” immobilizes us, turns us into statues, if we can’t loose its hold on us. If we can’t defuse its power 
by trying to say, right here and now, how we are moved (Irigaray 1985a, 214).  
 
Irigaray’s quote in response to Lacan’s efforts to arrive at the truth of woman’s pleasure not 
through an appeal to real women, but to Bernini’s statue of Saint Theresa located in Rome 
(1982), neatly summarises how women have been submitted and fixed into images and models 
designed by and for men. In this drip, I will explore the potential of a feminist aesthetics of 
resistance that can challenge the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation and 
thoroughly incite the practice of becoming-woman. I will argue that we can develop this 
feminist aesthetics of resistance through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-
revolutionary art (2013) and Irigaray’s concepts of the indifferentiated woman (1985b) and the 
labial lips (1985a). Such a synthesis has an enfolded purpose: 1) to formulate a new feminist 
and artistic theorisation of resistance; and 2) to propose a different feminist artistic practice of 
resistance. This enfolded approach amounts to a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic 
practice that produces not just political art nor an aesthetic approach within political theory, 
rather, an enfolded theory-practice of art and politics ‘without any possibility of distinguishing 
what is touching from what is touched’ (Irigaray 1985a, 26); a labial art-politics (Mackenzie 
and MacKenzie 2014, 77). The feminist artistic encounters that are produced will introduce a 
new influx of labial cosmic energy capable of forcing the psychic system open to new ideas of 
subjectivity and judgement. The new ideas evoked will produce a new enfolded process of 
thinking that is à deux, which will enable us to explore the emancipation of images of woman 
as well as female imagination, pleasure and expression.  
 
In their critique of capitalism’s exploitation of desire, which is captured by the mechanisms of 
representation and Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari introduce schizoanalysis to liberate desire 
and open it up to different possibilities (2013, 311). To the extent that capitalism is always in 
flux, searching for new territories, it is understood by Deleuze and Guattari as a form of 
schizophrenia (282). However, they describe, ‘schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, 
but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death’ (283). I understand Deleuze and 
Guattari’s proposal for schizoanalysis as an invitation for multiple ways to scramble the 
schizoic flows of capitalism through an artistic practice of experimentation (367). According 
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to Zepke, art has a revolutionary potential insofar as it is schizoanalytical because it can escape 
the dominant systems of representation and become something different (2014, 32).  
  
(DRIP: In the puddle, Condensation, I employ Guattari’s work on aesthetic paradigms to 
explore art’s potential to create possibilities for new subjectivities through experimentation and 
creativity.) 
 
In terms of how schizoanalysis can sit comfortably alongside my proposal for a feminist 
aesthetics of resistance, I will develop a labial formula for a schizo-revolutionary artistic 
process that engenders new feminist artistic encounters capable of forcing us to think 
differently about women, for women, (men and others) becoming-women, and as women, (men 
and others) becoming-women. According to Deleuze and Guattari, our identity is determined 
by the social field before we reduce it to the familial identities of an oedipal triangle (2013, 
304). For Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is schizophrenic insofar as it is a form of social 
formation that deterritorializes social identities and mutates them to provide a wide range of 
social identities: ‘[o]ur society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell shampoo or 
Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable’ (282). Capitalism remains 
wedded to oedipalisation because these social identities requires personalizing in order to 
produce them as images of capital, ‘“Mister Capital, Madame Earth,” and their child the 
Worker’, with the purpose that these ‘familial determinations become the application of the 
social axiomatic’ (303). The nonconforming schizophrenic is therefore determined by capitalist 
society as a sick person confined into a clinical entity because, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, 
she or he risks  
 
unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with revolutionary 
potential, so long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market (282-3). 
 
These ‘deterritorialized flows’ of desire have the potential to demolish the phallic and capitalist 
signifiers (85). However, they are also capable of demolishing entire social sectors (139) and 
the territory of the individual (337). Which is a problem for Lorraine, with whom I agree, to 
the extent that it would be a dangerous process for women to pursue who do not have a stable 
molar identity to leave behind (1999, 186-7). In following Lorraine’s argument, there is another 
option that is presented in Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference which could offer a 
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process to challenge capitalism and destratisfy oedipalisation whilst being less dangerous for 
women.  
 
For Irigaray, the production of social identities is determined by the social field that is already 
aligned with the interests of patriarchy. Her position differs to Deleuze and Guattari’s to the 
extent that capitalism, as a form of social formation, produces social identities in connection 
with the patriarchal logos of social formations (Irigaray 1985b, 121). Irigaray says that these 
two systems of oppression operate in close connection with each other, but are first of all 
patriarchal as they contribute to the cultural, political, economic and social oppression of 
women (1985a, 221). Instead of pursuing a process of demolishing entire social sectors and the 
territory of the individual, I find there is more potential in Irigaray’s project of mapping 
feminine differences into the social sectors and the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body. 
But only insofar as we understand Irigaray’s notion of the feminine as a new and non-phallic 
model of difference. According to Irigaray, feminine desire is already ‘always something more 
and something else besides that one – sexual organ, for example – that you give them, attribute 
to them’ (29). Her description of women’s desire could be understood as already schizo-
revolutionary because  
 
it really involves a different economy more than anything else, one that upsets the linearity of a project, 
undermines the goal-object of a desire, diffuses the polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts 
fidelity to a single discourse … (29).  
 
Feminine desire therefore already escapes the Oedipal codes that society imposes on women 
because the feminine other escapes the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. By 
mapping feminine differences into the social field, we will enable an alternative approach 
toward subjectivity that will provide us with a different range of social identities liberated from 
the patriarchal logos and, thus, capitalist form of social formations. I will develop this idea of 
feminine mapping as an artistic practice of experimentation. The feminist artistic encounters 
that will be produced will engender feminine flows capable of engendering alternative female 
subjectivities in a process of becoming-woman that can resist the patriarchal and capitalist 
systems of representation.  
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, for a feminist proposal of becoming-woman which develops 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman to incorporate Irigaray’s theory of the 
feminine. Through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s two models of 
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subjectivity, I propose the idea of the feminine nomad as a model of subjectivity that recognises 
the feminine within the process of becoming-woman. This idea of the feminine nomad employs 
the figure of the nomad, rather than the figure of the schizo, because it enables me to apply 
Irigaray’s feminist project of obtaining a female personal identity by focusing on the embodied 
experience of a female subjectivity rather than Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal for a nonhuman 
sexuality through the schizophrenic’s conceptual persona. The reason I employ Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art in this drip is to develop a schizo-revolutionary 
labial theory of artistic practice that can escape patriarchal and capitalist systems of 
representation to explore processes of becoming-woman, which can engender feminine 
nomads.) 
 
According to Deleuze, the art “object” is not a recognisable object. Rather, its primary aesthetic 
characteristic is that it is a fundamental encounter that ‘can only be sensed’ (1994, 139). With 
Guattari, Deleuze explains that the ‘percepts and affects’ preserved in an artistic encounter 
makes our experience of the art “object” distinct from our experience of empirical objects 
(1994, 164). According to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[a]ffects are precisely these nonhuman 
becomings of man, just as percepts – including the town [perceived in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
(2016b)] – are nonhuman landscapes of nature’ (169). In other words,  
 
Percepts are like landscapes in which the human being as subject no longer exists and yet remains 
diffused throughout the landscape; affects are intensities that traverse individuals and go beyond ordinary 
emotions and sensations. Percepts and affects exceed lived experience and our recollections of that 
experience (Bogue 2010, 100).  
 
Percepts and affects offer pre-personal sensations that challenge our tendency to interpret art 
through representation and recognition. According to Marks, ‘[t]hese are artistic forces that 
have been freed from the organising representation framework of perceiving individuals. 
Instead, they give us access to a pre-individual world of singularities’ (2010, 230). The artistic 
encounter therefore offers us an experience of a pre-individual world. This distinct experience 
is what Zepke calls a heterogeneous duration, which does not obey representational 
knowledge-claims, coherent narrative frames and/or linear temporalities (2008, 34). The art 
“object” can therefore be understood as an assemblage of sensory affects to the extent that our 
experience of it cannot be captured by our representational thought but our thought is forced 
into involuntary movements incited by what is sensed. Preserved within the artistic encounter, 
the percepts and affects condition the artistic experience and emit the problematic signs that 
perplexes the subject and forces the emergence of thought. The new ideas that are forced into 
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thought engender a different way of thinking and acting, as they are the real conditions of the 
subject’s experience in the world. It is not that art does this, it is rather that we call it art (what 
Deleuze and Guattari mean at least) if this happens. I have argued elsewhere that this 
ontological conception of art has the revolutionary potential to transform the normative ideas 
of subjectivity and judgment that are aligned with the interests of patriarchy and capitalism 
(Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 70).  
 
(DRIP: For the understanding of patriarchy I employ, see the drip, Labial Drip, in which I refer 
to Irigaray’s feminist critique to describe that the West is built on a phallic economy (1985a, 
86). Irigaray posits that the phallus is the ultimate signifier that permeates all discourse and 
logos, constituting a phallocentric language and order that symbolically and physically 
subjugates women. Unable to articulate the feminine as feminine within this phallocentric 
symbolic order (Halsema 2013, 28), women have been submitted to representations that relate 
her to man but in ways that designate her exclusion and subordination. In measuring woman 
against man, we come to know these patriarchal images as those that represent woman as 
counterpart identities, the opposite to man, and male-others. As a consequence of this 
patriarchal system, according to Irigaray, women ‘have been assigned and taught’ their ‘form 
of “social existence”’ by ‘the society of men’ (1985a, 164). In order to explore different forms 
of expression that are not subjugated to the phallic signifier, Irigaray proposes the creation of 
a feminine symbolic space that intervenes in the phallocentric symbolic system. She explores 
the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and difference that can produce 
different modes of thinking and being. By reclaiming woman’s morphological difference, 
Irigaray argues that women can discover themselves away from the phallic signifier and 
explore ways of articulating the feminine as feminine.) 
 
(drip: For a working definition of capitalism, see the puddle, Condensation, in which I employ 
Guattari’s account of Integrated World Capitalism (IWC) to describe that capitalism has 
moved away from industrial sites of power towards structures of control (2000, 47). IWC is 
not only destroying the natural environment, it is also mentally manipulating subjects and their 
political, cultural and social relations. Guattari explains that these structures of control are 
exercised through ‘mass-media and telematic standardization, the conformism of fashion, the 
manipulation of opinion by advertising, surveys, etc.’ (35). The control these structures have 
is experienced in the production of a ‘capitalistic subjectivity’, which Guattari argues, ‘is 
manufactured to protect existence from any intrusion of events that might disturb or disrupt 
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public opinion’ (50). This capitalistic subjectivity is produced so that IWC can control the 
production of subjectivity in ‘the worlds of childhood, love, art, as well as everything 
associated with anxiety, madness, pain, death, or a feeling of being lost in the Cosmos’ (50).) 
 
In proclaiming the revolutionary potential of art, it is important to acknowledge immediately 
that artistic flows can be captured by patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. There 
are always movements of reterritorialization that follow movements of deterritorialization in 
order to overcode any difference produced so as to (re-)submit it to the systems of 
representation and establish a territory once more. According to Deleuze and Guattari,  
 
Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, 
thereby attempting, as best it can, to recede, to rechannel persons who have been defined in terms of 
abstract quantities. Everything returns or recurs: States, nations, families. … The more the capitalist 
machine deterritorializes, decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them, 
the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order, do 
their utmost to reterritorialize, absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value (2013, 
48-9). 
 
In other words, ‘[t]he merchant buys in a territory, deterritorializes products into commodities, 
and is reterritorialized on commercial circuits’ (1994, 68). The new territory that is established 
does not return to the original territory before its deterritorialization, but takes the 
deterritorialized elements and recombines them to enter into new relations (Patton 2010, 73). 
That is to say, movements of reterritorialization turn lines of flight into rigid lines to (re-)submit 
back into the systems of representation (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 226). To the extent that 
this ontological conception of the artistic encounter can resist being dominated, subordinated 
and appropriated by the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, I will argue that a 
feminist artistic practice can create lines of flights that can escape these dominant structures. 
For a hint as to how, we can look to the feminist interventions of the Guerrilla Girls that have 
recently been embraced by the art institutions that they seek to critique (see Adams 2009). The 
Guerrilla Girls are a prime example of how feminist practices are not situated outside of 
capitalism (or patriarchy), as they too can be subsumed through movements of 
reterritorialization. To the extent that the Guerrilla Girls can still present a legitimate critique 
of the art institution whilst exhibiting in them, there is merit in Guerrilla Girls’ Kahlo and 
Kollwitz’s argument that it enables them to reach a larger audience (2016) and to critique the 
art institutions direct on their walls (2010, 208). The Guerrilla Girl’s feminist critique is 
nonetheless embedded in these reterritorializations, and it is in these encounters that new lines 
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of flight can be incited. A particular example of a clear connecting line of flight can be found 
in the feminist interventions of Pussy Riot (Alyokhina 2017).  
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, in which I employ Pussy Riot as an example of reinventing 
femininity. Inspired by the masked Guerrilla Girls, Pussy Riot also cover up their faces but 
instead of wearing gorilla masks, they don colourful balaclavas (Alyokhina 2017). I argue that 
the Pussy Riot balaclava locates a labial machine, produced from the cuts in the fabric around 
the wearer’s lips and eyes, in which we can perform deterritorializations of reterritorialized 
identities by expressing ourselves in a different feminine subjectivity.) 
 
(drip: I believe that there is a critique to be made of the Guerrilla Girl’s signature gorilla mask 
relating to the Guerrilla Girl’s claim of being intersectional feminists, however such a task is 
outside the scope of this drip. The ethical implications of wearing a gorilla mask can be found 
in an interview with ex-Guerrilla Girl, Thomas, who expresses having felt uncomfortable 
wearing it as a woman of colour (2008).)   
 
I will argue that by enlivening the feminine within the artistic process, art can release labial 
machines that move in processes of deterritorializations of the dominant structures and incite 
new ideas of female subjective identity and sexuality.  
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, for an account of Riordan’s concept of the labial machine. I 
argue that the process of becoming-woman launched at the threshold of the labial machine 
explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality as well as possibilities for 
alternative subjectivities because it is cuts and draws both molar and molecular lines of flights.) 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, when movements of deterritorialization take hold, 
machines are released that can open territorial assemblages to other assemblages (2004, 367). 
They describe this rupture ‘like a set of cutting edges that insert themselves into the assemblage 
undergoing deterritorialization, and draw variations and mutations of it’ (367). Within this 
rupturing process, these cutting edges create points of escape that connect the assemblage with 
the Cosmos, thereby opening it onto new possibilities. It is within this opening that the matters 
of expression that draw the territory, enter into a process of passage and relay (356-8), during 
which the components from the territorial assemblage and the Cosmos become ‘parts and 
pieces of one another’ (2013, 367). Within this movement of deterritorialization, Zepke 
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explains that the heterogeneous components express ‘a series of relations between a territory 
and its outside that ignores subject/object distinctions’ (2008, 35). The artist and territory 
become indiscernible in this process in which they are all parts and pieces of one another, 
because there is no longer representational knowledge-claims, coherent narrative frames and/or 
linear temporalities with which to discern subject – object relations or form – content 
distinctions (34). As Deleuze and Guattari say, ‘we no longer know what is art and what nature’ 
(1994, 185). If art is understood as an experience that cannot be captured by our 
representational thought, then it has the potential to create lines of flight that can resist the 
authoritative nature of the individual artist and the commodification of art. 
 
Even though the artist makes the expression, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the artist’s 
expression is but a ‘chancy formation of a domain’ (2004, 349). The artist delineates a territory 
in order to work through their experience of territorialization. Within this movement of 
territoriality, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the art produced is ‘not the privilege of human 
beings’; rather the artist is a participant in the movement that produces a territorial mark (349). 
With the understanding that a subject does not become an artist by thinking of herself or himself 
as one, she or he becomes an artist with the heterogeneous components in the process in which 
they are all parts and pieces of one another. This phrase, ‘parts and pieces of one another’ taken 
from Deleuze and Guattari (2013, 367), is important as it describes the process of becoming an 
artist as a process of merging, in which the artist and the heterogeneous components become 
parts of one another whilst retaining pieces of their original form. To this extent, the subject 
engages in a process of becoming a co-creator and participating artist. I am borrowing these 
terms from Guattari and Zepke, who employ them in order to delegitimise the sense of authority 
that resides within the traditional idea of the artist. My engagement with Guattari’s and Zepke’s 
terms is for a similar purpose, albeit my intention is a feminist task of delegitimising the 
patriarchal idea of the artist (this patriarchal idea of the artist has been critiqued by Nochlin 
1971, 150; Pollock 2003, xix; Ettinger 2004, 71; and Parker and Pollock 2013, xviii). Zepke 
explains that the subject becomes a participating artist when she or he administers a ‘shock’ 
when she or he is ‘forced to confront alterity in and as our lives’ (2008, 42). Zepke’s description 
of the artistic experience builds upon Deleuze’s notion of the encounter by explaining that the 
subject administers a ‘shock’ when being forced to think (42). Following Guattari, this shock 
is expressed by a ‘partial enunciation,’ which indicates the subject’s transformation from a 
passive spectator into a participating artist or ‘co-creator’ (1995, 14). In order to investigate 
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what the subject finds shocking within the artistic encounter, it will be useful to turn to 
Guattari’s description of ‘mutant’ percepts and affects (91). 
 
Within the experience of the artistic encounter, mutant percepts and affects seize the spectator, 
making them part of the artistic process, and set the conditions for what can be sensed. In doing 
so, the artistic process becomes an experience of ‘affect as immanent evaluation, instead of 
judgment as transcendent value’ (Deleuze 1997a, 141). In this movement of 
deterritorialization, the affective evaluation also connects with the Cosmos through the points 
of escape, thereby enabling evaluation from the outside as well as from within. Through a 
partial access to the infinity of virtual possibilities of the Cosmos, the parts and pieces become 
lost with the cosmic forces in a movement of, what Cézanne calls, ‘iridescent chaos’ (2001, 
114). Smith describes this ‘iridescent chaos’ as ‘a collapse of visual coordinates in a universal 
variation or interaction’ (1997, xxxv). He articulates Cézanne’s description of this movement 
as that of losing  
 
oneself in the landscape, without landmarks, to the point where one no longer sees forms or even matters, 
but only forces, densities, intensities: the forces of folding in a mountain, the forces of germination in an 
apple, the thermal and magnetic forces of a landscape (xxxv).  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, these forces ‘are no longer those of the earth, … but the 
forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and energetic Cosmos’ (2004, 378). They explain, this time 
by employing the work of Klee, that the immanent experience of these forces is part of the 
artistic process: 
 
the artist turns his or her attention to the microscopic, to crystals, molecules, atoms, and particles, not for 
scientific conformity, but for movement, for nothing but immanent movement; the artist tells him- or 
herself that this world has had different aspects, will have still others, and that there are already others 
on other planets; finally, the artist opens up to the Cosmos in order to harness forces in a “work” (372).  
 
The immanent movement that can be evaluated is that which can be sensed, therefore the 
evaluation rests on the conditions enabled by the mutant percepts and affects. This immanent 
evaluation is described by Deleuze as a matter of ‘evaluating every being, every action and 
passion, even every value, in relation to the life which they involve’ (1997a, 141). According 
to Smith, ‘[a]ffects and percepts are thus the genetic and immanent elements constitutive of a 
life’ (1997, xxxv). The life constituted by the mutant percepts and affects envelops the subject, 
revealing a different experience of the world. This is what, then, makes the artistic experience 
with difference or otherness, a shocking encounter.  
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Evaluating every-thing related to the life constituted by the mutant percepts and affects does 
not mean that what is produced henceforth becomes all-knowing about that life. The access to 
the Cosmos is only partial, not complete, because there is still a partial connection to the 
territorial assemblage. This partial connection is important as it maintains our engagement in 
the world and is how we can engender change within it. There is a danger, however, of arbitrary 
selection. The cosmic forces that are available to enter into a process of passage and relay are 
content dependent upon the life constituted by the mutant percepts and affects. Given that this 
evaluation is of every-thing, not every available cosmic force can be selected because of the 
risk of forming a ‘black hole’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 368). Deleuze and Guattari explain 
that a ‘black hole’ can be formed  
 
under conditions of precocious or extremely sudden deterritorialization, and when … cosmic paths are 
blocked; the machine then produces “individual” group effects spinning in circles, … [expressing] 
nothing more than the resonance of the black hole in which they are trapped (368).  
 
Therefore, I suggest the forces that can be selected are evaluated through experiencing their 
power to affect and be affected, in which this process of selection becomes a process described 
by Braidotti that ‘asserts the affirmative, joyful affects over and above the negative ones’ 
(2010, 307).  
 
This mode of selection is not judgmental, because it is immanent to the process and cannot be 
captured by our representational thought. Moreover, it is not conceptual in which involves a 
determinative judgment, because we can never know in advance what new forces are selected 
nor can we predict the outcome of the regrouping. We can instead understand this process of 
selection as the ‘combats-between’ forces (Deleuze 1997b, 132). As Deleuze claims ‘it is 
combat that replaces judgment,’ and the ‘combat-between is the process through which a force 
enriches itself by seizing hold of other forces and joining itself to them in a new ensemble: a 
becoming’ (132). It entails an approach that selects the affirmative forces within the process of 
combat-between, which is taking place in the movement of iridescent chaos, to enter into the 
process of passage and relay. I will argue that this method of passage and relay consists of the 
ordering and disordering of the readymade; where new affirmative forces take the place of 
existing forces that have been evaluated as negative and will not bring anything new to the 
territorial assemblage. Through this affirmative process of reinventing a different readymade, 
 55 
I propose that the expression of a territorial mark does not end the process, but rather enriches 
the artistic ensemble so as to incite a new artistic encounter(s) or becoming(s). 
 
Guattari describes this artistic process as the ‘autonomisation of the components of 
unconscious subjectivity, and the subjective autonomisation relative to the aesthetic object’ 
(1995, 13). This ‘autonomisation’ can be understood as the effect of the artistic experience in 
which the artist is enveloped. Seized by the mutant percepts and affects, Guattari explains that 
they take ‘“possession of the author” to engender a certain mode of aesthetic enunciation’ (14). 
Engendered through affective evaluation, Deleuze says that this artistic process proceeds ‘as if 
the [artist’s] hand assumed an independence and began to be guided by other forces, making 
marks that no longer depend on either our will or our sight’ (2005, 71). A partial enunciation is 
therefore no longer specific to a semiotic register but can be expressed in other domains as 
enunciative substances of a machinic order (Guattari 1995, 24). Guattari describes these 
domains as extra-linguistic, non-human, biological, technological, aesthetic, etc. (24). To this 
extent, Deleuze explains that the marks produced ‘are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, 
random. They are nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative’ (2005, 71). The shock that 
is expressed by a partial enunciation cannot be recognised as being administered from the 
subject because it becomes part of ‘the machinic assemblage of enunciation, [which] 
agglomerates these different partial enunciations and installs itself, as it were, before and 
alongside the subject-object relation’ (Guattari 1995, 24). Guattari does however describe this 
‘machinic assemblage of enunciation’ as a ‘machinic subjectivity,’ which posits the mutant 
affects and percepts as pre-personal components that can make possible a becoming of artist 
and art (24). It is in this sense that Guattari describes art as an event that produces ‘mutant 
centres of subjectivation’ (1996, 200), from which new intensities are extorted and being is 
summoned to exist differently (1995, 96).  
 
Zepke further describes this process as schizoanalytical, as it entails the ‘“art” of making 
something … escape from its “self”’ (2014, 32). This does not mean that the subject will die 
in a movement of deterritorialization, or that the work produced is no-thing. Instead, it is an 
artistic process of escaping dominant systems of representation: to make something escape 
from its ‘self’ as defined by normative models and images. That is to say, what can be created 
can escape ‘the gravity of its self-evidence’ and become something different (2008, 42). This 
schizoanalytical artistic practice is therefore a transformational process that can open up new 
possibilities for thinking and being. It is an artistic process that, according to Deleuze and 
 56 
Guattari’s description of the schizophrenic process, can provide ‘the potential for revolution’ 
(2013, 388). Understanding artistic practice in this way will enable us to rethink what we mean 
by art generally speaking; or, more particularly, what we mean by art objects, the artist, and art 
practice. I argue for an understanding of art as an experience of the artistic process; the artist 
as the ‘artist-as-process’ (Cutler 2013, 356); and the artistic practice as ‘schizo-revolutionary’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 420-1).  
 
(DRIP: See Zepke (2014) for a description of schizo-revolutionary artistic practice.) 
 
(drip: For further discussion of Cutler’s term, the ‘artist-as-process’, see the puddle, 
Condensation. In emphasising the potential that Guattari gives to the artist in The Three 
Ecologies as capable of transforming the normative ideas produced by a dominant mass-media 
subjectivity (2000), Cutler proposes her term to  
 
clarify that it is not the concept of an artist as a creative “self” that is at issue, rather that it is in the 
processes of creative construction that de-regulation can occur (2013a, 356).  
 
That is to say, transformation occurs not through the artist wishing it into existence, but by 
participating in the artistic processes.) 
 
However, before we frame the schizo-revolutionary artistic practice as a feminist artistic 
practice, we must specify exactly what is at stake within this experience of the schizo-
revolutionary artistic process. I argue that this specification can be achieved by understanding 
schizo-revolutionary artistic process as the indifferent/ciated organisation of the Cosmos. 
 
The term indifferent/ciated includes both the t and the c because, as I will explain, the artistic 
process becomes the dynamic between the undifferentiated chaos and the differenciated order. 
Although Deleuze employs these terms to describe the virtuality and actuality of an Idea, I will 
be using them to describe the approach of an artistic process of indifferent/ciation. According 
to Deleuze, ‘differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, 
differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions’ 
(1994, 209). He introduces ‘the complex notion of different/ciation’ to explain that difference 
contains two parts:  
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The t and the c here are the distinctive feature or the phonological relation of difference in person. Every 
object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual 
image and the other an actual image (209). 
 
This virtual content is able to be actualised because the problem that resides within the Idea is 
determined (differentiated), however its actualisation cannot be exact because the problem 
might not be ‘“solved”, and thereby remains undifferenciated’ (280). It is in this sense that 
Deleuze claims that Ideas are ‘distinct-obscure’ (280). Deleuze says that the process of 
actualisation therefore 
 
always takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation … [which] breaks with resemblance as a 
process no less than it does with identity as a principle … In this sense, actualisation or differenciation 
is always a genuine creation (212).  
 
This process of actualisation is not that of representing the Idea, because its virtual content 
cannot be represented, so it must be expressed in difference.  
 
In the context of an artistic process of actualisation, it may be that there is a risk of the artistic 
process expressing difference through a differenciated order or an undifferenciated chaos. On 
the one hand, expressing difference through a differenciated order that proceeds by way of 
succession, as Deleuze describes: ‘one “before” and the other “after”. It is from this point of 
view that the second is said to resemble the first’ (1994, 124). This approach thereby risks 
subordinating any expression of difference to the Same. Such an approach would suppress the 
forces of the Cosmos and end the process. This would be an approach privileged by the artist-
as-chooser and would result in a “finished” art object.  
 
(DRIP: In describing this approach of reducing difference to the same, I am suggesting that the 
operation of the differenciated order is based upon Irigaray’s description of the logic of the 
Same (1985a, 74).) 
 
On the other hand, expressing difference through an undifferenciated chaos proceeds by way 
of indetermination, producing an expression which is incomprehensible or schizophrenic. This 
approach differentiates by actualising a virtuality that is too complex, thereby subordinating 
any expression of difference to indifference. This approach is described by Deleuze and 
Guattari as one in which  
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one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a jumble of lines and sounds; then instead of producing a 
cosmic machine capable of “rendering sonorous,” one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends 
up reproducing nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds (2004, 379). 
 
Such an approach threatens a sudden deterritorialization and the formation of a black hole, 
thus, blocking the cosmic paths. Instead, I will propose that it is a dynamic between the 
differenciated order and the undifferentiated chaos that has an organisation to it through a 
selection of the, in principle, infinite possibilities of the Cosmos. This artistic organisation 
works between the territory and the outside to organise the territorial assemblage as composed 
chaos (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 204). This approach will develop Zepke’s concept of the 
readymade by arguing that we need to bring the made out of the readymade; not in order to 
return to the artist-as-maker, but to posit that new existential territories are always ready-to-be-
made. It is in this sense that the artistic process is indifferent/ciated because it involves a 
process of working in-between the virtuality and the actuality of the readymade. 
 
The readymade described by Zepke is different to the readymade defined by Duchamp (1973). 
According to Duchamp, art was produced for ‘the service of the mind’ (1998, 274), to which 
any ordinary object could become a work of art if it is the artist’s conceptual choice or 
‘nomination’ (1973, 32). Art, in this sense, becomes ‘complete anaesthesia’; where its affects 
(and aesthetics) are completely subtracted from art (141). Contrary to Duchamp’s claim is 
Zepke’s articulation of the readymade as ‘affectual’ (2008, 36). Through its aesthetic excess, 
Zepke describes this affectual readymade as a ‘war machine of a politics of sensation that 
Duchamp and Conceptual art’s “informational” readymades in fact counteract’ (36).  
 
(DRIP: The concept war machine that Zepke is employing comes from Deleuze and Guattari. 
In their description, Deleuze and Guattari explain that their concept can be defined according 
to its two poles: when the war machine ‘takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction 
prolongable to the limits of the universe’, this is the case when it is appropriated by the State, 
and; when the war machine ‘has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, 
the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space’, this is the 
case when it is directed against the State (2004, 466). I believe the concept of the war machine 




The aesthetic excess of the affectual readymade provides the available materials from the 
territory with which to make an artistic encounter. Not in the sense that any of the territory’s 
available materials can be elevated to the status of art, as would be Duchamp’s version of the 
readymade. Rather, the territory’s materials are ready-to-be-made. In this sense, the territory is 
always a readymade.  
 
To the extent that the selected cosmic forces cannot be represented but are experienced within 
the movement of iridescent chaos, the artistic problem becomes one of harnessing them in a 
territorial mark. By working with the territory as readymade, the cosmic forces can be 
preserved as percepts and affects through a process of material appropriation. It is through 
preserving the percepts and affects of the cosmic forces that we can introduce difference into 
the territorial assemblage in order to engender change within the world. Deleuze and Guattari 
explain this process of marking the territory with its available materials as borrowing weapons 
in order to yield vision or sensation (1994, 204). This artistic process raises the ‘lived 
perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the affect’ (170). They describe this operation 
as ‘the moment the artist connects material with forces of consistency or consolidation’ in order 
to form a synthesizer of ‘the molecular and the cosmic, material and force’ (2004, 379-80). The 
synthesizer is an assemblage that ‘unites disparate elements in the material, and transposes the 
parameters from one formula to another’, that is, it produces the process (378). Deleuze and 
Guattari warn that this gesture must be a sober one so as to avoid producing a scrambling and 
a black hole (379). They say, 
 
Your synthesis of disparate elements will be all the stronger if you proceed with a sober gesture, an act 
of consistency, capture, or extraction that works in a material that is not meagre but prodigiously 
simplified, creatively limited, selected (380).  
 
It is not about using all the available materials in the territory, because this will overdo it and 
suppress the cosmic forces. Rather, it is about ‘sufficiently’ deterritorializing the material in 
order for it ‘to be molecularized and open onto something cosmic, instead of lapsing into a 
statistical heap’ (379). It is to this extent that Deleuze and Guattari claim that the synthesizer 
takes ‘the place of the ground in a priori synthetic judgment: its synthesis is of the molecular 
and the cosmic, material and force, not form and matter, Grund and territory’ (379). The 
material is only important insofar as it preserves the percepts and affects of the cosmic forces. 
In their description of the synthesizer, I believe Deleuze and Guattari are urging us to consider 
the synthesizer as a ‘force of the Cosmos’ which can ‘make thought travel’ (379). To this extent, 
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we could posit that the synthesizer is what makes the artistic encounter ‘something in the world 
that forces us to think’ (Deleuze 1994, 139).  
 
By harnessing the cosmic forces in the territorial assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari explain 
that the cosmic forces become ‘directional components’ (2004, 344-5), which enrich the 
readymade by resolving the combat experienced in the movement of iridescent chaos, without 
suppressing the cosmic forces or ending the process of passage and relay. Consequently, the 
directional components are the force of the Cosmos that blows otherness through the system 
and opens up the virtuality of the readymade. This changes the direction in the ordering and 
disordering of the readymade which makes possible transformations from one territory to 
another. It is in this sense that Zepke claims that ‘the readymade is in constant contact with a 
multiplicity of possible futures’ (2008, 35). The process of marking delineates a new existential 
territory, producing an actualisation of the virtuality opened up in the readymade. I argue that 
it is when a territorial mark is made that the indifferent/ciated organisation moves from 
indifferentiated to indifferenciated, and it is only this expression that can incite a becoming of 
art and subject. That is to say, a territorial mark marks a transition from a virtual artistic 
organisation as indifferentiated, to an actualised artistic organisation as indifferenciated. In 
doing so, the territorial assemblage is (re)organised, in which the directional components 
transform into ‘dimensional components’ and become expressive (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 
345). This transformative artistic process is what, according to O’Sullivan, produces art as ‘an 
event that actualises a set of virtualities and in so doing expresses a possible world’ (2006, 
130).  
 
However, this does not mean that the process is thereby complete. There is always a 
reterritorializing attack by patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, which subsumes 
the artistic ensemble. It is therefore necessary to continue this artistic process as 
indifferent/ciated in order to endlessly renew the artistic organisation. The upshot is that the 
territorial mark is described by Guattari as a ‘double enunciation’ (1995, 55), which expresses 
a new existential territory and the virtuality of that affectual readymade. It is within the 
virtuality of the readymade that this artistic process can (re)connect to the infinite possibilities 
of the Cosmos and renew the artistic organisation. This double enunciation can therefore 
produce schisms within the artistic organisation in which, Deleuze and Guattari explain, some 
of the dimensional components can always give way to ‘components of passage’ that can incite 
new processes of passage and relay and with it, new possibilities of difference (2004, 345). 
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They claim that these particular dimensional components have remained ‘functional and 
transitory’ because they are ‘tied to a type of action (sexuality, aggressiveness, flight)’ (347). 
Their functions, when territorialized, acquire an autonomy that can suddenly draw a line of 
deterritorialization (354-9). These particular dimensional components can thus escape the 
movement of reterritorialization. I would add that these particular dimensional components are 
feminine because Deleuze and Guattari describe that they can enliven a process of 
deterritorialization in which components of passage and relay produce an ‘innovative opening 
of the territory onto the female’ (358). In making this argument, I will claim that this process 
of deterritorialization releases a labial machine by invoking Irigaray’s theory of the labial lips. 
As a result, a work of art is never “finished” because it is always in the process of escaping and 
becoming different. The nature of the indifferent/ciated artistic process can now be thought of 
as a mixed two-way process of working within the ordering and disordering of the readymade. 
To this extent, new existential territories can continually be constructed from the affectual 
readymade in a process of organising that Guattari says requires ‘an untiring renewal’ (1995, 
56). Therefore, this indifferent/ciated artistic process can also be thought of as a process of 
working within the ordering and disordering of possible worlds. Accordingly, the value of what 
is produced in this indifferent/ciated artistic process will never be subsumed within capitalist 
and patriarchal structures because these have already been left behind in the (re)organisation 
of a new world with new systems of valorization. That is, in following Guattari’s proposal for 
new existential systems of value, what is created will be valued according to its ‘existential 
productions that cannot be determined simply in terms of abstract labour-time or by an 
expected capitalist profit’ (2000, 65). 
 
I have described this artistic practice elsewhere as a methodology of ‘writing within, rather 
than about, the structures that condition our experience’ (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 71). 
With MacKenzie, I argued that this “art” can be thought of as learning the art of expressing 
ideas as problems (71). I propose that this methodology of expressing ideas as problems 
enables us a way of making sense of these ideas by preserving them as problems in artistic 
encounters. This methodology therefore becomes an artistic process of learning that can 
produce new processes of engaging with the ideas that structure our experience. I suggest that 
by transforming the way we experience and engage with the world, we also transform our way 
of thinking to engage with these ideas in art. However, artists face the reterritorializing habits 
of mind that, as Braidotti notes, aim to re-present reality to itself by equating the ideas to a pre-
established normative model (1994, 101). Given the pervasiveness of patriarchal forms of 
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thought, this artistic process could be applied as a feminist methodology of creating within the 
patriarchal structures that condition our thought. Applied in this way, I argue that one of the 
tasks of feminist art as a practice of resistance is to learn how to think schizoanalytically (in 
order to think difference).  
 
In order to explore the ways in which this schizo-revolutionary artistic process can be sustained 
as a form of feminist resistance that can engender becomings-woman, it is necessary to 
consider what it means to think from within the labial. By employing this expression within 
theory, we invoke the work of Irigaray.  
 
(DRIP: For overviews of the connection between Irigaray’s explicitly feminist project and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of difference, see Braidotti 1994, Colebrook 2000, Grosz 
1994b, Lorraine 1999, and Olkowski 2000. For more recent discussions see also Jenkins 2016, 
MacCormack 2010, Stark 2017, and Von Samsonow 2019. The differences between these 
accounts can be found in the authors’ development of the connection that articulate their 
individual proposed feminist projects. Braidotti proposes feminist nomadism which argues for 
a feminist nomadic subject that can ‘conjugate the multilayered, multicultural perspective, with 
responsibility for and accountability to their gender’ (1994, 32); Colebrook suggests a different 
way of asking the question of sexual difference; Grosz develops corporeal feminism to argue 
that the body marks a site for becomings (1994b, 167); Lorraine suggests a visceral philosophy 
which opens up new ways of thinking about subjectivity as an embodied, dynamic process, 
that overcomes mind/body dualisms (1999); Olkowski proposes the possibility of the ruin of 
representation, such as the representation of sexual difference (1999, 2); Jenkins develops the 
idea that desire is overlaid by energies of sexual difference, which are a ‘driving force behind 
the material manifestations of cultural production in practices as diverse as art or economy’ 
(2016, 4); MacCormack offers the idea of ‘becoming-vulva’ as a way of thinking the flesh 
(2010, 94); Stark introduces a new way to think about sexual difference by focusing on the 
figure of the girl in Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman (2017, 4); and Von Samsonow 
proposes a ‘feminist counterpart’ to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus through her project, 
Anti-Electra, which (also) focuses on the figure of the girl as the potential for another symbolic 
order (2019, xxiv).) 
 
Arguing that the phallus is the ultimate signifier that permeates all discourse and logos (1985a, 
86), Irigaray explores the labial as the potential for different forms of expression that can 
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produce alternative modes of thinking and being. It is important to note that Irigaray 
investigates the labial not ‘as merely the female counterpart of the phallus’ (Joy 2013, 77), but 
as a new and non-phallic model of difference. Irigaray claims ‘[i]t is not a matter of producing 
a discourse of which woman would be the object or the subject’ (1985a, 135), or creating 
representations of the feminine subject in order to “know” the nature of woman, or to claim 
that there is one. Instead it is an exploration for different forms of expression that can produce 
alternative modes of thinking and being that are not subjugated to the phallic signifier. The 
feminine in this model is not understood as man’s counterpart, opposite, and other, but as the 
other of the other (Richardson 1998, 104). Braidotti explains that Irigaray invests in the 
feminine as ‘the sole force that can break the eternal return of the Same and its classical Others’ 
(2011, 283). Therefore, in pursuing the argument that thinking from within the labial could 
break our reterritorializing habits of mind, I agree that it is in the feminine difference 
engendered by exploring the labial that we can resist the reterritorializing movements of the 
patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation.  
 
It is important to note Riordan’s description that labial machines can be located on all bodies: 
on the face, female genitals, and cuts etc., and so everybody can connect to the intensities of 
the feminine (2011, 85-7). Therefore, a feminist artistic practice is not only for women, but for 
everybody to create new movements of flight that can escape the patriarchal and capitalist 
systems of representation. By employing the term labial machine, Riordan invokes the concept 
of an abstract machine from Deleuze and Guattari. To the extent that abstract machines are 
defined by ‘the cutting edges of decoding and deterritorialization. They draw these cutting 
edges’ (2004, 562), Riordan claims how labial machines are also defined by their two cutting 
edges in relation to castration (2011, 84). According to Riordan,  
 
Irigaray’s argument that the feminine is coded within masculine parameters in two contradictory but 
related ways – as lack and leak. Within this code, cutting would create lack and leak, tomb and womb 
simultaneously (83). 
 
In other words, the labial machine cuts and ‘draws both molar and molecular lines’ creating a 
‘becoming-woman via contagion with the microfeminine [that] need not subtract from woman, 
whose becoming-woman proceeds from her own sexually specific cartography’ (85). The 
cutting edges of a labial machine insert themselves into the assemblage undergoing 
deterritorialization, drawing variations and mutations that produce this process of becoming-
woman. I would add that labial machines produce openings of the territory into the female 
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because Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘female’ when describing the operation that opens 
the territory onto the Cosmos (2004, 358).  
 
By describing the opening of the territory onto the Cosmos as opening onto the female, we can 
now further liken the access of the labial machine to the access to the Cosmos by explaining 
that labial machines can only be partially accessed because they are partially hidden inside the 
body. Both provide a partial access to the, in principle, infinity of virtual possibilities of the 
Cosmos, or the, in principle, infinity of virtual possibilities of the female. Furthermore, the 
labial machine, like the Cosmos, provides an escape from the patriarchal and capitalist systems 
of representation because Irigaray explains that it presents ‘the horror of nothing to see’ 
(1985a, 26). By escaping the territories of representation, the labial machine offers an 
experience that can only be sensed. In this respect, I will return to Guattari’s description of 
‘mutant’ percepts and affects in order to frame the ‘mutant’ as labial. Labial affects are 
nonhuman becomings of man because they offer a becoming-woman launched at the threshold 
of the labial machine, that explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality 
as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities. Labial percepts are nonhuman landscapes 
of nature because they offer access to a ‘smooth labial space of pure difference’ (Mackenzie 
and MacKenzie 2014, 74). That is to say, by escaping the territories of representation, the labial 
machine accesses a destratified space: a smooth space. Deleuze and Guattari describe the 
‘smooth space’ as ‘a space without borders or enclosure’, in which its ‘essential feature’ is its 
‘variability, the polyvocality of directions’ (2004, 420-1). They also describe the smooth space 
as ‘a tactile space, or rather “haptic,” a sonorous much more than a visual space’ (421), which, 
I argue, is in tune with the smooth space accessed by a labial machine. To this extent, I propose 
that everybody can find in their labial machines a movement of escape from their “self” as 
defined by patriarchal and capitalist logos of social formations, from within. According to 
Guattari, the ‘the aesthetic paradigm’ is ‘the creation and composition of mutant percepts and 
affects’, which ‘has become the paradigm for every possible form of liberation’ (1995, 91). 
Therefore, in creating and composing labial percepts and affects, we will produce an aesthetic 
paradigm for women’s liberation from patriarchal and capitalist ideas of subjectivity and 
judgment. Accordingly, this labial theory of artistic process can provide a practical feminist 
application of Deleuze and Guattari’s formula for schizoanalysis.  
 
To the extent that this movement of deterritorialization engenders an experience of being lost 
with the cosmic forces in ‘iridescent chaos’ (Cézanne 2001, 114), I argue that the labial 
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machine engenders an experience of being lost with the labial cosmic forces. Insofar that the 
labial cosmic forces are tied to her sexuality, I will now turn to Grosz to posit that the process 
of selection within a feminist artistic process can be understood as ‘sexual selection’ (2008, 
33). According to Grosz, sexual selection produces and explores excesses ‘for no reason other 
than their possibilities for intensification, their appeal’ (33). Therefore, the cosmic forces that 
are available to select in this excess are found as ‘pleasurable and intensifying qualities that 
can be used to adorn both territory and body’ (102). This excess described by Grosz can be 
allied to the aesthetic excess described by Zepke (2008, 36), making the affectual readymade 
a labial machine that has as its object the cutting and drawing of creative molar and molecular 
lines of flight, the composition of a smooth labial space and of the movement of feminine 
nomads in that space (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 466, my revision). Furthermore, this excess 
can therefore be likened to the disruptive excess posited by Irigaray that follows a feminine 
fluid “style” that ‘resists and explodes every firmly established form, figure, idea or concept’ 
(1985a, 78-9). According to Irigaray, this style ‘of course, is not a style at all, according to the 
traditional way of looking at things’, because it ‘does not privilege sight; instead, it takes each 
figure back to its source, which is among other things tactile’ (78-9).  
 
From Grosz, we can understand that the process of sexual selection becomes about selecting 
forces by experiencing their power to intensify pleasure. Given that the immanent evaluation 
is of every-thing related to the life constituted by the labial percepts and affects, not every labial 
cosmic force can be selected because of the risk of the experience being too intense. This could 
result in blocking the cosmic paths because, Grosz explains, it puts the ‘life [constituted by the 
labial percepts and affects] at risk for the sake of intensification, for the sake of sensation itself’ 
(2008, 63). In the event that the cosmic paths are blocked, the cosmic forces that have been 
selected will no longer be cosmic. By losing their cosmic difference, these forces become 
negative and will not bring anything new to the territorial assemblage. Such an approach risks 
the expression of a differenciated order, because it suppresses the possibility of difference 
offered by the labial cosmic forces for the sake of a pleasurable and intense climax that ends 
the process. According to Irigaray’s critique of the logic of the Same, I argue that this approach 
could also be thought of as phallocentric: not only does it subjugate the labial cosmic forces 
for the sake of the one climax, as a result it reproduces the same.  
 
(DRIP: By italicising the one, I refer to the way Irigaray describes the male organ:  
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The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of the proper meaning 
… supplants, while separating and dividing, that contact of at least two (lips) which keeps woman in 
touch with herself, but without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched 
(1985a, 26).) 
 
That is not to say, however, that the only way to experience the labial cosmic forces fully is to 
completely escape. This would enable the body and territory to escape the practice of 
representation defined by patriarchal and capitalist systems and be fully immersed with the life 
constituted by the labial percepts and affects, but this would ultimately risk the life of the 
subject and the art. Such an approach risks the expression of an undifferenciated chaos, because 
it would entail the creation of a black hole (of death) or artistic qualities that are 
incomprehensible (schizophrenic). The point of this feminist artistic process is not to abandon 
personal identity, not least until we all have a personal identity that we can abandon, but to 
assert a female personal identity as part of the process of creating alternative subjectivities that 
leave all territories of patriarchal and capitalist representation behind. 
 
This process of sexual selection can instead be explored through a method of combats-between 
labial cosmic forces. In accord with Irigaray’s description of women’s sexual multiplicity, this 
approach to female pleasure does not entail a ‘choice’ between ‘clitoral activity and vaginal 
passivity,’ but instead moves between the multiple different ‘caresses’ that can invoke ‘the 
hystericization of her entire body’ (1985a, 28). This process of combats-between overturns the 
judgment that her body sex is ‘zero,’ because her ‘sex organs’ can be located ‘more or less 
everywhere’ (28). Moving between her multiple sex organs avoids focusing on one sex organ 
that ends the process in one climax, and instead explores her body sex as ‘a thousand tiny 
sexes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 235) which can continue and enrich the process. I propose 
that we can understand this method of combats-between as caresses-between to incorporate 
Irigaray’s description of women’s sexual multiplicity into this artistic approach to female 
pleasure. The immanent evaluation, therefore, draws the affirmative labial cosmic forces 
together in a ‘close embrace’ of a combat of sexual energies (354), enriching the artistic 
ensemble to incite a new feminist artistic encounter(s) or becoming(s)-woman.  
 
In harnessing the labial cosmic forces in the territorial assemblage, they become directional 
components that blows the otherness of labial cosmic energy through the system and opens up 
the virtuality of the readymade, which makes possible transformations from one territory to 
another in a becoming-woman. When the territorial assemblage is (re)organised, the directional 
components transform into dimensional components and become expressive of her sexual 
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multiplicity. This expression of female sexuality develops my argument that particular 
dimensional components are labial (still feminine) because they are tied to her sexual action. 
In making this development, I argue that these dimensional components function like labial 
machines that produce openings of the territory onto the female. Suggesting once more that 
this argument could explain why Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘female’ when describing 
the operation that opens the territory onto the Cosmos (2004, 358).  
 
As there is no single model of female sexuality, it is through her sexual multiplicity that the/a 
woman is indifferentiated (Irigaray 1985b, 227). Neither open (undifferentiated) nor closed 
(differenciated), her morphology is determined as indeterminate (indifferentiated) (229). Lost 
in the movement of escape within a labial machine, the subject and the territory become 
indiscernible because they are in her ‘zone of … indifferentiation where one can no longer be 
distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule…’ (Deleuze 1997b, 1). It is in this space 
of pure difference that provides the momentary experience of woman, and it is from this 
experience that can incite a becoming-woman. That is to say, this experience related to the 
labial affects and percepts bears witness to her morphological difference. By experiencing the 
world from the viewpoint that does not have a representation because, as Braidotti says, women 
have ‘never managed to gain powers of discursive representation’ (2011, 232), thought is 
forced to think her feminine difference. I propose that a way of thinking through this process 
of becoming-woman is by embodying it in Irigaray’s idea of the ‘self-caressing’ labial lips 
(1985a, 24). 
 
Labias are different in that their folds are plural, have no center, and are different in and of 
themselves. The ‘two lips’ of the labia are in fact ‘neither one nor two’ and this ‘keeps woman 
in touch with herself, but without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what 
is touched’ (26). It is taking place ‘all the time’ because the two lips are in ‘continuous contact’ 
(24). By sacrificing no lip over the other, no one of her pleasures to another, she is able to 
identify herself with none of them in particular, but rather always an ever-folding becoming 
‘of never being simply one’ (31). Without knowing (never “knowing”), she is already ‘several,’ 
but these are identities that cannot be dispersed because the other within her is already 
becoming something else (31).  
 
The lips are in a ceaseless exchange with each other, each expressing a continuous differential 
enactment of singularities that are enunciated involuntarily:  
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She steps ever so slightly aside from herself with a murmur, an exclamation, a whisper, a sentence left 
unfinished ... When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. From another point of pleasure, or 
of pain (29).  
 
The points of pleasure or pain that she sets off from are important, I argue, as they each indicate 
the incorporation of the methods of combats-between employed from Deleuze (1997b, 132) 
and caresses-between employed from Irigaray (1985a, 28) to explain the multiple possibilities 
of movement between and within female pleasure. Each singular expression is unable to be 
distinguished from which lip it was expressed, therefore what is enunciated can only be partial. 
That is not to say that two (or more) partial enunciations expressed together, as a unit, can make 
one whole (something that can be understood within the phallic symbolic order). For Irigaray 
claims, while they are ‘contiguous’, what they express is not the same (29). What is expressed 
between them has an enfolded meaning, ‘an “other meaning”’ (29) that expresses a difference. 
It is these enfolded partial enunciation(s) that make her ‘whimsical, incomprehensible, agitated, 
capricious ... leaving “him” unable to discern the coherence of any meaning’ (28-9). This labial 
language of difference cannot be understood by the phallic symbolic order, because it speaks 
from the smooth labial space that is outside of the patriarchal territories of representation. 
Instead, following Guattari’s description of artistic process, it can be understood as belonging 
to an enfolded ‘logic of non-discursive [sexual] intensities’ and ‘vectors of partial [female] 
subjectivity’ (1995, 22). To the extent that the labial lips are in touch with the infinite 
possibilities of the female, they can be thought of as already in touch with the infinite 
possibilities of the Cosmos. I propose that this cosmic difference is what makes feminine 
difference able to rise to the feminist problem posed by Braidotti as that of freeing  
 
“woman” from the subjugated position of annexed “other,” so as to make her expressive of a different 
difference, of pure difference, of an entirely new plane of becoming, out of which differences can 
multiply and differ from each other (1994, 115).  
 
Understood in this way, it is through her self-caressing lips that she can set ‘off in all directions’ 
(Irigaray 1985a, 29) towards a ‘multiplicity of possible futures’ (Zepke 2008, 35). 
 
The process of becoming occurs in the smooth labial space, but, as Deleuze and Guattari 
explain, ‘all progress is made by and in the striated space’ (2004, 536-7). The partial access of 
the labial machine is only partial because there is still a partial connection to the rest of the 
body. This can be described as the connection to the striated space as it is how we maintain an 
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engagement in the world and engender change within it. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the 
striated space is rendered homogeneous through its ‘parallel forces’ which striate ‘all of space 
in all of its directions’ by ‘formalizing all the other dimensions’ according to the ‘center of 
gravity’ (408). In other words, the directional components selected from the smooth labial 
space are transformed into expressive dimensional components in the striated space. This 
necessary operation preserves the labial affects and percepts of the labial cosmic forces into a 
feminist artistic encounter and introduces a labial cosmic difference into the territorial 
assemblage. It is when a territorial mark is made that her morphology transforms from 
indifferentiated to indifferenciated, and it is only this expression that can incite a becoming-
woman. By expressing a labial cosmic difference, her morphology becomes definite and 
defined as difference. Her morphological difference is not, cannot, be understood by 
patriarchal forms of thought insofar as it is difference.  
 
Although this is a necessary operation, Deleuze and Guattari warn us that it can run risks of 
closure or stoppage (536). They caution that  
 
You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter 
organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signified, attributions that 
reconstitute a subject (10). 
 
That is to say, parallel forces can work in accordance with patriarchal and capitalist structures 
to the extent that they discontinue the change of direction in the ordering and disordering of 
the readymade, by formalising the labial cosmic forces according to a center that is fixed upon 
the logic of capital and the phallic as ultimate signifiers. To this extent, any difference or 
progress produced from the smooth labial space will be reterritorialized in the triumph of 
phallogocentrism and the law of capital (411), thereby reproducing the female body in the 
territories of representation that, Grosz explains, judge and re-present her in models and images 
designed by and for men (1989, xx). Braidotti claims that this is the necessary structural 
operation of the phallogocentric system: to represent her difference as other, subjugated and 
pejorative (1994, 80). 
 
However, Braidotti explains that what is ‘troublesome’ in the patriarchal and capitalist systems 
of representation is that ‘[s]he is morphologically dubious’ (80). There are always opportunities 
for openings on the striated space because, according to Irigaray, the ‘geography of her pleasure 
is far more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is 
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commonly imagined’ (1985a, 28). In agreement with Braidotti and Irigaray, I propose that 
these opportunities are produced as the territorialized function(s) of the labial dimensional 
components acquire an autonomy and enliven processes of deterritorializations which create 
openings, or in other words, smooth patches in the striated space. By following Deleuze and 
Guattari’s description of the resistance of the smooth space (2004, 411), it can be said that 
enlivening the feminine process releases labial machines that open the territory onto the female, 
in which the smooth labial space can reconquer the properties of contact that free it from the 
patriarchal and capitalist structures. In this movement of escape, she becomes lost in her zone 
of indifferentiation, in which she experiences becoming woman again (and again…). Through 
a process of caressing-within, she is able to (re-)discover her labial cosmic difference and 
introduce it into a new assemblage. In a movement of territorialization, she reclaims her 
morphological difference by expressing it as affirmative, joyful, and empowering. This 
territorial mark not only expresses the indifferentiated woman as indifferenciated, that incites 
a becoming-woman, but it also delineates the transformation from one assemblage to another 
that can be described as ‘the becoming-imperceptible of women becoming-women’ 
(Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 74). Her territorial mark therefore expresses an enfolded 
enunciation that, according to Braidotti, marks ‘a process of simultaneous exiting from the 
phallogocentric premises and of asserting and thus creating new territories’ (2002, 111). 
Accordingly, the process of becoming in the reimparted smooth labial space becomes an 
enfolded becoming of (at least) two: the becoming-imperceptible of women becoming-women. 
As a result, the indifferenciated woman never emerges as one, whole, unified individual female 
Being, but always as plural: she is a feminine nomad. According to Lorraine’s description of 
Irigaray’s model of becoming, woman always emerges as ‘two or more subjects’, each of which 
are continuously ‘transformed’ (1999, 163). This is because, as Braidotti explains, she is 
always in a process of becoming that splits her ‘time and time again, over multiple axes of 
differentiation’ (1994, 171). 
 
(DRIP: See Marshalore’s Trop(e)isme (1980, colour, 14min) for an example of a feminist 
artistic encounter that creates an opening onto the female, in which the smooth labial space 
reconquers the properties of contact that free it from the patriarchal and capitalist structures, 
and produces a movement of territorialization that reclaims her morphological difference. 
According to Tenhaaf,  
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The artist is again the subject, her face in profile appearing in the foreground of the screen for much of 
the tape, contorted in a succession of silent screams. Enacting a metaphor for accessing her inner rage, 
this subject puts her fingers into her vagina, framed very close, then takes them out covered in menstrual 
blood and smears the blood across her face. In this intense and cathartic moment that Deleuze and 
Guattari would characterize as a (schizophrenic) hiatus in the production of the real, excess finds an 
opening, surfacing as a wounding knowledge akin to the enlightening wound of the mystic. After this 
disturbing, taboo-breaking gesture, the artist takes a long drag on a cigarette, exhaling slowly with 
sensual satisfaction (2001, 384).) 
 
By creating art that escapes the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, the 
viewpoint therefore does not obey traditional representations of beauty. As described by 
Irigaray in her experience of women’s art: 
 
Very often, when looking at women’s works of art, I have been saddened by the sense of anguish they 
express, an anguish so strong it approaches horror. Having wanted to contemplate beauty created by 
women, I would find myself faced instead with distress, suffering, irritation, sometimes ugliness. The 
experience of art, which I expected to offer a moment of happiness and repose, of compensation for the 
fragmentary nature of daily life, of unity and communication or communion, would become yet another 
source of pain, a burden. … The portrayal of suffering is, then, for women an act of truthfulness. It’s also 
akin to an individual and collective catharsis (1993c, 107-8).  
 
I can now posit this artistic practice as a feminist methodology of creating within the patriarchal 
structures that condition our experience. In agreement with Olkowski, this feminist artistic 
practice of resistance reveals her libidinal energy as the source of her creativity and ethical 
relation to the world (Hiltmann 2007, 11). By exploring her libidinal cosmic energy through 
art, she can reinvent the representations of beauty and create new and different images of 
women that express her imagination, pleasure and expression. The indifferenciated woman is 
still indifferentiated, because her morphology is always in the process of becoming other. What 
she produces can never be “finished” because her expression is in a continuous process of 
touching within. Her territorial mark, therefore, is an expression of a point in the artistic process 
of becoming-woman that is always becoming (within). Moreover, it is an expression of a point 
in which she was/is able to (re-)discover herself away from the phallic signifier. Consequently, 
what she produces can never be owned because there is no patriarchal image that can recognise 
its enfolded meaning. She cannot be asked to repeat herself because she has already returned 
(to the indifferentiated) within herself. When asked who she is, or more precisely to explain 
her indifferenciation, she ‘can only reply: Nothing [(differenciated)]. Everything 
[(undifferentiated)]’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). Accordingly, the value of what she expresses will 
never be subsumed within capitalist and patriarchal structures because it is a line of flight that 
leaves them behind in the creation of ‘a possible world’ (O’Sullivan 2006, 130) with new 
systems of valorization. To this extent, the indifferent/ciated woman is a line of flight (Deleuze 
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and Guattari 2004, 305). She does not, and cannot, belong to the models and images given to 
her by and for men because she is enfolded: she is both indifferentiated and indifferenciated; 
Nothing and Everything; finite and infinite; within and outside. She is different; she is other; 
she is sublime; she is becoming; she is nomadic; she is cosmic. 
 
This labial formula for a schizo-revolutionary artistic process can therefore engender new 
feminist artistic encounters that can force us to think differently about women, for women, 
(men and others) becoming-women, and as women, (men and others) becoming-women. In 
working through what makes these feminist artistic encounters something in the world that 
forces us to think, I will use Irigaray’s phrase to describe the operation of connecting the 
territorial materials with the labial cosmic forces as ‘the meeting point of the properties of 
physical matter and an elaboration of sexualised subjective identity’ (1993b, 153). For Irigaray, 
her sexuate subjectivity is valid in her process of writing because, she argues,  
 
I am a woman. I write with who I am. … how could I on the one hand be a woman, and on the other, a 
writer? … The whole of my body is sexuate (1993c, 53).  
 
In expressing ourselves, we also express our sexuate subjectivities. This is the reason Irigaray 
argues for the ‘need … to work out an art of the sexual, a sexed culture’ (1993a, 3), that is, ‘an 
art of the sexual that respects the colors, the sounds, and the forms proper to each sex’ (1993b, 
165). To create art capable of preserving the labial affects and percepts, I believe Irigaray 
provides us with a suggestion of making the connection to colour (1993c, 109, see also 1993b, 
164). She says that 
 
in breaking out of our formal prisons, our shackles, we may discover what flesh we have left. I think 
color is what’s left of life beyond forms, beyond truth or beliefs, beyond excepted joys and sorrows. 
Color also expresses our sexuate nature, that irreducible dimension of our incarnation … When all 
meaning is taken away from us, there remains color, colors, in particular those corresponding to our sex. 
Not the dullness of the neuter, the non-living or problematically living (stones, for example) but the 
colors that are ours owing to the fact that we are women (1993c, 109). 
 
(DRIP: We are reminded of the menstrual blood in Marshalore’s Trop(e)isme (1980, colour, 
14min), mentioned in the previous drip.)  
 
In making this connection to colour as a way to preserve the labial affects and percepts, we 
almost echo Deleuze and Guattari: 
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Sensation is not realized in the material without the material passing completely into the sensation, into 
the percept or affect. All the material becomes expressive. It is the affect that is metallic, crystalline, 
stony and so on; and the sensation is not colored but, as Cézanne said, coloring (1994, 166-7).  
 
Therefore, without wishing to be proscriptive about the nature of a schizo-revolutionary labial 
artistic practice, it could be argued that the operation of connecting the territorial materials with 
the labial cosmic forces involves that of colouring. Irigaray argues that it is within ‘such an art, 
[that] the hysteric should be able to regain her perceptions – her virginity, her gender – and 
keep hold of them’ (1993b, 164). This operation therefore forms a synthesizer that is a force of 
the labial cosmic difference, and to this extent can ‘make thought travel’ beyond the patriarchal 
forms of thought. Moreover, the preserved labial affects and percepts emit problematic signs 
that are outside the patriarchal images of thought because they bear the enfolded meaning that 
make feminist art an encounter with the labial cosmic difference.  
 
By situating her morphological difference as the conditions for thinking differently, I argue 
that we can reclaim her morphological difference from the patriarchal mental processes that 
represent it as pejorative and instead affirm it as the source of her creative process of thought. 
That is to say, it is precisely because her expression cannot be understood by the phallic 
symbolic order that it has the potential to force thought to create the unknown, unthought and 
unsymbolised. The new ideas that are forced into thought can therefore open thought up to 
feminine differences that can engender new possibilities for thinking that is not subjugated to 
the phallic signifier. Moreover, these feminine ideas can help us to think difference in plurality 
insofar that what is thought will never be the Same, but a fluid process of thinking with her 
libidinal energy.  
 
In order to engage with the enfolded meaning that make feminist art an encounter with the 
labial cosmic difference, a new enfolded mode of thinking is forced into thought that can think 
of two, for two. This enfolded process of thought provides us with a two-way enfolded basis 
for thinking the relationship between the indifferentiated and indifferenciated; the represented 
and representation; and the differenciated and undifferentiated. Instead of thinking of one, for 
one, as we have been programmed to think through a practice of self-representation provided 
by patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, it is a mode of thought that Olkowski 
describes continually recognises one’s own boundaries but also surpasses them (Hiltmann 
2007, 11). This processual and creative mode of thought forces thought to start from the 
outside, or as Olkowski explains, from a ‘plurality of outsides’ (90), because it operates outside 
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the ordinary scene of representations in thought. This enfolded mode of thought can break our 
reterritorializing habits of mind that seeks to recognises a fixed image of oneself to the extent 
that Olkowski argues that it creates a ‘polygenesis in which mastery fades away’ (90). Thinking 
without an image forces the psychic system to become open to new ideas of subjectivity and 
judgment incited by the new influxes of labial cosmic energy from the encounter with their 
enfolded meaning. The ideas produced not only explore the emancipation of images of the 
woman as indifferenciated, but also explore the emancipation of the infinite possibilities of the 
female incorporeal in the female imagination, pleasure and expression. As a result, the new 
images emancipated within this thought are enfolded to the extent that it thinks of two, for two: 
indifferentiated and indifferenciated; Nothing and Everything; finite and infinite; within and 
outside. Thinking in this way allows us to experience the world through a perspective that is à 
deux, in which Olkowski explains that we can consider ourselves indifferentiated, unfinished, 
and always becoming (97-8).   
 
(DRIP: I also explore this perspective in the drip, Ripple Effect, as a feminine method of 
thinking. I propose that a process of learning to think à deux enables us to open our closed 
system of thought to the feminine, not in order to submit her to the Same patriarchal images, 
but in ways that assert the positivity of her difference.) 
 
Therefore, these feminist artistic encounters can transform ideas of subjectivity and judgment 
aligned with the interests of patriarchy and capitalism and create new enfolded modes of 
thought that are better suited to a life lived à deux. This feminist artistic practice of resistance 
can be understood as an artistic process of learning a labial formula for thinking 
schizoanalytically. 
 
(DRIP: For an example of a feminist artistic encounter that offers the reader a perspective that 
is à deux, see Woolf’s story of Judith in A Room of One’s Own (2016a). In the drip, Mist, I 
employ this example to argue that when imagining Judith’s story, Woolf is building her 
feminist dwelling in literature as a feminist approach to writing and thinking à deux, to the 
extent that Woolf is nomadically remembering two different Shakespeares, for two different 
becomings.) 
 
Even though this enfolded mode of thought can break our reterritorializing habits of mind, it is 
a process of resistance that is on-going, ever-folding and never-ending because movements of 
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reterritorialization will continue to attack both: the indifferenciated woman, so that she can be 
submitted to the patriarchal models and images (again), and; the enfolded processes of thought 
so that patriarchal forms of thought can find a mental solution to this enfolded problem. There 
is nonetheless always a feminist critique embedded in these reterritorializations because 
Irigaray explains that ‘no one single thing – no form, act, discourse, subject, masculine, 
feminine – can complete the development of woman’s desire’ (1985b, 229). That is to say, no 
amount of overcoding can diminish woman’s desire to express herself in a continuous process 
of touching within, and it is this feminine desire that incites us to continue a feminist artistic 
practice of resistance. According to Irigaray’s description of women’s desire, a feminist artistic 
process is already schizo-revolutionary because ‘her insatiable (hysterical) thirst for 
satisfaction’ (229) calls for an untiring renewal of her artistic organisation, and, as a 
consequence, produces her ‘endless becoming’ (1993c, 53).  
 
The nature of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice can now be summarized 
as an on-going, never-complete, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and 
becoming. By enlivening the feminine within the artistic process, art can move in processes of 
deterritorializations of the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation towards 
possibilities of becoming-woman. By exploring the emancipation of the female imagination, 
pleasure and expression through art, we can produce different ways of thinking and being that 
will allow us to experience the world through a perspective that is à deux. The feminist artistic 
encounters, processes and practices that are produced amount to neither a set object or subject, 
but rather, a labial art-politics (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 77): an enfolded practice of 
art and politics ‘without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is 














According to Coate, in order ‘to understand what is possible to think and who can think it’ we 
need to understand ‘how the curriculum is structured’ (2006, 408). Western modern political 
thought is saturated with patriarchal ideas, producing a curriculum that Abbott describes as 
‘malestream’ (1991, 189). To the extent that we learn/teach this malestream curriculum, our 
thought is being trained in the patriarchal tradition. Therefore, it seems that modern political 
thought inhibits us from learning to think differently because it is still teaching us that ‘it is 
men who live and move in history’, as Lerner argues (1987, 201). Learner claims that ‘[w]omen 
have not only been educationally deprived throughout historical time in every known society, 
they have been excluded from theory-formation’ (5). As a result, the curriculum of Western 
modern political thought, as typically presented, includes more theories formed by men. In 
developing Haslanger’s claim that philosophy departments are ‘hypermasculine places’ (2008, 
217), I will argue that the environment in which modern political thought is taught is also 
hypermasculine. With the purpose of resisting this patriarchal tradition, I will propose a 
feminine process of thinking that can be understood as learning/teaching from a perspective 
that is à deux, which thinks of two, for two. This proposal will build upon Irigaray’s suggestion 
for a sexuate education (2008b) by arguing for the construction of feminist dwellings in modern 
political thought as a feminist approach to teaching and learning to think differently.  
 
The perpetual representation of “great” male political theorists produces a hierarchy of power 
relations in political theory, in which men are positioned as intellectually superior and are 
capable of producing what Pareira terms as ‘proper knowledge’, whereas women are positioned 
as intellectually inferior and can only produce secondary knowledge that is ‘less credible’ 
(2012, 286). According to this patriarchal logic, Pareira explains that the political treatises 
written by women or that express feminist ideas are ‘located partly within, and partly outside, 
the realm of proper knowledge’ (283). If these texts are included on the curriculum, Abbott 
claims that they are placed under ‘recommended texts,’ where they ‘tend to be lumped under 
the “gender” label and given a couple of lectures or a chapter in a book: “malestream” can then 
carry on as normal’ (1991, 189). It seems clear that insofar as ‘proper knowledge’ is written by 
“great” male political theorists, we learn and internalise the ideas that men are intellectually 
superior and women are intellectually inferior.  
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(DRIP: In the drip, Mist, I explore this process of internalisation as the effect of the patriarchal 
conditioning of thought enabled by a representational approach to thinking. By building upon 
Deleuze’s critique of the modern image of thought as representational, I develop a feminist 
critique that aligns with Grosz’s (1989) and Braidotti’s (1994) to argue that the image of 
thought is phallocentric. According to Grosz, this mode of thought submits women to models 
and images that have been defined by and for men based on patriarchal systems of 
representation (1989, xx).) 
 
This process of internalisation, according to Haslanger, forms ‘schemas’ relating to those 
individuals or groups of people that influence an unconscious bias (2008, 212). It is to this 
extent that positive perceptions of men and negative perceptions of women are thereby 
institutionalised in academia.  
 
By internalising the idea that men are intellectually superior, Flood argues that it is undeniably 
‘easier for men to live up to the expectations attached to their statuses as ‘“man” and 
“professor”’ (2011, 146). According to Rich’s outline of the assimilation process into Western 
culture (1983, 142), it could be argued that those who are male, white, cis, heterosexual, able-
bodied, and middle-class will find assimilating into academia a lot smoother and quicker than 
those who are other. The reason for this could be because ‘[o]rthodox epistemology 
presupposes a standardized knower who is everyone and no one (yet whose experiences and 
assumptions are strikingly congruent with those of privileged White men)’ (Code 2006, 149). 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the standard Western idea for the human has always been 
the face of the ‘White Man himself’ (2004, 196). Therefore, the white male academic is able 
to fit the idea of the ‘standardized knower’. In Western epistemologies of modernity that 
coalesce around ideals of objectivity, where the “neutral” approach of the ‘standardized 
knower’ is most valued, the white male academic assumes the ideal position of knowledge 
(Code 2006, 149). Therefore, according to Code, white men are able to  
 
sustain the “myth of the neutral man,” presumed capable of representing everyone’s interests objectively, 
and of knowing women and other Others better than they know themselves. By contrast, women and 
other Others produce only partial, subjectivity interested knowledge (150).  
 
This contrast further serves the idea that men are more capable of producing ‘proper 
knowledge’ than women. Code claims that this ‘ideal objectivity ... objectifies women’ to the 
extent that it works to ‘ensure the hegemony of “their” [men’s] knowledge while suppressing 
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“women’s ways of knowing”’ (147-8). Hearn and Kimmel build upon Code’s argument by 
explaining that ‘any book that does not have the word “women” in it is a book in “men’s 
studies” – but we call it “literature”, “history”, or “political science”’ (2006, 55). As a result of 
this patriarchal logic, men dominate the literature (Maliniak, Powers and Walter 2013, 917-9), 
professoriates (see Laube, Massoni, Sprague and Ferber 2007, 87; and Jenkins 2014, 163), and 
intellectual life (Ahmed 2017, 152).  
 
Even though this patriarchal logic benefits men, it can also be diminishing for them. It is 
reasonable to assume that the representations of the “great” male political theorists in the 
curriculum engenders a desire to be part of the “boy’s club”. Consequently, it could be argued 
that some male academics aspire to produce ‘proper knowledge’ worthy of the label “great”. 
In line with this argument, Hearn and Kimmel have claimed that men work within two major 
sets of power relations within the academy: heterosocial and homosocial power relations (the 
power of men over women, or the privileging of men’s work over women’s, and the power of 
some men over other men, or the privileging of some men’s work over other men’s) (2006, 
56). From this understanding of how power relations are measured within the academy, I will 
turn to Haslanger who argues that the philosophy departments in America ‘often are 
hypermasculine places’ (2008, 217) to posit that the environment in which modern political 
thought is taught is also hypermasculine. Haslanger describes this environment as ‘competitive, 
combative’, ‘highly judgmental, orientated toward individual accomplishment, individual 
intelligence, and agency,’ and ‘hostile to femininity’ (217). Drawing succour from Olkowski, 
I will describe that the production of knowledge in a hypermasculine environment takes place 
in a ‘closed conceptual system’, in which one’s own philosophy is predicated ‘on nothing but 
the continual rebuttal of previous [male] thinkers mak[ing] one’s own work a dead end’ (2007, 
76). Olkowski goes on to say that working in a ‘closed conceptual system’ condemns 
academics to follow and repeat the ‘ideas of a single male master’ (90). I suggest that this 
method of producing knowledge is based upon Irigaray’s description of the logic of the Same, 
such that new work produced within this context becomes more of the Same (1985a, 74). In 
line with Irigaray’s critique, I argue that this method could also be thought of as phallocentric: 
not only does it subjugate women’s ways of knowing for the sake of “neutrality”, it reproduces 
the same which sustains men’s knowledge as the ‘proper knowledge’. I would further argue 
that producing such ‘proper knowledge’ and becoming “great” political theorists results in 
becoming the master of a phallocentric ‘closed conceptual system’. However desirable it is to 
be “great”, this method of producing knowledge betrays thought because learning in a ‘closed 
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conceptual system’ does not bring about the new, but, rather, ‘a dead end’ (Olkowski 2007, 76-
7).  
 
What arises as a result of learning within a closed system where nothing enters or leaves, 
according to Olkowski’s work on Freud, is the ego (85). This feeling of having to prove oneself 
as “great” drives some male academics to mark their name in the male lineage of political 
theory and philosophy. According to Braidotti, ‘the dominant subject is stuck with the burden 
of self-perpetuating Being and the flat repetition of existing patterns’ (2011a, 29). I suggest 
that this is because they are stuck in a ‘closed conceptual system’ stroking their egos. Following 
Olkowski’s argument, these flat repetitions uphold an ‘image of philosophy coloured by 
masculinism: a power of the ego-philosopher whose megalomania is based on a contrast with, 
and then endangered by, something Sartre thinks of as “feminine”’ (2007, 73). The production 
of knowledge in a hypermasculine environment therefore presents an indifference to the 
innovations from women and minorities (Jenkins 2014, 163). It does this by fixating on the 
approach of “neutrality”, however Jenkins argues that ‘perhaps this has something to do with 
a certain survival strategy that the [philosophy] discipline’s masculine guardians have pursued’ 
(163). Haslanger claims that this hypermasculine environment ‘keeps women out’ by making 
it ‘difficult for women to feel “at home”’ (2008, 211-7). Women can succeed within the 
hypermasculine discipline and academy, Haslanger explains, if they assimilate into the 
hypermasculine environment as much as one-who-is-other can. This hypermasculine survival 
strategy for women therefore requires them to sublimate ‘potentially important aspects of 
identity’ (217). Haslanger explains that this hypermasculine survival strategy makes it more 
unlikely for women to want to pursue work within a hypermasculine system that makes them 
‘regularly feel “stupid”’ and/or causes them to quit because they ‘don’t have to put up with this 
mistreatment’ (212-8). While these analyses are largely drawn from investigations into 
philosophy as a discipline and philosophy departments as an institutional expression of that 
discipline, it is reasonable to assume that women encounter these hypermasculine conditions 
when entering and working within political theory. However, following Olkowski’s argument, 
I agree that the hypermasculine discipline is endangered by the feminine and propose that 
women can resist these hypermasculine conditions through feminine innovations.  
 
(DRIP: See Labial Drip, where I carve out an understanding of this feminine as a new and non-
phallic model of difference through Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference.) 
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It is important to note that I am not suggesting men should stop producing knowledge or not 
engage in learning, rather, I am calling for them, along with women, to engage in learning of a 
different kind that will open this ‘closed conceptual system’ in order to bring about the new. I 
argue that we can open our closed system of thought by thinking with feminine difference, not 
in order to submit her to the Same phallocentric ideas, but in ways that assert the positivity of 
her difference. In doing so, feminine innovations can be recognised, not as unworthy secondary 
knowledge, but as worthy contributions to political theory.  
 
With the aim of developing a feminine process of thinking in political theory, I will formulate 
a proposal that argues for valid female representation in the curriculum of modern political 
thought that can create a space for feminine difference. This proposal for a feminine process 
of thinking is motivated by Irigaray’s contested relationship to the canon of Western 
philosophy, which aims to problematise and reinvent it by articulating and promoting a space 
for the feminine within it. Building upon Irigaray’s proposal for woman’s rights, I will argue 
for a feminine pragmatic approach that aims to introduce ‘valid representations’ of women in 
the ‘actions, words, and images’ in political theory (Irigaray 1993c, 86) in order for women to 
intervene as a woman in its masculine discourse (1985a, 135; see also Whitford 1991, 13). 
According to Braidotti, by asserting the positivity of sexual difference Irigaray invites us to 
reclaim feminine difference from the patriarchal images and models that represent it as a 
negative by situating it as the source of women’s creativity in which ‘women must speak the 
feminine – they must think it, write it, and represent it in their own terms’ (1994, 118). The 
female representation introduced in this way will be valid insofar that it is expressed by women, 
for women.  
 
This proposal for a feminine pragmatic approach may seem at odds with the argument I 
constructed in another drip, Mist, that aligns with Deleuze’s critique of the modern image of 
thought as representational. However, I agree with Irigaray (1993c, 86) and Braidotti (1994, 
169) that introducing valid female representation could be strategic as part of the process 
towards changing our way of thinking. Both Irigaray and Braidotti suggest preliminary 
feminist strategies of claiming valid female representation in order to transform the social form 
specific to women. The aim of this proposal is not to make modern political thought more 
inclusive, Whitford describes Irigaray’s warning where ‘women become assimilated to the 
world of men and then have nothing to contribute as women’ (1991, 12). Nor is it to create a 
female version of modern political thought or a “girls club”; as Irigaray puts it, to ‘reverse the 
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order of things, even supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself’ and ‘revert to 
sameness: to phallocratism. It would leave room neither for women’s sexuality, nor for 
women’s imaginary, nor for women’s language to take (their) place’ (1985a, 33). Rather, it is 
to assert the positivity of feminine difference within our process of thought which can, as neatly 
summarised by Joy, introduce ‘measures that celebrate both women’s minds and bodies’ (2013, 
71). 
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, in which I further explore Irigaray’s and Braidotti’s 
suggestions of preliminary feminist strategies for claiming valid female representation as part 
of the process of becoming-woman. Through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s and 
Irigaray’s two models of subjectivity, I propose the idea of the feminine nomad as a model of 
subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-woman, positing a 
process of becoming-other of the other, not becoming-other or -elsewhere.) 
 
It is important to remember that claiming valid female representation is only the preliminary 
task. The difference is rather in the potential that this preliminary task brings. Unlike most 
contemporary women writers who consider themselves feminists yet are politically positioned 
as liberals of one sort or another who would accept and argue vigorously that once women’s 
social form is promoted and progressed, women will be liberated, I follow Irigaray’s argument 
that women will only be liberated to an equal status with men because the maximum individual 
liberty achievable by women in a liberal democratic state would still mean that they remain 
subordinate to the idea of Man. By claiming valid female representation within the curriculum, 
women will have created a space within the hypermasculine discipline to make feminine 
differences. This new task follows an Irigarayan approach to the extent that it aims to create a 
space for ‘an “other meaning”’ that will enable the emergence of woman in the philosophical 
discourse (Irigaray 1985a, 29; Whitford 1991, 13). She is not to be understood as the feminine 
represented in models and images designed by and for men (Grosz 1989, xx), but as the other 
of the other insofar as she is expressive of ‘an “other meaning”’. Irigaray creates a way for the 
philosophy canon to express ‘an “other meaning”’ by problematising and reinventing its 
masculine discourse to create a different discourse that expresses a feminine philosophy. 
Through her articulation of philosophy in terms of sexual difference, Irigaray’s feminist 
critique situates her work outside the canon yet creates a space for the feminine that intervenes 
within it. This Irigarayan approach is described by Braidotti as that of reading, or rather, un-
reading classical philosophical texts ‘in terms of their representation of and relations to the 
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“feminine”’ (1994, 131). The task of creating a space for the feminine in modern political 
thought can be furthered through the process of un-reading the mainstream political treatises 
in relation to the ‘feminine’. I argue that this feminist process can resist the patriarchal habits 
of thought as it involves becoming consciously aware of feminine differences, not in ways that 
consider it as other, but in ways that will think with the other.  
 
Braidotti reads Irigaray’s feminist practice of critiquing the masculine discourse of philosophy 
as ‘a game of specular/speculative reflection of the inner logic of phallogocentric discourse’ 
(131). She goes on to say that ‘[t]his game of strategic repetition of throwing back to the text 
what the text does to the “feminine” becomes a highly subversive practice of the critique of 
discourse’ (131). This ‘strategic repetition’ does not, however, end here as a critique of the 
‘malestream’. It is a strategy which brings about a repetition with difference to the extent that 
the political treatises are (re)read with the feminine. This strategy can be understood as a 
process of (re)reading through a perspective that is à deux.  
 
(DRIP: I have employed the term à deux from Olkowski, who uses it in reference to Salomé’s 
theory of woman’s narcissism. Salomé posits the dual orientation of narcissism in her revision 
of the myth of Narcissus: 
 
Bear in mind that the Narcissus of the legend gazed, not at a man-made mirror, but at the mirror of 
Nature. Perhaps it was not just himself that he beheld in the mirror, but himself as if he were still All: 
would he not otherwise have fled from the image instead of lingering before it? And does not melancholy 
dwell next to enchantment upon his face? Only the poet can make a whole picture of this unity of joy 
and sorrow, departure from self and absorption in self, devotion and self-assertion (1962, 9). 
 
Olkowski says that because Narcissus did not see just himself, he thus ‘did not fall into self-
love’ (2007, 96). To the extent that Narcissus also witnessed his surroundings, his love 
expanded the boundaries of his self and included others. This sense of connectedness describes 
for Salomé the conditions of women’s narcissism (1964, 118). Olkowski translates this 
narcissism into a  
 
Love of others [that], rather than arising from the diminishment of our libidinal energies, arises out of an 
excess of love; not even self-love but simply “love belonging to ourselves” (Salomé [1962, 9]). It is that 
we have too much love rather than not enough (2007, 97). 
 
Moreover, as Salomé claims that it is only in the cathexis of objects that the libido is manifested 
as something in itself (1962, 9), Olkowski says that ‘without the love of others, no self even 
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emerges … So out of this emergence of love, in which we make light of our boundaries, arises 
not only the self but friendship and ethics as well’ (2007, 97). In this love of others, the excess 
of love given does not exhaust the libido but enriches it (Salomé 1962, 10). For Salomé, this 
enrichment is experienced in connection with ‘object cathexis, value judgements, and the 
narcissistic transformations into artistic creativity’ (4). According to Schultz, ‘[t]he most 
excessive, most infantile ecstasy may turn into an actual object – perhaps a poem, perhaps an 
invention’ (1994, 190). This theory of narcissism therefore promotes women’s libidinal energy 
as the source of her creativity and ethical relation to others and the world (Hiltmann 2007, 11). 
For Salomé, loving beyond the self ‘allows the world to be experienced not from the vantage 
point of the omnipotent ego, but à deux’ (1962, 13). That is, instead of thinking of one, for one, 
by practicing self-representation, self-absorption, self-devotion and self-assertion, thinking à 
deux thinks of two, for two, by continually recognising one’s own boundaries and surpassing 
them in the love of others.) 
 
I argue that (re)reading the political treatises à deux allows them to be read beyond the 
masculine discourse of philosophy towards a creative reading that enriches the reader, even to 
the point that the reader creatively reinvents the text. (Re)reading à deux enlivens women’s 
ways of knowing and restores the feminine into the text, making a difference to the same which 
sustains men’s knowledge as the ‘proper knowledge’. As a result, I propose that all those 
accusations that mark feminine or feminist knowledge as subjective, limited and ‘less credible’ 
(Pareira 2012, 286), are rethought à deux. This process of thinking à deux can assert the 
positivity of feminine differences in thought in the love of others.  
 
It is important to note that (re)reading à deux is not a process of establishing a ‘proper 
knowledge’ of the feminine. Instead, it is about introducing feminine difference into thought 
which can free thought from its ‘closed conceptual system’ by opening it up to the outside. To 
the extent that Pareira claims feminist scholarship is considered as limited and ‘less credible’ 
because it is located ‘partly outside’ what is considered ‘proper knowledge’ (2012, 283-6), I 
believe that it is precisely this partial location that has the potential to open up the closed system 
of thought that Olkowski describes is produced by learning in ‘a dead end’ (2007, 76-7). 
(Re)reading à deux is a process of reading both parts that are located within and outside the 
realm of proper knowledge. According to Olkowski’s reading of Le Doeuff, ‘thought that starts 
from outside philosophy but from a plurality of outsides … makes possible a plurality of 
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starting points’, from which, thought creates a ‘polygenesis in which mastery fades away’ 
(2007, 90). Le Doeuff claims  
 
the idea that a thought always begins elsewhere is of no interest unless that “elsewhere” allows us to 
introduce a plurality: the specific effort of one thought would then be to constitute one coherence 
(approximate at least) from an initial diversity (2007, 170).  
 
For Le Doeuff, producing knowledge is not about bowing down to a single master or claiming 
that she knows the philosopher’s work better than she/he does, but a ‘reworking’ of the 
philosopher’s work which involves thinking about her/his work as well as drawing upon many 
other things, including one’s own multiple geneses (171-2). In relation to her critique of the 
‘closed conceptual system’, Olkowski calls Le Doeuff’s suggested process of producing 
knowledge a process of working in an open system (2007, 76). She goes on to say,  
 
Le Doeuff maintains that a multiple relation in philosophy to what is multiply outside philosophy makes 
possible the flows of new energy and information essential to the creation of a unique theoretical 
viewpoint (76).  
 
(Re)reading in relation to feminine differences, therefore, creates openings in the closed system 
of thought which can free us from learning in ‘a dead end’ by learning through a process that 
thinks à deux. Learning to think à deux, I propose, can therefore make possible an ‘open 
system’ in thought. The psychic system is able to become ‘open to new flows of ideas, images 
and influences’ (91), which are incited by the new influxes of feminine difference from the 
outside. The new feminine ideas that emerge not only explore the emancipation of images of 
woman in political theory, but also explore the emancipation of women’s ways of knowing. I 
suggest that it is to this extent that the feminine is described by Braidotti as ‘the sole force that 
can break the eternal return of the Same and its classical Others’ (2011a, 283). 
 
Learning from a perspective that is à deux is not the same as learning from a dualistic 
perspective. Learning to think à deux proceeds by learning to think of two, for two; it is a way 
of thinking positively of and about our differences. Whereas, learning to think dualistically 
proceeds through limiting binaries in which differences to the masculine norm are thought as 
negatives. With the aim of developing an understanding of learning à deux, I will incorporate 
Irigaray’s suggestion of a ‘civic education in difference’ (2008b, 204). Irigaray explains that 
such an education involves ‘our becoming conscious of our sexuate identity and that of the 
other – whether it is the same as ours or different from ours’ (204). It is important to distinguish 
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the purpose of this education from sex education. Irigaray clarifies this distinction by 
introducing the term ‘sexuate education’ in place of ‘sexual education’ (204). A sexuate 
education focuses on our sexuate identities and how our relationships with each other arise 
from our sexuate belonging (204). In ‘becoming conscious of our sexuate’ identities, Irigaray 
explains that we will create ‘[t]he most originally real and polyvalent relationship’ because our 
sexuate belonging ‘creates the first bridge between us: as children, adolescents, lovers or 
parents, but more generally as persons or citizens’ (204). Without this education, Irigaray 
claims that we ‘deprive ourselves of the most important source of relationships between us, 
and construct these [relationships] starting from artificial codes which annihilate real relational 
energy’ (204). Through a sexuate education, we will learn how to cultivate energy that arises 
from sexual and sexuate attraction ‘in order to allow for respectful and reciprocal relations, and 
the construction of a world fitting for the two being in relation with one another at each time’ 
(205). Irigaray claims that this cultivation of energy would develop ‘an alternative perspective’ 
from which ‘the regulation of energy would come from us, from the development of our desire, 
and would not be imposed on us by norms external to us’ (205). From such a perspective, she 
continues to argue, a new ‘culture’ can be constructed of ‘horizontal relations between different 
subjects’ (210), which can replace the current culture that is constructed of relations which 
reduce themselves ‘to a “dyad” or a pair of opposites’ (228).  
 
In her proposal for a sexuate education, Irigaray explains that ‘[t]eaching cannot amount to 
imposing on the other our knowledge, our competence, including through a paternalistic or 
maternalistic generosity’ (234). Such an approach ‘is no longer appropriate to our times’ as 
‘[i]t presupposes that only one world can amount to the universal truth, and it does not take 
into account that different worlds exist’ (231-2). Irigaray suggests that teaching does not have 
to only consist in ‘speaking, but in being capable of remaining silent too, of withdrawing in 
order to let the other be, become and discover his or her path, his or her language’ (234). She 
suggests learning this capability by ‘listening-to’, instead of ‘looking-at’, to the extent that 
listening  
 
does not amount to grasping something in order to integrate and order it into our own world, but to 
opening one’s own world to something or someone external and strange to it. Listening-to is a way of 
opening ourselves to the other and of welcoming this other, its truth and its world as different from us, 
from ours (232).  
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I would add that learning to speak to the other involves learning to listen to how the other 
wishes to be spoken to. It is in this sense I read that ‘[s]uch a gesture’, according to Irigaray, 
‘leads the teacher to question his or her own thought and to maintain it alive and loving’ (233). 
To this extent, the teacher can open themselves to the other and welcome its difference instead 
of rejecting it as negative. Learning this capability of ‘listening-to’ is also suggested for the 
students, as Irigaray explains that ‘the past experience of the teacher has to be respected, but it 
has to be put at the service of a present relation between master and student’ (233). In order to 
build a mutually respectful teacher-student relationship, ‘the present time and the entry into 
presence of the two’ cannot be subjected ‘to the past’ (233). It is in this sense that Irigaray says 
that ‘[t]eaching requires us to be, and not only to have knowledge’ (234) to the extent that 
‘listening-to’ each other  
 
is not to simply listen to an abstract and presumed universal truth that we ought to share after our 
discussion, a truth that we could transform into universal mental images, but to listen to the way in which 
the other envisions and constructs their truth (232).  
 
Irigaray is arguing that we should not learn to listen to the other in order to claim to “know” 
the nature of our sexuate difference in a ‘universal mental image’, or to claim that there is one. 
Rather, she is proposing that learning to listen to the other enables us to recognise that the other 
creates, and speaks, their own difference; a difference that we can learn to speak to. Irigaray’s 
suggestion of learning to ‘listen-to’ could be thought of as a process of learning to actively 
cultivate a certain passivity that enables us to be open to an encounter with / in / from 
difference. Moreover, learning this capability of ‘listening-to’ can be understood as learning to 
live our sexuate difference with each other, and not according to models and images imposed 
by the patriarchal systems of representation (203). 
 
In emphasising the number two in learning à deux through Irigaray’s suggestion of a sexuate 
education, it is important to note Irigaray’s clarification that  
 
the number two does not signify that I allude only to a traditional couple, nor to an intimate or affective 
relation. Being two is the way of emerging from this undifferentiated group of someones or somebodies 
to which our culture leads us, and in which we lose our singularity, our difference(s) and our relational 
desire and energy (205).  
 
In agreement with Irigaray, learning à deux does not entail learning to tolerate differences in 
order to be respectful to each other as human beings, rather it entails learning to think positively 
of and about our differences so that we are respectful to each other’s subjectivity. According 
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to Irigaray, our sexuate identity does not only concern our ‘sex and a few bodily characteristics, 
but also [our] whole subjectivity’ (205). A sexuate education is therefore important because 
we know ‘almost nothing’ about ourselves (219). Learning to live our sexuate difference is 
described by Irigaray as learning to ‘use our body, our imagination and intelligence’ in order 
to ‘build a home in which to live’ (235). Irigaray’s descriptions of building one’s own home 
does not mean physical bricks and mortar, rather, it ‘concerns the all that we are’ (234). Put in 
this way, bodies, imagination and intelligence are territories in which we mark our domains. 
She describes the activity of ‘building one’s own home’ as the process of thinking to the extent 
that ‘[t]hinking has to secure the return to home, the dwelling within oneself for reposing, for 
a becoming of one’s own, for preparing future relations with the other, with the world’ (234-
5). It is in this sense that Irigaray explains the ‘teacher has to build his or her own dwelling in 
order to help others to build their proper dwelling’ (235). In addition to Irigaray’s proposal, I 
argue that the teacher’s dwelling cannot be built as a master’s house. Such a construction would 
amount to what Richardson describes as ‘the (male) court house of reason’ (1998, 94). Building 
a master’s house, therefore, constructs the structures that make possible a ‘hypermasculine’ 
environment (Haslanger 2008, 217). By residing in the master’s house, the teacher would 
encourage others to build their own master’s house which will betray thought to the extent that 
the hypermasculine structures would engender a closed system of thought. Therefore, instead 
of building a hypermasculine master’s house, I suggest that the teacher’s dwelling can be built 
according to Ahmed’s blueprint for a feminist dwelling (2017, 241-2). 
 
Through a synthesis of Irigaray’s proposal to build one’s dwelling and Ahmed’s description of 
feminist dwellings, I argue that these feminist dwellings are constructed in resistance to the 
hypermasculine master’s house. These feminist dwellings cannot, however, be constructed in 
the same way as the master’s house. Building a new feminist master’s house that opposes the 
hypermasculine will only presume a binary and dogmatic strategy of attack and defence which 
will reproduce the same structures and, as a result, will reproduce the same betrayal of thought. 
It is to this extent that Ahmed employs Lorde’s famous quote to warn us against using the 
master’s tools, because they ‘will never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde 1984, 112, 
quoted in Ahmed 2017, 160). Ahmed describes that these feminist dwellings are instead 
assembled from ‘lighter materials’ such as ‘[c]itations’ (16) from  
 
those who have contributed to the intellectual genealogy of feminism and antiracism, including work 
that has been too quickly (in my view) cast aside or left behind, work that lays out other paths, paths we 
can call desire lines, created by not following the official paths laid out by disciplines (15). 
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We can therefore say that the hypermasculine master’s house is constructed with bricks that 
represent ‘ideas of a single male master’ (Olkowski 2007, 90), in which its ‘timber frame’ 
follows and repeats the official paths laid out by the hypermasculine discipline (Ahmed 2017, 
16). Ahmed claims that feminist dwellings are not ‘secure’ like the solid hypermasculine walls 
of the master’s house because ‘the walls move’ (268). This is because the lighter materials 
allow for other paths to be made whereas the hypermasculine bricks secure the official paths. 
Following this analogy, I will argue that following the official paths laid out by the 
hypermasculine discipline pursues a closed system of thought, however following other paths 
as suggested by Ahmed opens up this closed system of thought.  
 
Although I disagree with Ahmed’s ‘strict citation policy’ in which she does not cite any ‘white 
men’ (15), I agree with this process of building with citations insofar that they are approached 
through a process of thinking à deux. In place of Ahmed’s strict citation policy, I propose 
employing Le Doeuff’s suggested process of producing knowledge in an open system to the 
extent that ideas of a single male master can be cited but only insofar that they are related to a 
multiplicity outside philosophy, including one’s own multiple geneses (Le Doeuff 2007, 171-
2). Ahmed’s idea of citations as ‘feminist bricks’ or ‘feminist straw’ (2017, 16) can now 
connect to Irigaray’s claim to use our bodies, imagination and intelligence to build a home 
(2008b, 235). I propose that the process of thinking à deux is therefore the activity of building 
a feminist dwelling. Contrary to becoming a master of one’s own hypermasculine house, 
building a feminist dwelling creates a polygenesis in which one is open to the influx of feminine 
difference as well as to entering respectful and reciprocal relations with others. Building in this 
way not only creates other paths, it also makes possible new diversions in the official paths laid 
out by the hypermasculine discipline. It is in this sense that we can apply Richardson’s 
metaphor that ‘Irigaray’s intervention can be viewed as both “a brick thrown through the (male) 
court house of reason” and more’ (1998, 94). In agreement with Ahmed, this process of 
building feminist dwellings can ‘bring the [hypermasculine] house down’ (2017, 159). 
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Mist, for an example of a feminist dwelling built by Woolf. I argue that 
when imagining Judith’s story in A Room of One’s Own (2016a), Woolf is building her feminist 
dwelling in literature as a feminist approach to writing and thinking à deux, to the extent that 
Woolf is nomadically remembering two different Shakespeares, for two different becomings. 
Woolf’s process of bringing Judith to life is a process of learning to imagine the virtual 
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feminine within the malestream. Judith lives as an example of (re)reading with a feminine 
difference. I propose it is by asking questions in the feminist dwellings such as, “how much 
will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will 
women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”, that we will learn how to express the 
problems that reside within patriarchal ideas. These questions of difference will evoke 
processes of nomadic remembering that will engender processes of thinking differently, 
opening up our closed system of thought to feminine difference.) 
 
By teaching in a feminist dwelling, Irigaray suggests that the teacher helps ‘others to build their 
[feminist] dwelling’ by encouraging her or his students to learn to think differently to the extent 
that the activity of thinking is transformed from ‘these games of for and against into another 
logic, a logic of coexistence in difference’ (2008b, 237). In order to learn and teach a logic of 
coexistence in difference, Irigaray explains that we ‘have to listen to those who talk, think and 
act according to another logic than our own’ (238). Not in order to imitate or identify with 
those who practice another logic, rather, Irigaray explains, it is a process of ‘listening-to’ in 
order to learn and teach ‘how to communicate in difference without destroying our own values, 
without destroying the other or ourselves’ (238). It is in this sense that Irigaray suggests we 
build our own homes so that we can protect ourselves in our differences, whilst being open to 
encountering other differences.  
 
(DRIP: In the puddle, Condensation, I describe an artistic installation that was designed and 
exhibited within the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution as part of the 
collaborative artistic pedagogy I put into practice with Heaney, which is an ongoing campaign 
entitled Learning, Exchange and Play (LEP). Constructed as a large labial enclosed 
installation, Not One / To Be Two was built as an Irigarayan inspired dwelling to protect 
ourselves in our differences, whilst forming bonds with others.) 
 
The nature of a sexuate education of building feminist dwellings can now be summarised as a 
feminist approach to teaching and learning to think differently. It is an approach that challenges 
teaching and learning in a closed system of thought, in which we are encouraged to build a 
secure master’s house for one. Teaching and learning à deux opens up our system of thought 
and encourages us to build a feminist dwelling for relations with others. Learning to live our 
sexuate difference will bring into question the ideas that men are intellectually superior and 
women are intellectually inferior insofar that, according to Irigaray, it is a task of ‘transforming 
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ourselves at every moment in order to respect and care about the subsistence and becoming of 
both myself and the other, that is, of two radically different subjects’ (238). The practice of 
transforming the way we experience the world, will also transform the way we engage with it. 
This pedagogical proposal is a call to teachers and students of modern political thought to 
become feminist builders and create a space for feminine difference by teaching and learning 
































For Deleuze, “thought” is understood as that which is first of all non-representational thought, 
and aesthetic rather than conceptual. According to Deleuze, thought loses its creative force 
when it is conceived in terms of recognition (1994, 143). Thought is therefore betrayed in its 
modern image that rests upon the presumption of a subject that re-presents reality to him/herself 
according to the dominant models and images available. In this drip, I will argue that this 
dominant system of representation provides the conditions of possible experience which 
constitutes a gendered concept of subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy. The 
tension of this drip will therefore lie in the challenge of this phallocentric mode of thought that 
representationally aligns man and mind against woman and body, whist resisting the pull 
towards establishing a dominant ‘woman-centered’ image of thought. Developing upon 
Deleuze’s proposal to understand thought as the expression of ideas, I will explore the potential 
for female thought as a practice of learning how to express the problems that reside within 
ideas. Crucial to this practice is Braidotti’s creative processes of nomadic remembering and the 
virtual feminine. I will suggest that we will learn how to express the problems that reside within 
patriarchal ideas of women by asking questions of difference such as, “how much will she have 
changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have been 
free?” “Who will have been free?”. These questions of difference will evoke processes of 
nomadic remembering which will engender processes of thinking differently, not traditionally, 
of and about women. I will argue that this process will produce a female thought because it 
engenders a process of individuation fuelled by the virtual feminine and becoming-other of the 
other, opening thought to feminine difference and de-programming it out of its dominant mode. 
 
The history of Western philosophy of thought is full of presuppositions. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze claims that these presuppositions constitute a traditional image of thought 
and provides us with the following definition:  
 
By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less 
implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals and our methods when we 
try to think (1994, xvi).  
 
According to Lorraine, this traditional image of thought evolved from Plato’s theory of the 
forms to its modern image of representation, in which the “truth” of thought is measured 
against the originary ideals of the forms, subordinating any difference to identity and 
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resemblance (1999, 130). The modern image of thought was made explicit by Descartes in 
positing the pure self of ‘I think’, that is, the presumption ‘that everyone knows, independently 
of concepts, what is meant by self, thinking, and being’ (Deleuze 1994, 129). Deleuze critiques 
Descartes’ claim to avoid objective presuppositions by saying that he contains them in another 
subjective form, in opinions rather than concepts (129-30). The presumption that everybody 
knows what it means to think rests on the presupposition found in the idea of a common sense 
understood as an upright nature and a good will (131). According to this summary, Deleuze 
says that ‘[w]e may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image’, because 
it cannot be regarded as a fact that thought possesses a good nature and a good will (131-2).  
 
This modern image of thought is further developed by Kant in the form of recognition. 
Although Deleuze claimed that Kant ‘seemed equipped to overturn the Image of thought’, this 
was not made possible because ‘Kant did not want to renounce the implicit presuppositions’ 
(136). According to Deleuze’s reading of Kant, thought involves the unity of the faculties – 
imagination, reason and understanding – determined by a given common sense in the 
supposedly universal thinking subject, culminating in recognition which is expressed in the 
form of a recognisable object (134-7). Lorraine puts it in this way, ‘[w]hat is thinkable or 
perceivable is that which is recognizable; what is recognizable is that which can be referred to 
what is the same’ (1999, 130). This way of thinking is problematic because it rests upon the 
presumption of a subject that re-presents reality to him/herself. To this extent, thought is limited 
to a presupposed image of the world and of the subject. By thinking and living through systems 
of representation, the subject also thinks and lives to re-present him/herself according to the 
dominant models and images available. Rather than allowing for further creation, thought is 
betrayed in its will to know or recognise what is experienced. For Deleuze, this modern image 
of thought ‘both presupposes and betrays [thought]’ because thought loses its creative force 
when it is conceived in terms of recognition (1994, 143). 
 
According to Colebrook, this process of re-presenting reality  
 
assumes that there are experiences and that these are given to one who thinks. It does not consider that 
the “I think” might be one effect among others in a “swarm” of experiences (2001, 73).  
 
In considering what it means to think from within the modern image of thought, the thinking 
subject is continuously put at the centre of the world. It is through the thinking faculties that a 
subject knows he/she exists in the world. Accordingly, Deleuze claims that the ‘pure self of “I 
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think” thus appears to be a beginning only because it has referred all its presuppositions back 
to the empirical self’ (1994, 129). Experiencing the world in this way posits the thinking subject 
as the main starting point of reference. The objects which are recognised reflect the subjective 
identity of the thinking subject because it is he/she who recognises them (133). This 
understanding constructs a dualism between mind and body to the extent that the modern image 
of thought prioritises mind as the theatre from which the thinking subject views and re-presents 
the world. Accordingly, Grosz claims  
 
Dualism, in short, is responsible for the modern forms of elevation of consciousness … above 
corporeality. … [Consciousness is] positioned outside of the world, outside its body, outside of nature; 
it is also removed from direct contact with other minds and a sociocultural community. At its extreme, 
all that consciousness can be sure about is its own self-certain existence (1994b, 7).  
 
The modern image of thought therefore creates the conditions for the production of the 
disembodied subject.  
 
The binary of mind/body not only engenders the opposition between disembodiment and 
embodiment, it also fuels the mapping for a series of other oppositions. For Grosz, the most 
relevant opposition in this series associated with the mind/body binary is the ‘opposition 
between male and female, where man and mind, woman and body, become representationally 
aligned’ (1994b, 4). As a consequence, Grosz claims that the discipline of ‘philosophy has 
surreptitiously excluded femininity, and ultimately women, from its practices through its 
usually implicit coding of femininity with the unreason associated with the body’ (4). 
Following the evolution of the modern image of thought, it seems that the supposedly universal 
thinking subject is in fact male, and it is therefore man who is considered as endowed with 
thought that has an upright nature and a common sense. Grosz goes on to say 
 
a corporeal “universal” has in fact functioned as a veiled representation and projection of a masculine 
which takes itself as the unquestioned norm, the ideal representative without any idea of the violence 
that this representational positioning does to its others—women, the “disabled,” cultural and racial 
minorities, different classes, homosexuals—who are reduced to the role of modifications or variations of 
the (implicitly white, male, youthful, heterosexual, middle-class) human body (188). 
 
According to this dualist system of representation, man is the ideal representative of a thinking 
subject because it is presumed that he knows what it means to think, whereas others exist as a 
specular subjective identity of man because he is the main starting point of reference for all 
others. As argued by Braidotti,  
 
 94 
Insofar as man, the male, is the main referent for thinking subjectivity, the standard-bearer of the Norm, 
the Law, the Logos, woman is dualistically, that is, oppositionally, positioned as the “other.” (1994, 114).  
 
This dualist and specular system of representation articulates that of a phallocentric economy, 
in which the phallus is privileged and centred as the ultimate signifier and which therefore 
permeates all discourse and logos (Irigaray 1985a, 86). Grosz explains that phallocentrism ‘is 
a form of logocentrism in which the phallus takes on the function of the logos’ (xx). 
Logocentrism, for Grosz, designates  
 
the dominant form of metaphysics in Western thought. The logos, logic, reason, knowledge, represents 
a singular and unified conceptual order, one which seems to grasp the presence or immediacy of things. 
Logocentrism is a system of thought centred around the dominance of this singular logic of presence 
(xix).  
 
She further explains that ‘Logocentric systems rely heavily on a logic of identity which is 
founded on the exclusion and binary polarisation of difference’ (xix). Therefore, according to 
this logic, Grosz’s claims that ‘[t]he term [phallocentrism] refers to the ways in which 
patriarchal systems of representation always submit women to models and images defined by 
and for men’ (xx). In measuring woman against man, we come to know these patriarchal 
images as those that represent woman as counterpart identities, the opposite to man, and male-
others.  
 
With our systematic thinking centred on phallocentric logic, Dawson explains that our mental 
processes and traditions of conceptualisation assume a binary, oppositional and antithesis 
nature (2008, 3). Such a dualistic mode of thought, according to Braidotti, supports ‘[c]lassical 
universalism, which conflates the masculine and the white with the universal [and non-white] 
and confines the feminine to a secondary position of difference’ (1994, 98). She goes on to say 
that ‘[r]adical feminists, especially Irigaray, argue that this dualistic mode creates binary 
differences only to ordain them in a hierarchical scale of power relations’ (98). According to 
Lloyd, this way of thinking produces, and is produced by, structures of sexual dominance that 
form our ideas and ideals of maleness and femaleness to reflect those ‘of superiority and 
inferiority, “norms” and “difference”, “positive” and “negative”, the “essential” and the 
“complementary”’ (2004, 104). These ideas and ideals of maleness and femaleness operate  
 
not as a straight-forwardly descriptive principle of classification, but as an expression of values. … What 
is valued–whether it be odd as against even numbers, “aggressive” as against “nurturing” skills and 
capacities, or Reason as against emotion–has been readily identified with maleness (104).  
 
 95 
It is therefore no wonder that Lloyd claims ‘[r]ationality has been conceived as transcendence 
of the feminine; and the “feminine” itself has been partly constituted by its occurrence within 
this structure’ (105). The series of dichotomies that representationally align with a male/female 
opposition therefore become all too easily accepted within this dualistic mode of thought. As 
a result, these dichotomies ‘underwrite the symbolism that represents masculinity as a 
regulative character ideal, defined in stark contrast to and repudiation of “the feminine”’, as 
argued by Code (2006, 151). Some other typical examples of these dichotomies include the 
pre-Oedipal/Oedipal, precastrated/castrated, and premodern/modern, as noted by Bray and 
Colebrook (1998, 47); reason/emotion, objective/subjective, abstract/concrete (Code 2006, 
151); active/passive, strong/weak, rational/irrational, divine/evil, to rule/be ruled (Lerner 1987, 
209).  
 
If it is man who represents the “universal” thinking subject, it begs the question how can 
woman know what it means to think for herself? At risk of reiterating the ‘chant of negativity’, 
challenged by Bray and Colebrook, that lists: 
 
representations are phallocentric and thus disembodied; reason is phallocentric; language is 
phallocentric; history is phallocentric; philosophy is phallocentric; science and technology are 
phallocentric; all cultural productions are phallocentric; and even “touching is phallic in this culture” 
(Grosz 1994a, 10) (Bray and Colebrook 1998, 48).  
 
MacKenzie and I have claimed that the modern image of thought constitutes ‘the image of the 
masculine subjectivity sitting in sovereign judgement over experience’ (2014, 72). The reality 
that is lived and re-presented provides the conditions of possible experience which constitutes 
a gendered concept of subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy. I suggest that our 
given modes of thinking and being are conditioned so that everybody is forced to think and act 
in and through a masculine world perspective. It is in this sense that I agree with Braidotti’s 
argument of ‘the dominant image of thought as the expression of a white, masculine, adult, 
heterosexual, urban-dwelling, property-owning subject’ (2011a, 6). This phallocentric mode of 
thinking is problematic insofar that it interrupts her becoming by fixing her in the same 
patriarchal representations that designates her difference as pejorative. As a result, this 
phallocentric mode of thought limits processes of thought that might explore the emancipation 
of female imagination, pleasure and expression. Lerner explains the effects that this patriarchal 
conditioning of thought in women has had, where:  
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Women have for millennia participated in the process of their own subordination because they have been 
psychologically shaped so as to internalize the idea of their own inferiority. The unawareness of their own 
history of struggle and achievement has been one of the major means of keeping women subordinate. The 
connectedness of women to familial structures made any development of female solidarity and group 
cohesiveness extremely problematic (1987, 218). 
 
According to Lerner, by internalising the idea that women are inferior to men, women have 
unconsciously accepted their subordination to men in thoughtful silence. She goes on to 
describe this account in rather drastic terms: ‘we have participated, although unwittingly, in 
the rape of our minds’ (225). By not questioning the idea of their own inferiority, woman have 
been complicit in the subjection of their own minds. Moreover, in doing so, women (and men) 
have not only internalised the idea that women are inferior, they have also internalised the idea 
that men are superior. To this extent, this process of internalisation has simultaneously 
produced the “God-complex” in men, and a desire in women for a strong male leader (Braidotti 
2017). Women have therefore been conditioned to think of themselves as the other to man, not 
as his equal but as his subordinate. 
 
Lerner explains that once we become consciously aware of how ingrained the patriarchal mode 
of thought is in our mental processes, we can ‘exclude it … which always means a special 
effort’ (1987, 36). However, it is not so easy to become aware of our thought processes and to 
resist conforming to the dominant image of thought, because these processes of thought are so 
habitual. Her suggested ‘special effort’ should be understood instead as a processual practice 
of learning to question and respond to dominant habitual processes of thought that are 
patriarchal. It is with this development that I can agree with Lerner’s ‘special effort’ to work 
towards shifting the ways in which we think of and about women. Lerner argues that making 
this special effort is a ‘precondition for change’ (221), and suggests that it be enacted in the 
following two steps she outlines: 1) ‘we must, at least for a time, be woman-centered’, which 
‘means ignoring all evidence of women’s marginality, because, even where women appear to 
be marginal, this is the result of patriarchal intervention’, and ‘when using methods and 
concepts from traditional systems of thought, it means using them from the vantage point of 
the centrality of women’ and; 2) ‘[w]e must, as far as possible, leave patriarchal thought 
behind’, which means:  
 
[b]eing sceptical toward every known system of thought; being critical of all assumptions, ordering values 
and definitions. Testing one’s statement by trusting our own, the female experience. Since such experience 
has usually been trivialized or ignored, it means overcoming the deep-seated resistance within ourselves 
toward accepting ourselves and our knowledge as valid. It means getting rid of great men in our heads and 
substituting for them ourselves, our sisters, our anonymous foremothers. Being critical toward our own 
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thought, which is, after all, thought trained in the patriarchal tradition. Finally, it means developing 
intellectual courage, the courage to stand alone, the courage to reach farther than our grasp, the courage to 
risk failure (228). 
 
Although I am sympathetic to Lerner’s proposal to liberate our mental processes from the 
patriarchal mode of thought, she offers a female-centric “logic”, or at least a method, by 
proposing the use of masculine notions for producing a female thought that puts women at ‘the 
center’ (228). The only step Lerner does not include is how this ‘woman-centered’ process 
(228) can resist what Braidotti describes as the ‘pull towards assimilation or integration into 
the Majority’ (2002, 85). That is to say, to employ Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, how 
‘the becoming-thought of the woman’ can resist becoming a dominant image of thought itself 
(2004, 417). I suggest that Lerner’s ‘woman-centered’ process can therefore risk producing a 
new form of logocentrism. According to Deleuze, ‘[i]t is not a question of opposing to the 
dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed’ (1994, 148), which is to say, we cannot 
simply oppose the phallocentric image of thought with a ‘woman-centered’ one. Instead, 
Deleuze suggests, it is a question of ‘remembering’ that a different possibility for thought is 
possible, ‘which can only be revealed as such can through the abolition of that image’ (148). 
Therefore, in following Lerner’s proposal to liberate our mental processes from the patriarchal 
mode of thought, I suggest that we can resist the pull towards establishing a dominant ‘woman-
centered’ image of thought by exploring female thought in terms of Deleuze’s proposal for ‘a 
thought without image’ (167).  
 
(DRIP: In the first chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze explores the idea of this new 
thought with Guattari in a vegetal model. They oppose the dogmatic image of thought, which 
they describe as arborescent, in favour for a rhizome-thought (2004, 17). Deleuze claims that 
the third chapter in Difference and Repetition  
 
serves to introduce subsequent books [such as Proust and Signs] up to and including the research 
undertaken with Guattari where we invoked a vegetal model of thought: the rhizome in opposition to the 
tree, a rhizome-thought instead of an arborescent thought (1994, xvii).) 
 
Deleuze argues that we can liberate thought from the images that imprison it by understanding 
thought, not through systems of representation, but as the expression of ideas. For Deleuze, an 
idea is not a solution to a problem but is its transformation. These ideas cannot be represented 
in thought but are nonetheless real because they are the real conditions of real experience (156-
67). Instead of thinking through systems of representation in which we can re-present a reality 
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that we can claim to recognise or “know” according to the dominant patriarchal models and 
images, we can transform the way we experience the world by learning to think through the 
expression of ideas. Ideas are forced into thought when we encounter something unknown, that 
is, something not recognised by our image of thought because it does not have a representation 
for it. It is by experiencing this encounter that thought is forced into involuntary movements to 
create a new idea for it. It is helpful to consider Colebrook’s description of Deleuze’s account 
of ideas as ‘reflections of experience, formed from experience’ (2001, 80). Yet, these 
experiences are not given to one who thinks and these reflections are not re-presentations of 
the world. She claims that  
 
Deleuze argues against mediation. He insists that it is not the case that there is a life or being which is 
then mediated or ordered by ideas; life is lived directly and immediately. We do not perceive a picture or 
idea of the sun, we experience sunlight itself. Indeed, far from our ideas ordering our world; the world 
itself produces ideas – or images – of which we are effects. … Put more concretely, we cannot use the 
subject and his ideas to explain the world or experience; we have to account for how the subject is formed 
from experience (80).  
 
Experience is no longer understood as that of the thinking subject, it is impersonal and 
inhuman. The thinking subject is not positioned at the centre of the world, he/she is but ‘the 
effect of one particular series of experiential connections’ (81). To use Colebrook’s examples, 
different impersonal and inhuman experiences include ‘plants perceiving light, the muscles of 
the body experiencing strain, genes experiencing viral mutation’ (81). It is by experiencing 
material impressions on the body that the mind forms incorporeal ideas (81). Deleuze explains 
that ideas cannot be recognised or represented because representations do not capture the 
process in which they were formed. Ideas are formed as thought is forced into involuntary 
movements incited by what is sensed (1994, 139). By transforming the way we experience the 
world, we will also transform the way we engage with it. This process of engaging with the 
world can be understood as a process of becoming that, in earlier work I presented as a practice 
of learning how to express the problems that reside within ideas (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 
2014).  
 
According to Zepke, Deleuze provides a ‘post-Kantian image of thought’ (2017, 111). By 
focusing on Deleuze’s account of the three syntheses of time, in which Deleuze explains that 
Ideas emerge passively before being taken up and distorted in the active syntheses of 
representation (1994, 135-7), Zepke goes on to say that by  
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“reversing” this relationship [of the passive and active syntheses] and making the passive synthesis 
constitutive of reality (rather than representation condemning reality to be supersensible) Deleuze makes 
the disjunctive synthesis of the faculties in the ‘empty form of time’ the genesis of thought (as it is in 
Kant), but thought now creates reality (qua being) rather than simply representing it (118).  
 
This ‘empty form of time or third synthesis [of time]’ in Deleuze’s account (1994, 88), is 
described as ‘a disjunctive synthesis’ by Zepke because he explains that it ‘both divides and 
connects the passive and active syntheses, or more exactly, it connects by dividing’ (2017, 
117). What this disjunctive synthesis connects by dividing is ‘the passive contractions of 
sensation (the event) and the pure past that contains them (memory) with the active syntheses 
of a conceptual self-consciousness (the act)’ (117). Thought is thereby moved into 
consciousness in and through the unconscious (Deleuze 1994, 114). This process of thought is 
separate to the active syntheses and is thus what takes thought on a violent involuntary 
movement that disrupts and disturbs the representational image of thought, because it is incited 
within the unconscious which goes beyond the active syntheses of consciousness. It is to this 
extent that Deleuze claims that the Idea expresses ‘that extra-propositional or sub-
representative problematic instance: the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation 
of consciousness’ (192). Thought is no longer limited to a presupposed image of the world and 
of the subject, because it is generated passively. To this extent, the subject cannot think and 
live through re-presentations of experience, thinking must be created to conceive of what is 
sensed. The subject is thereby produced in the experience rather than presupposed. Ideas are 
not, therefore, fixed into a being from which the subject can begin to recognise an image of 
themselves (or others). In other words, Ideas evade any transcendental subjectivity and are 
instead expressed in a schizo-subject, and actualised as a psychotic-singularity. This 
understanding breaks the dualism between mind and body to the extent that the mind is no 
longer considered as the theatre from which the thinking subject views and re-presents the 
world, but as a ‘site’, among many on the body, where experience takes place because life is 
lived directly and immediately (Colebrook 2000, 80). 
 
Explaining it in this way, Deleuze attempts to redefine consciousness in terms of a multiplicity 
of layers of experience. According to Braidotti, Deleuze interprets the body in a Nietzschean 
manner, as ‘a play of forces, a surface of intensities; pure simulacra without originals’ (1994, 
112). The subject thus becomes the result of what Deleuze terms ‘individuations’ (1994, xxi). 
Individuations are the complex relational interplay between material forces (whether bodily, 
social, or symbolic) and so, for Deleuze, the personal becomes an effect of those pre- or 
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impersonal forces (xxi). But furthermore, such ‘individuations’ are never ‘complete’; rather, 
we are engaged in a constant process of individuation.  
 
(DRIP: See Simondon’s theory of individuation that inspired Deleuze’s revision of the subject, 
in which Simondon claims that an “individual” is never given in advance but continually 
produced in the course of an ongoing process without end (Iliadis 2013, 94-5).) 
 
According to Braidotti’s account of Deleuze’s effort to move beyond the dogmatic image of 
thought, ‘Deleuze redefines philosophy as the nonreactive activity of thinking the present, the 
actual moment, so as to account adequately for change and changing conditions’ (1994, 112). 
Thought is produced in experience, and in its creation expresses an individuation. In other 
words, ‘thought is the actualisation of Ideas as the individuation of being itself’ (Zepke 2017, 
123). The subject is produced in the process of individuation, but the Idea that is actualised is 
not of the individual but of a singular subject (of a schizo-subject). Deleuze describes that ‘[t]he 
individual distinguishes itself from [its individuation], but it does not distinguish itself, 
continuing rather to cohabit with that which divorces itself from it’ (1994, 152). It is in this 
sense that Deleuze and Guattari claims that we are always already several (2004, 3). It is not a 
case of acting schizophrenic, but of understanding our ‘self’ as a result ‘of these thousands of 
little witnesses which contemplate within us’ to the extent that ‘it is always a third party who 
says “me”’ (Deleuze 1994, 75). According to Zepke, ‘Ideas are, in this sense, the thoughts of a 
dissolved cogito’ (2017, 123). The actualisation of Ideas does not express images of the self 
(or others) in order to fix an identity to be recognised, but the self as a process of becoming. 
Therefore, a singular subject can be thought of as an ‘immanent identity’ (Deleuze 1994, 128), 
actualised in the Idea presented from the ‘system of the unconscious’ as an expression of 
difference (125). Deleuze’s description of how the subject is produced transforms the way we 
think of the self from the ‘pure self of “I think”’ (129) to the self as ‘itself a modification’ (79), 
and, to this extent, transforms the way in which we think of ourselves through distributions that 
are ‘nomadic rather than sedentary and fixed’ and different, as in, ‘individuating difference’ 
(269). Thinking the self in this way breaks the dominant habitual mental processes of thinking 
according to systems of representation, because the thinking subject is no longer the fixed 
starting point of reference. This development therefore displaces man as the ideal 
representative of a thinking subject and woman as the specular subjective identity of man. To 
this extent, my understanding of Deleuze’s argument challenges the modern image of thought 
that representationally aligns man and mind against woman and body. In doing so, it enables 
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us to explore a way of thinking and acting that is liberated from patriarchal images, opening us 
up to different world-perspectives and new ideas of subjectivity.  
 
According to Braidotti’s account,  
 
[Deleuze’s] work does not rest upon a dichotomous opposition of masculine and feminine subject 
positions but rather on a multiplicity of sexed subjectivities. The differences in degree between them 
mark different lines of becoming, in a web of rhizomatic connections (1994, 112). 
 
Herein lies the potential for a multiplicity of alternative subjectivities to be created beyond the 
images and models designed by and for men. To break the habit of thinking and living through 
patriarchal systems of representation, in which the subject re-presents reality to him/herself 
according to the dominant models and images available, Deleuze posits the process of 
becoming as molecular. For Deleuze, the minority is always understood as an immanent 
outside of the majority, it propels the majority along a line of flight to become something else. 
Braidotti explains that  
 
The minority marks a crossing or a trajectory; nothing happens at the center, for Deleuze: the heart of 
being is still, like the center of a nuclear reactor. But at the periphery there roam the youthful gangs of 
the new nomads: the horsemen and the horsewomen of the postapocalypse (113).  
 
Although Braidotti admits this reading may differ to other readings of Deleuze, she emphasises 
the central and marginal positions of the majority and minority in order to argue their 
asymmetrical starting positions (2011a, 30). It is not about opposing to the majority position a 
minority position such as woman against man, because this would not undo the oppositional 
dialectics of the dualistic and specular systems of representation. Rather, minorities must also 
engage in a process of becoming in order to break out of the unitary identity imposed on them 
by the majority as “others” (30). This is the reason we cannot follow Lerner’s suggested 
‘woman-centered’ process (1987, 228) to produce female thought because it is only through a 
process of individuation that thought can be forced into being and de-programmed out of its 
dominant mode. Braidotti claims that  
 
Alternative figurations consequently are figural modes of expressing affirmative ideas, thus displacing 
the vision of consciousness away from the phallogocentric mode: rhizomes, becomings, lines of escape 
express the fundamentally Nietzschean nomadism of Deleuze (1994, 113).  
 
Her quote is evocative as it suggests that the schizo is figural in the sense that it expresses what 
is problematic in the subject, what is trying to escape it. In other words, minority subjectivities 
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appear as majoritarian subjectivities escaping from themselves. It is in this sense that there is 
no becoming-man, ‘because man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are 
minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 320). And 
becoming-woman is not about becoming a woman, understood as a molar entity defined by her 
form, but creating a ‘molecular woman’ (303-4). The molecular woman is the minoritarian 
subjectivity appeared as the majoritarian subjectivity of Woman, escaping from herself as 
“other”. According to Braidotti, what is ‘[c]rucial to this entire process of becoming-molecular 
is the question of memory’ (2011a, 30). In positing the minoritarian memory as ‘a creative 
force’ in its ‘close relationship to the imagination’ (32), Braidotti provides us with the tools to 
explore Deleuze’s proposal of a new thought as a female thought. 
 
According to Braidotti,  
 
[t]he Majority Subject holds the keys to the central memory of the system and has reduced to the rank of 
insignificant practices, the alternative or subjugated memories of the many minorities (31). 
 
Minority subjects are submitted into representations provided by the majority memory that 
writes their history in relation to that of the majority. As these minority memories were 
forgotten by the majoritarian memory, they cannot be remembered and represented in thought 
and so, according to Braidotti, must be remembered ‘in relation to creative imagination’ 
(2011a, 34). She argues that these minority memories can be created in a process of ‘nomadic 
“remembering” (34). This nomadic and creative process ‘traces empowering transversal lines 
that cut across the staticity of sedimented memory, activating it by de-programming it out of 
the dominant mode’ (2002, 116). In doing so, Braidotti explains that the Majority Subject is 
released from his central memory and its dominant representations into a process of 
‘reinventing a self as other’ (2011a, 33). Consequently, this mode of nomadic remembering for 
the Majority Subject is considered as a process of ‘anti-memory’ because it ‘functions as a 
deterritorializing agency that dislodges the subject from his/her sense of unified and 
consolidated identity’ (31). The Majority Subject is no longer the starting point of reference in 
the process of remembering. According to Braidotti, minority subjects have ‘a head start’ in 
remembering nomadically to the extent that they have already experienced the exclusion and 
subordination from the majoritarian memory. But they still have to ‘activate their memories 
against the black hole of counteridentity claims as well as against the grain of the dominant 
vision of the subject’ (32). For women, remembering minoritarian memories does not mean 
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remembering themselves as “other” to man, but reinventing themselves. In following 
Braidotti’s account of becoming-woman that employs Irigaray’s feminist theory, women 
remember nomadically to reinvent themselves as the other of the other.  
 
(DRIP: In the drip, Labial Drip, I develop Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman 
to align with Irigaray’s notion of the feminine to argue that becoming-woman should be posited 
not as a becoming-other or -elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the other. I 
propose that this model of subjectivity produces a feminine nomad, which supports the claim 
for a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman.) 
 
My understanding of this nomadic mode of remembering breaks dominant habitual mental 
processes of always referring back to a fixed representation of the empirical self, to a process 
of becoming other than what was before. Braidotti argues that  
 
nomadic “remembering” is not indexed on the authority of the past. It rather occurs in relation to creative 
imagination in the future anterior: “you will have changed,” “they will have fought for justice,” “we will 
have been free.” (34). 
 
In this way, minoritarian memories can free the future of “woman” from any a priori 
determination written by the majority memory to the extent that what is remembered is not 
presupposed according to patriarchal representations. Braidotti’s phrases are expressive of 
problematic ideas that evoke questions such as: how much will you have changed? How will 
they have fought for justice? In what cases will we have been free? Who will have been free? 
Posed in this way, Braidotti evokes such ideas without directly determining them. Deleuze 
would describe these questions as ‘those of the accident, the event, the multiplicity – of 
difference – as opposed to that of the essence, or that of the One, or those of the contrary and 
the contradictory’ (1994, 188). These questions of difference do not seek to find a solution to 
‘What is X?’, but rather seek to engender other questions (188). For instance, we gain nothing 
but fixed universal representations when we ask “what is Woman?”, but can explore the 
emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression when we ask “how much will she 
have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have 
been free?” “Who will have been free?”. The ideas that are evoked are expressive of a different 
way of thinking of and about women, as minoritarian subjectivities. This process of thinking 
can produce in us a molecular woman and therefore a process of becoming-woman. For 
Braidotti, this process of becoming-woman is understood as a feminist process of redefining 
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female subjectivity, a project she calls the ‘virtual feminine of sexual difference feminism’ 
(2011b, 103). She claims that the “feminine” in this project is  
 
neither as an essentialized entity nor as an immediately accessible one; femininity is rather a virtual 
reality, in the sense that it is the effect of a political and conceptual project aimed at transcending the 
traditional subject position of Woman as other (111).  
 
My understanding of Braidotti’s account is that the virtual feminine can be understood as the 
project of becoming other of the other as an effect of the process of thinking of and about 
female minoritarian subjectivities, which (will) have been evoked by nomadic remembering.  
 
An example of this nomadic remembering can be found in Woolf’s A Room Of One’s Own, 
where Woolf imagines that Shakespeare had a sister called Judith who was also wonderfully 
and extraordinarily gifted (Woolf 2016a, 46). However, Woolf argues that Shakespeare was 
able to go to grammar school, went to London and became a successful actor. Whereas Judith 
was not sent to school, she ran away to London only to be laughed at by men at the stage door 
and told women could not be actresses, she then became pregnant by an actor-manager who 
took pity on her and so killed herself (46-7). Woolf stresses the contrast between Judith’s story 
and that of her brother’s to exemplify it as an effect of their sexual difference. Braidotti employs 
this example to describe the virtual feminine by claiming Judith as a  
 
figuration of symbolic absence and misery functions simultaneously for Woolf as a source of 
empowerment and inspiration. Her empirical existence lies in the past, yet she is as present as ever in the 
force of the memory and the imagination that evokes her (2006, 184). 
 
Woolf’s process of nomadically remembering Judith guides her writing and, thus, becoming-
woman as she brings into existence a new feminist perspective and female minoritarian 
subjectivity. Remembering Judith enables Woolf to articulate a creative critique of the situation 
of women’s writing in the sixteenth century as well as reclaim women’s genius. Woolf goes 
on to say,  
 
When … one reads of a witch being ducked, of a woman possessed by devils, of a wise woman selling 
herbs, or even of a very remarkable man who had a mother, then I think we are on the trach of a lost 
novelist, a suppressed poet, of some mute and inglorious Jane Austin, some Emily Brontë who dashed 
her brains out on the moor or mopped and mowed about the highways crazed with the torture that her 
gift had put her to. Indeed, I would venture to guess that Anon, who wrote so many poems without 
signing them, was often a woman (2016a, 48).  
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The virtual feminine evoked in Judith brings about a different way of thinking of and about 
these women, who have been submitted into representations provided by the majority memory 
that writes their history in relation to that of the majority. I would even go so far as to say that 
thinking about these women as female minoritarian subjectivities engenders more questions 
that produce new ideas and minoritarian memories, fuelling the virtual feminine process and 
becoming-other of the other. For according to Braidotti, ‘[m]y memories splinter and 
proliferate accordingly, bringing in data that may or may not relate directly to my lived 
experience, but are integral to my consciousness’ (2011b, 110). This feminist process of 
remembering nomadically allows thought to create different realities of the past that did not 
exist before, but could have been, and are nevertheless ready to be activated in the present to 
propel dominant habitual mental processes towards change in the future.  
 
In the drip, Ripple Effect, I develop Irigaray’s suggestion for a sexuate education (2008b) by 
arguing for the construction of feminist dwellings in modern political thought as a feminist 
approach to teaching and learning to think à deux, which thinks of two, for two. Through a 
synthesis of Irigaray’s proposal to build one’s dwelling using our bodies, imagination and 
intelligence (2008b, 235) and Ahmed’s description of feminist dwellings as assembled from 
materials such as citations (2017, 16), I propose that the process of thinking à deux is the 
activity of building a feminist dwelling. Within this flow between the two drips, I would argue 
that when imagining Judith’s story, Woolf is building her feminist dwelling in literature as a 
feminist approach to writing and thinking à deux, to the extent that Woolf is nomadically 
remembering two different Shakespeares, for two different becomings. In writing from within 
her feminist dwelling, it is not so ironic that Woolf’s novel is entitled, A Room of One’s Own. 
I suggest that we learn how to express the problems that reside within patriarchal ideas of 
women by asking questions of difference in the feminist dwellings such as, “how much will 
she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women 
have been free?” “Who will have been free?”. These questions of difference will evoke 
processes of nomadic remembering which will engender processes of thinking differently, not 
traditionally, of and about women. This process will produce a female thought because it 
engenders a process of individuation fuelled by the virtual feminine and becoming-other of the 
other, opening thought to feminine difference and de-programming it out of its dominant mode. 
These are the questions of difference that will be asked in the feminist dwellings in order to 
avoid recuperation within a dogmatic masculine image of thought. Therefore, we must ask 
them because, in the words of Woolf,  
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She lives in you and in me, and in many other women who are not here tonight, for they are washing up 
the dishes and putting the children to bed. But she lives; for great poets do not die; they are continuing 
presences; they need only the opportunity to walk among us in the flesh. This opportunity, as I think, it 


































There is an art to learning that takes thought on an involuntary journey. According to Deleuze, 
this process of learning is made possible through an encounter with signs (1994, 22). Deleuze 
says that an encounter produces problematic signs that ‘perplexes’ the learner and forces her 
or him to think (139-40). Through this perplexing experience, Deleuze explains that learning 
occurs ‘in the relation between a sign and a response’ (22). By developing a Deleuzian account 
of the process of learning, I will argue that the learner engages in a process of becoming-artist. 
Understanding the process of learning as an artistic practice, I will argue that an artistic 
approach aimed at experimentation can resist the traditional approach of instruction aimed at 
knowledge. When learning is understood in this way, the teacher also becomes an artist (Allan 
2013, 55) and co-participates in the process of learning with the student by emitting signs that 
can be developed through art. 
 
In his introduction to Difference and Repetition, Deleuze employs the example of learning to 
swim in the sea to convey his understanding of the process of learning (1994, 23). Learning to 
swim is a different experience for every learner as the body of water affects different bodies of 
swimmers in different ways. Enveloped within the body of water in the sea, the swimmer 
engages with the signs of the waves, such as the problem of an oncoming wave. The encounter 
of the wave is problematic to the extent that the swimmer does not yet know how to respond 
to it. Semetsky describes this process as ‘[n]ot-yet-knowing-how-to-swim,’ where she explains 
that the swimmer ‘struggles against the waves because she [or he] is facing the unknown and 
unthought’ (2013, 223). Confronted with the involuntary movement of the waves, the swimmer 
responds to its problematic signs through the movements of her or his body. According to 
Deleuze’s description of the process of learning, the swimmer learns by conjugating  
 
the distinctive points of [her or his body] with the singular points of the objective Idea [that is swimming] 
in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at 
which our real acts are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a solution to 
the problem [of swimming] (1994, 165). 
 
We could say, in this context, that ‘the distinctive points of our bodies’ are the ‘subjective acts’, 
which are ‘carried out’ by the body of the swimmer in relation to ‘the singular points of the 
objective Idea’ confronted in ‘the objecticity of a problem’ that is swimming in a body of water 
(164-5). Performing these ‘subjective acts’ in the water engages the swimmer to adjust her or 
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his ‘real acts’ to her or his ‘perceptions of the real relations’ of the waves and, subsequently, 
learns how to swim (164-5). As a result, the learner may develop the problem of not-yet-
knowing-how-to-swim into an Idea of swimming to the extent that the learner was forced to 
think of how to respond to the problematic signs produced in the encounter through their bodily 
movements.  
 
(DRIP: Deleuze’s quote is important as it describes his understanding of “thought” as that 
which is first of all non-representational thought (against most of the history of philosophy), 
and aesthetic rather than conceptual. See the drip Mist for Deleuze’s account of the history of 
Western philosophy of thought and his proposal to understand thought not as conceived in 
terms of recognition, but as the expression of ideas.) 
 
It is in this sense that Deleuze says ‘“learning” always takes place in and through the 
unconscious’ because the learner’s unconscious physical processes produce responses that 
allow for new knowledge to emerge at the ‘threshold of consciousness’ (165). At this conscious 
threshold, Cutler and MacKenzie claim that the learner acquires a ‘sense of having learnt 
something new’ through the ‘acquisition of new bodily habits’ (2011, 57). They explain that 
this process of becoming conscious of the act of learning ‘marks a change in one’s internal 
sense of oneself’, in which the learner can consider herself or himself as ‘being conscious and 
active learners, without undermining the transcendental priority of “passive” learning’ (57). 
Cutler and MacKenzie argue that this development is still compatible with Deleuze’s account 
of the passive synthesis of habit in ways that do not compromise ‘Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique of subjectivism’ (58). They argue that the process of learning does not stop when the 
learner becomes conscious she or he is learning because, they explain that ‘[k]nowledge is not 
the end of learning’ rather, it ‘emerges “as one learns”’ (68). That is to say, by becoming 
conscious that she or he is learning, the learner does not stop learning ‘in and through the 
unconscious’ (Deleuze 1994, 165). According to Semetsky, this learning process can be 
understood as a process of the ‘unconscious-becoming-conscious’ (2013, 230), because the 
learner becomes conscious of a process that remains unconscious. Learning can therefore be 
understood as an ongoing process to the extent that learning takes place in the unconscious. 
Cutler and MacKenzie propose that learning in this way ‘maintains learning as a transcendental 
condition of what it means to think’ (2011, 59). In other words, thought is produced from 
experience. The teacher can teach “learning”, but she or he cannot represent what that means 
in any specific instance.  
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Learning, therefore, is not a case of copying the teacher. For Deleuze, prioritising the 
knowledge of the teacher produces a hierarchy in the relationship between teacher and learner, 
in which the teacher is positioned as “master” and the learner as her or his “disciple”. Deleuze 
describes this relationship as an ‘infantile prejudice,’ in which ‘the master sets a problem, our 
task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority’ (1994, 158). 
He critiques this dogmatic image of learning as that which subordinates learning to knowledge 
and ‘profoundly betrays what it means to think’ (167). Deleuze says, ‘the movements of the 
swimming instructor which we reproduce on the sand bear no relation to the movements of the 
wave,’ and to this extent, he argues that ‘[w]e learn nothing from those who say: “Do as I do”’ 
(23). According to Cutler and MacKenzie, the swimming instructor who instructs swimmers 
to copy their movements outside of the body of water employ a teaching method that ‘presumes 
that knowledge of swimming can be transmitted through the regulation of the learning process’ 
and ‘is premised upon the idea that every learner learns the same way’ (2011, 54). In return, 
the swimmer must re-present this method in order to show that they are “learning” (54). Cutler 
and MacKenzie argue that one cannot learn how to swim through this method because it teaches 
by way of ‘conscious conceptual construction’, in other words, representation, in which the 
learner can think she or he can swim, however, without engaging her or his body with the signs 
of the water, the learner cannot actualise an idea of swimming (55). The only way to know how 
to respond to the problematic signs of the wave is, quite simply, to dive in! According to Bogue,  
 
Only when the swimmer’s body interacts with the waves of the sea can swimming begin, and it is the 
encounter between wave-signs and the responding body movements that does the teaching (2013, 22). 
 
Therefore, in order to learn we have to do something with the signs in the body of water, and 
it is in this sense that I agree with Bogue’s description that ‘the signs themselves are the 
teachers’ (22). In this Deleuzian approach, Bogue explains that the swimming instructor is not 
positioned as the “master” who provides ‘apprentices with answers’, instead she or he is an 
‘emitter of signs’ who ‘guides [apprentices] in the art of discovering problems, an art that can 
only be mastered by practising it’ (31). The teacher can teach “learning” by inviting the learners 
to dive in and experience the problematic signs themselves. In accord with Deleuze’s 
understanding of learning, the learner can now be understood as an ‘apprentice’, who is no 
longer positioned as the master’s “disciple” who seeks to know what her or his “master” knows, 
but who ‘constitutes and occupies practical or speculative problems as such’ (1994, 164), that 
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is, who learns by doing. As Deleuze says, ‘[o]ur only teachers are those who tell us to “do with 
me”, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures 
for us to reproduce’ (23). The process of learning is described by Deleuze as a practical 
apprenticeship, which is not an education of the knowledge held and taught by the swimming 
instructor as “master”, but is an ‘education of the senses’ insofar that the apprentice learns 
through encounters that incite ‘an involuntary adventure’ that ‘affects the entire individual’ 
(165).  
 
With this development, I suggest that the teacher can create the site of learning as an artistic 
experience by becoming an artist and emitting signs that can be developed through artistic 
encounters. By proposing learning through an artistic encounter, I argue that learners can co-
participate in the artistic experience by becoming artists themselves and what they learn can 
become apparent in their artistic expression.  
 
(DRIP: In the puddle, Condensation, I explore this idea of an artistic experiential pedagogy 
through the example of my own collaborative feminist artistic pedagogy.) 
 
According to Allan’s following summary, I agree that ‘the arts have a potential reach that 
enables teachers to engage all students … to provoke altered forms of subjectivity and to 
promote a more affecting kind of education’ (2013, 37).  
 
(DRIP: Others who also posit art as an affirmative tool for an education of affect include 
Boberg 2018, Deleuze 1997b, Cutler 2013a, Greene 2011, Grushka and Young 2014, Hickey-
Moody 2013, Matarraso 1997, and Pringle 2009.)  
 
Allan explains that artistic encounters have the potential to take learners ‘out of the reach of 
the familiar and into new territories of experience’ (2013, 42). By describing the artistic 
experience in this way, we are reminded of Deleuze’s example of the experience of learning to 
swim in the unfamiliar waters of the sea. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the problematic 
signs that perplexes the learner and forces them to think are produced by the ‘percepts and 
affects’ preserved within an artistic encounter. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the ‘percepts 
and affects’ preserved in an artistic encounter makes our experience of the art “object” distinct 
from our experience of empirical objects (1994, 164). They offer pre-personal sensations that 
challenge our tendency to interpret art through representation and recognition. 
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(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for a full definition of percepts and affects.) 
 
In understanding the artistic encounter as an assemblage of sensory affects, the learner’s 
experience of it cannot be captured by representational thought but her or his thought is forced 
into involuntary movements incited by what is sensed. The new ideas that are forced into 
thought engender a different way of thinking and acting as they become the real conditions of 
the learner’s experience. It is not that art does this, it is rather that we call it art (what Deleuze 
and Guattari mean at least) if this happens. The artistic encounter incites a becoming by 
offering us an experience of a pre-individual world. With the purpose of developing an 
argument for an artistic experiential pedagogy, I will first outline the grounds for experiential 
learning through Semetsky’s development of Deleuze’s understanding of learning in 
experience, as edusemiotics (2013).  
 
Although I will not explicitly employ Semetsky’s terminology of edusemiotics to pursue my 
argument for an artistic experiential pedagogy, Semetsky’s edusemiotics is worth outlining 
because our proposals align to the extent that we both articulate an experiential kind of learning 
to resist the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge (Semetsky 2013, 215), 
which I propose through artistic processes (see Heaney and Mackenzie 2017, Heaney, 
Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2017, and Gaydon, Heaney, Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2019). 
With Deely, Semetsky describes this ‘educational semiotics’ as a pedagogy which ‘is not 
reducible to teaching “true” facts, but aims to enrich experience with meaning and significance’ 
(2017, 207-16). They argue that  
 
Edusemiotics challenges the present status of education that continues to be haunted by the ghosts of the 
past: Cartesian substance dualism, analytic philosophy of language, and the scientific, objective method 
of modernity as the sole ground for educational research that tends to ignore human subjectivity with its 
gamut of experiences and purposes (209). 
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Mist, for a feminist argument that this Cartesian substance dualism fuels 
the mapping for a series of dichotomies that representationally align with a male/female 
opposition, the most relevant being man and mind against woman and body.) 
 
I agree with Deely and Semetsky’s attack on the present status of education that divides 
knowledge and experience, because the creative potential of learning is lost when the outcome 
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of research is already determined by the transmission of pre-existing facts or “truths”. There is 
nothing new to be learnt when knowledge is acquired in terms of recognition or instruction.  
 
(DRIP: In the drip, Ripple Effect, I explore similar themes that critique the construction and 
dissemination of knowledge in political theory as the saturation and repetition of patriarchal 
ideas.) 
 
Deely and Semetsky go so far as to claim that learning cannot be achieved in this form of 
education because it operates through a detached view of the world (214). Learning can be 
achieved, they argue instead, by constructing meaning from lived experience in the world 
(214). For them, 
 
Experiential learning expands the walls of the traditional classroom and opens it to the greater social and 
natural world. … The realization of meanings in lived experience enriches this very experience with its 
existential dimension. Edusemiotics creates a novel open-ended foundation for knowledge which is 
always already of the nature of a process; thus subject to evolution, development and the intrusion of 
signs that need to be interpreted anew in the unpredictable circumstances of lived experience for which 
our old habits of thought and action may be unfit or counterproductive (216).  
 
Deely and Semetsky’s pedagogical approach has the potential to engage learners to think 
through the expression of ideas by experiencing them, rather than positioning learners as 
passive receptors of pre-existing knowledge. That is to say, instead of understanding that the 
process of learning is guided by the will to know, it is posited as an exploration into the 
unknown. In this sense, the outcome of research cannot be pre-determined and so must be 
achieved through experimentation. As Deleuze and Guattari say,  
 
you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with, you don’t know which subterranean stem is 
effectively going to make a rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment (2004, 
277)!  
 
By venturing into the unknown, unfamiliar problems can arise that call for experimentation to 
produce new ideas. This leads to a process of learning from experience and becoming-other 
(Semetsky 2013, 219). Semetsky proposes that these learners are ‘nomads capable of 
overcoming the limits of being and tapping into multiple becomings’ (232). Moreover, 
Semetsky posits teachers within this mode of learning as edusemioticians, ‘capable of reading, 
interpreting and creating signs … whose function is to be clinicians of culture and inventors of 
new immanent modes of existence’ (232). To this extent, Semetsky outlines a proposal for the 
classroom to become ‘an informal learning site permeated with signs’ to represent ‘a milieu for 
 113 
the transformational pragmatics of experience’ (215). I will suggest that this informal learning 
site can be created by organising the classroom as a space of artistic encounters.  
 
According to Semetsky, learning in the face of the unknown and unthought engenders a new 
image of (affective) thought, which is semiotic because it operates by interpreting, or 
evaluating, experience (217-8). Learning in and from experiencing unfamiliar territory is, 
therefore, how we come to create and know new ideas. However, it is important to note that 
once we come to know them we can represent them but such representations do not capture the 
process in which they were formed. In order to capture the significance of the event 
experienced, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the learner creates concepts (1994, 5). They 
describe the process of concept creation as that of setting up and extracting the event in our 
experience (160). Within the context of Deleuze’s example of learning to swim, Semetsky 
describes this creative process as that in which the learner ‘has to invent a novel concept of 
what it means to swim in the midst of the very encounter’ (2013, 223). The learner engages in 
a practical process of learning whilst experiencing the encounter, and invents a concept with 
which to express the ‘unknown problematic’ she or he has encountered (223). It is a practical 
task to the extent that the learner experiences the significance of the event in practice, and 
makes sense of the difference that presents a shock to thought. By learning in and from 
experience, as Semetsky explains, the novel concepts ‘embody a singularity of experience’ 
because learning occurs ‘“by grasping … signs” … in practice, within the experiential milieu’ 
(Deleuze 1994, 23, quoted in Semetsky 2013, 220-3). It is in this sense that Deleuze and 
Guattari say that the ‘concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing’ (1994, 21). That is 
to say, it speaks the significance of the experience of the event so that the learner can make 
sense of it in order to express the problem that resides within the idea forced into thought in 
the encounter.  
 
Learning to express a problem (Idea) in a new concept is a necessarily creative process because, 
according to Deleuze, ‘concepts involve two other dimensions, percepts and affects’ (1995, 
137). This creative task of expressing a problem (Idea) in a new concept describes the task of 
philosophy as it is understood by Deleuze, which requires a ‘philosophical understanding, 
through concepts, [and] a nonphilosophical understanding, rooted in percepts and affects’ 
(139). Therefore, according to Deleuze, in order to express a new concept, ‘you need all three 
to get things moving’ (165). In creating a new triadic relationship, Semetsky explains that the 
new concept makes sense out of the experience because it is produced in its relationship with 
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percept and affect which makes this concept ‘filled with sense’ (2013, 220-1). Semetsky 
describes this ‘irreducible triad’ as that which comprises ‘a genuine sign of transformational 
pragmatics’ (219). This ‘genuine sign’ expresses what is sensed in the encounter by producing 
sense. According to Semetsky,  
 
A sign filled with sense is produced under the proviso of transversal communication between the series 
of events operating along different planes or levels so that these planes become related: they form a 
multiplicity, a Janus-faced genuine sign functioning as a semiotic bridge between different planes even 
without actually passing from one to another (228). 
 
Although incited by, and thus related to, an encounter with signs, expressing a new ‘genuine 
sign’ is not about reproducing the sign already encountered, because the problem produced has 
already transformed into an idea and is therefore operating along a different plane. The new 
sign therefore cannot be a representation of the sign already encountered because it bears a 
problem (idea) that ‘reveals and unfolds something new’ (Ayyar 2014, 16). That is to say, 
expressing a new sign produces a different sense, which can incite a different experience. 
Semetsky’s quote suggests that as ‘a Janus-faced genuine sign’, it can operate between different 
planes (2013, 228), such as those described by Deleuze and Guattari as the plane of immanence 
of philosophy, which thinks through concepts, and the plane of composition of art, which thinks 
through affects and percepts (1994, 66). Learning to express these signs can be thought of as 
an aesthetic activity of thinking to the extent that it involves inventing new triadic relationships 
between concepts, percepts and affects by passing into each plane (66). Learning to think 
aesthetically will enable us to learn to think differently because it may require the learner to 
‘decisively modify what thinking means, draw up a new image of thought, and institute a new 
plane of immanence’ (66). 
 
Although Semetsky does not describe edusemiotics as an artistic experiential learning, she does 
however describe, with Deely, that the process of engaging with and learning from signs brings 
a ‘dimension of art into the science of signs’ (2017, 216). To this extent, I will develop 
Semetsky’s proposal for experiential learning by arguing that the process of grasping signs in 
practice and developing them in the encounter is artistic; which not only confirms Semetsky 
and Deely’s description that engaging with and learning from signs brings an artistic dimension 
into the science of signs, it also produces art as part of the creative process. That is not to say 
that the art produced is born out of the concept invented, in which the learner creates conceptual 
art. According to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[i]n the one [plane of composition] there is the 
constellation of a universe or affects and percepts; and in the other, constitutions of immanence 
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or concepts’ (1994, 66). The process of inventing concepts and creating art requires different 
approaches to the extent that ‘[a]rt thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects 
and percepts’ (66). However, Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘[t]his does not mean that the 
two entities do not often pass into each other in a becoming that sweeps them both up in an 
intensity which co-determines them’, forming ‘alliances’ or ‘branchings and substitutions’ 
between the two planes, in which ‘the concept as such can be concept of the affect, just as the 
affect can be affect of the concept’ (66). In each case, the concept of the affect and the affect 
of the concept comprises a new genuine sign. The art produced, therefore, cannot amount to 
conceptual art that, according to Duchamp, seeks ‘complete anaesthesia’, that is, to subtract its 
affects (and aesthetics) from art (1973, 141), because it preserves the affect of the concept.  
 
(DRIP: See Zepke for an excellent overview of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of conceptual 
art and suggestions for possible trajectories for a Deleuze and Guattarian contemporary 
aesthetics (2006, 2008, 2014 and 2017).) 
 
Rather, according to Deleuze and Guattari, it may create a new plane of immanence which is 
populated not by the creation of new concepts, but ‘with other instances, with other poetic, 
novelist, or even pictorial or musical entities’ (1994, 66-7). They employ a list of philosophers, 
including Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as examples of thinkers who have created such planes 
of immanence (67). They describe these thinkers as  
 
“half” philosophers but also much more than philosophers. … To be sure, they do not produce a synthesis 
of art and philosophy. They brunch out and do not stop brunching out. They are hybrid geniuses who 
neither erase nor cover over differences in kind but, on the contrary, use all the resources of their 
“athleticism” to install themselves within this very difference, like acrobats torn apart in a perpetual show 
of strength (67). 
 
Given the examples of ‘hybrid geniuses’ employed by Deleuze and Guattari, it suggests 
creating such planes of immanence is not so easy and that the average learner might not reach 
it. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s brief acknowledgement that the two planes may traverse 
each other enables us to rethink the distinct processes of inventing concepts and creating art as 
a potential hybrid approach, that may transgress the distinction Deleuze and Guattari 
themselves tend to maintain between philosophical thought and artistic practice. This hybrid 
approach could be understood as that of creating affective concepts through an artistic 
experiential process of learning.  
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(DRIP: An example of art that might be produced in this hybrid process could amount to 
Zepke’s concept of the ‘affectual readymade’ (2008, 36). See the drip, Drizzle, in which I 
develop upon Zepke’s account of this readymade to propose that its aesthetic excess enables 
percepts and affects to be preserved, which enriches the artistic ensemble so as to incite a new 
artistic encounter(s) or becoming(s).) 
 
By understanding the process of learning as an artistic practice, I will argue that the learner, 
when learning, engages in a process of becoming-artist. This concept will develop Allan’s 
description of the ‘teacher-becoming-artist’ (2013, 51) by arguing that both the teacher and the 
learners co-participate in the artistic experience by becoming artists. That is not to say that the 
learners copy the teacher’s artistic expression, rather, they engage in their own artistic 
processes of learning in order to make sense of the artistic experience incited by the artistic 
encounter offered by the teacher. With the purpose of developing the process of learning as an 
artistic process of learning to preserve the affective concept that expresses a new sign in art, I 
will turn to Proust who describes the process of producing signs as an artistic process of 
translation (2010, 232).  
 
(DRIP: This art-thesis not only expresses the concept of what I think it means to become a 
learner- and teacher- becoming-artist, it also preserves the affect of the concept by expressing 
the traditional idea of a thesis as an artistic encounter. I invented this affective concept to 
express the problem I faced as a female student in the midst of experiencing what Richardson 
calls a ‘sad encounter’ with the construction and dissemination of knowledge in political theory 
as the saturation and repetition of patriarchal ideas (1998, 98). By carving out my own artistic 
process of learning, I infused the encountered political theory concepts with percepts and 
affects which enabled me to experience them in ways that creatively confronted the 
hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. This art-thesis is created to express a new 
sign of a feminine artistic problem of what a thesis may become.) 
 
For Proust, translating signs requires ‘an act of creation’ because they present ‘unknown 
symbols’, which he describes take ‘after the fashion of those hieroglyphic characters’ (2010, 
232-3). Proust employed the metaphor of hieroglyphics in order to describe this process of 
translation:   
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I had the feeling that perhaps beneath these signs there lay something of a quite different kind which I 
must try to discover, some thought which they translated after the fashion of those hieroglyphic 
characters which at first one might suppose to represent only material objects. … if I tried to read them 
no one could help me with any rules, for to read them was an act of creation in which no one can do our 
work for us or even collaborate with us (232-3, my italics). 
 
In Deleuzian terms, these thoughts are unknown because they are not recognised by our image 
of thought that does not have a representation for them. Therefore, they are forced into thought 
as hieroglyphic characters to the extent that hieroglyphics can express that which can only be 
sensed in the secret messages that underlie the signs. Deleuze explains that our ‘mistake is to 
suppose that the hieroglyphs represent “only material objects”’ (2000, 13) because this 
‘something’ that forces us to think ‘is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental 
encounter’ (1994, 139). This ‘object’ cannot be recognised because it bears a sign that is 
‘imperceptible’ (139). According to Deleuze, the hieroglyphs are not representations, but secret 
messages which they transmit as a sensuous impression in the material object (2000, 11). The 
‘object of encounter’, therefore, points to something other than what the object itself represents; 
it points to its secret message that ‘can only be sensed’ (1994, 139-40). For example, the sea is 
the ‘object’ which bears the signs of a multiplicity of waves, the movements of which can only 
be experienced by diving in. I propose that it is this idea of the encounter described by Deleuze 
that the teacher can introduce as an artistic encounter to create the site of learning as an artistic 
experience for the learners, to which the learners, in their experience of this artistic encounter, 
engage in their own artistic processes of learning in order to make sense of its secret message. 
 
According to Ayyar, when one encounters a sign,  
 
they are actually seeing the effect of a set of rapid judgments that their mind has made from its unique 
perspective. These judgments are as subtle and hard to perceive as hieroglyphics nearly effaced from the 
walls of an ancient tomb. Art sinks in and reveals those delicate inscriptions (2014, 17). 
 
This artistic process of translation, Ayyar explains, is ‘the true vocation of the artist’ because 
the message in the sign can only be found  
 
in the unique perspective of its experiencer. And that unique perspective can be manifested only through 
artistic expression. Thus the meaning of a sign, its secret message, is revealed in how art may use it to 
show us our own way of seeing things (17).  
 
Only the learner-becoming-artist can reveal what she or he experienced in the encounter with 
a sign by translating the thought it produced. The task of the learner-becoming-artist therefore 
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becomes that of learning to reveal the delicate inscriptions produced in thought, in the 
encounter with a sign, through art. As Deleuze says,  
 
Henceforth, the world revealed by art reacts on all the others and notably on the sensuous signs; it 
integrates them, colors them with an aesthetic meaning, and imbues what was still opaque about them’ 
(2000, 13-4). 
 
Through the encounter, as Deleuze explains, the learner experiences ‘the quality [that] no 
longer appears as a property of the object that now possesses it, but as the sign of an altogether 
different object that we must try to decipher’ (2000, 11). I posit that one of the tasks of the 
learner-becoming-artist can be found in Proust’s description of the process of translating signs: 
 
to interpret the given sensations as signs of so many laws and ideas, by trying to think – that is to say, to 
draw forth from the shadow – what [she or he] had merely felt, by trying to convert it into its spiritual 
equivalent (2010, 232). 
 
According to Proust, the experience with these signs gives ‘an impression which is material 
because it enters us through the senses but yet has a spiritual meaning which it is possible for 
us to extract’ (232). The creative process of learning to express the problem that resides within 
the idea forced into thought in the encounter can be understood as the artistic process of trying 
to ‘draw forth’ the messages from the shadow of secrecy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
through an artistic process of translation, the learner-becoming-artist can render ‘perceptible 
the imperceptible’ signs produced in the encounter (1994, 182). In the example of learning to 
swim, perhaps Deleuze’s book on Bacon might be more appropriate to use to the extent that 
these imperceptible signs become ‘invisible forces’ that the learner-becoming-artist can render 
visible through her or his bodily movements with the waves (2005, 40). In doing so, we learn 
from Deleuze, the learner-becoming-artist comes to ‘understand that the sensuous signs [or 
forces] already referred to an ideal essence that was incarnated in their material meaning’ 
(2000, 14). That is to say, the secret of the sign is its essence. The essence of the sea is its 
heterogeneous movement of waves. 
 
The artistic process of learning to make sense of experience is explained in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s description of artistic practice: 
 
the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to 
wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, 
a pure being of sensations (1994, 167). 
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Deleuze explains that what is extracted from the object of encounter is not the materials or the 
object it represents, ‘but the unconscious themes, the involuntary archetypes in which the 
words, but also the colors and the sounds, assume their meaning and their life’ (2000, 47). It is 
the heterogeneous movements of the waves that give the sea its meaning and life. The essence 
of the sign is incarnated in these ‘unconscious themes’, and are those which ‘form a 
spiritualized substance’ (47). According to Deleuze, art has the ability to express these 
unconscious themes through a ‘veritable transmutation of substance’, in which ‘substance is 
spiritualized and physical surroundings dematerialized in order to refract essence, that is, the 
quality of an original world’ (47). For Deleuze, this artistic ‘treatment of substance is 
indissociable from “style.”’ (47). He argues that ‘in order to spiritualize substance and render 
it adequate to essence’ in a work of art, style ‘reproduces the unstable opposition, the original 
complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial elements that constitute essence 
itself’ (48). That is to say, style translates essence through art by expressing it in a substance 
(words, colours, sounds, movements) that can recreate what Proust describes as ‘the primordial 
elements of nature’ (2010, 906). Deleuze explains that style substitutes ‘the determined 
conditions of an unconscious natural product’ for ‘the free conditions of an artistic production’ 
(2000, 155). Artistic style sets up a resonance between the object of encounter experienced and 
an artistic object of encounter in order to extract the secret message that can express what is 
sensed. As a result, the style of art can recapture ‘the quality of an original world’ in an artistic 
object of encounter (47). To use a well-known example that Deleuze employed in his book on 
Bacon (2005, 22), Snow Storm – Steam-Boat of a Harbour’s Mouth Making Signals in Shallow 
Water, and going by the Lead. The Author was in this Storm on the Night the “Ariel” left 
Harwich (1842), Turner’s style of painting captures the essence of the sea caught in a storm. 
His movement of brush strokes express the different movements of the rough waves, producing 
an artistic object of encounter that expresses and recaptures the original quality of the 
primordial elements of nature experienced. According to Deleuze, artistic style expresses ‘that 
continuous and refracted birth, that birth regained in substances adequate to essences, that birth 
which has become the metamorphosis of objects’ (2000, 48). Therefore, style raises lived 
perceptions and affections experienced in the encounter with signs, to the percept and affect in 
the creation of a work of art (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 170). 
 
We must be wary of the importance we place on the learner-becoming-artist in this artistic 
process of harnessing the essence of the sign, for Deleuze explains that ‘[s]tyle is not the man, 
style is essence itself’ (2000, 48). That is to say, it is not the subject as writer, painter, musician 
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‘that explains essence’ (43), it is, rather, ‘the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and 
rhythms, the painter’s lines and colours’ that can express the unconscious themes that harness 
essence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 170). Given that these words, marks, colours, and sounds 
cannot be expressed without a subject to express them, I agree with Ayyar’s argument that the 
expression of these unconscious themes invariably take ‘on the artist’s signature style, which 
is the artistic manifestation of the artist’s perspective’ (2014, 18). As a result, the artistic 
expression is produced in ‘personalised metaphors’ because only the artist can describe what 
is sensed by making connections or resemblances (17). In the context of learning to swim, the 
body of each swimmer is different to the next and so the body of water will affect different 
swimmers in different ways. To this extent, the swimmer’s bodily movements with the waves 
will be different for each swimmer, thereby, producing different personalised styles of 
swimming. However, although the artistic expression is produced by the artist, essence does 
not become the subject’s because it is distinguished from the subject’s existence (Deleuze 
2000, 43). According to Deleuze, essence transcends ‘the states of subjectivity no less than the 
properties of the object’ to the extent that ‘it is irreducible’ both ‘to the object emitting it’ and 
‘to the subject apprehending it’ (38). The essence will be lost if the learner designates that it 
belongs to the material object that now possesses it, or extracts it so it belongs to herself or 
himself as the subject who apprehended it (31). Therefore, it is expressed by the artist ‘as the 
essence not of the subject, but of Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject’ 
(43). That is to say, the subject is seized by essence to the extent that it ‘implicates, envelops, 
wraps itself up in the subject’ in order to reveal to her or him an ‘independent reality’, that is, 
a viewpoint that is ‘difference itself, the absolute internal difference’ (42-3).  
 
If essence is understood as style, then it has the potential to transform the way the learner 
engages with the world. To this extent, Deleuze claims that essence ‘constitutes subjectivity’ 
(43). Which is to say, essence ‘is not only individual, but is individualizing’ because it 
‘determines the substances in which it is incarnated’ by artistic style (48). No one other than 
the learner can express the essence revealed in her or his viewpoint, and it is to this extent that 
essence loses ‘nothing of its singularity’ because, Deleuze explains, the act of creation is 
‘entirely determined by the point of view of essence’ (62). The learner’s viewpoint therefore 
‘expresses an absolutely different world’ to another’s viewpoint (42). For swimmers learning 
to swim, their bodies not only enter the body of water in different ways, but the body of water 
affects their different bodies in different ways, producing different experiences and 
engagements with the sea. According to Proust, 
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Through art alone are we able to emerge from ourselves, to know what another person sees of a universe 
which is not the same as our own and of which, without art, the landscapes would remain as unknown to 
us as those that may exist on the moon. Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world only, our own, we see 
that world multiply itself and we have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists, worlds 
more different one from the other than those which revolve in infinite space, worlds which, centuries 
after the extinction of the fire from which their light first emanated, whether it is called Rembrandt or 
Vermeer, send us still each one its special radiance (2010, 254). 
 
With the understanding that art has the potential to open our viewpoint to others, I propose that 
an artistic process of learning can incite different experiences of the world that can engender 
different perspectives. By experiencing the teacher-becoming-artist’s viewpoint expressed in 
the artistic encounter, the learner can experience how the teacher experiences the world. It is 
not about experiencing what it is like to be the teacher, it is to experience the world from this 
viewpoint itself (Deleuze 2000, 119). According to Guattari, it is an experience in which the 
spectator is able to ‘carry out a complex ontological crystallisation, an alterification of beings-
there’ (1995, 96). For Deleuze, the essence of the sign of art individualizes subjectivity to the 
extent that it ‘surmounts the entire chain of individual association’, that is, it breaks with the 
artist that has expressed it to provide ‘a pure existence’ (2000, 119). Deleuze and Guattari claim 
that art exists in itself as ‘a being of sensation and nothing else’ (1994, 164). The artistic 
experience offered by the teacher-becoming-artist is able to offer the learner an encounter with 
difference which she or he experiences with her or his different viewpoint. This artistic 
experience is understood by Guattari as ‘a transference of subjectivation operating between the 
author and the contemplator of a work of art’ in which the spectator becomes a ‘co-creator’ 
with the author of the work or art (1995, 14). The transference can incite the learner to engage 
in her or his own artistic process with the aim to extract and preserve the affects and percepts 
in an altogether different art “object” to express her or his different viewpoint. To the extent 
that the essence of the artistic encounter experienced is recreated anew, its being of sensations 
will continue to exist and enjoy an eternity in the very moments afforded by the substances it 
is incarnated (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 166). Therefore, extracting and preserving the affects 
and percepts of the artistic encounter introduced by the teacher does not (re)produce the same 
artistic expression as the teacher’s, the learner’s artistic expression transforms the experience 
and brings about the new (see Cazeaux 2000, 615-7). 
 
(DRIP: By preserving the percepts and affects of the melting watches in Dalí’s The Persistence 
of Memory (1931), I am able to express the difference experienced in his artistic encounter in 
an altogether new artistic object of encounter, Duration (2016). Although it has preserved these 
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percepts and affects, Duration is a being of sensation and exists for itself detached from 
association with an individual artist. Therefore, even though I made it, and was inspired by 
Dalí, the essence of the melting clock does not belong to me (or Dalí).) 
 
According to Sousanis, by ‘looking from a different angle’ we are able to deprivilege our 
‘absolute vantage point’ and open ourselves up to the world (2015, 36). He explains the danger 
of ‘a fixed viewpoint’ is that of facilitating ‘a single line of thought’ which can lead us to ‘a 
trap – where we see only what we’re looking for’ and are ‘blind to other possibilities’ (36). I 
argue that this danger can be experienced in the traditional pedagogical approaches of 
instruction aimed at knowledge. This approach traps learners as passive receptors of pre-
existing knowledge to the extent that the only viewpoint they experience is guided by the will 
to know. To resist this danger, Sousanis urges us instead to consider joining ‘in dialogue’ 
different vantage points so that they exist ‘not merely side-by-side’ but ‘they intersect, engage, 
interact, combine, and inform one another’ (37). He describes this process like ‘the coming 
together of two eyes [which] produces stereoscopic vision’; the joining, interplay and overlap 
of these ‘outlooks held in mutual orbits’ can ‘facilitate the emergence of new perspectives’ 
(37). He argues that ‘our solitary standpoint is limited,’ and instead embraces ‘another’s 
viewpoint as essential to our own’ (38). I propose that an artistic approach can develop 
Sousanis’s argument for dialogue to the extent that the teacher-becoming-artist’s expression 
can offer the learner an experience of a different viewpoint, in which the learner can learn to 
see ‘through another’s eyes – from where they stand and [attend] to what they attend to’ (39). 
I argue that this artistic approach can avoid establishing a hierarchy in the relationship between 
teacher and learner, in which the teacher is positioned as “master” and the learner as her or his 
“disciple”, that is experienced in traditional pedagogical approaches, because they have both 
become co-participants in the event that is learning to think differently.  
 
Since each learner’s viewpoint is different to each other’s, I further argue that participating in 
their own artistic processes of learning will enable learners to open their viewpoints to each 
other and experience the different perspectives of their fellow learners-becoming-artists. 
Sousanis explains that ‘expanding our understanding requires divergence of thought and 
diversity of thinkers’, which can produce a ‘kaleidoscopic’ perspective (39). Therefore, by 
experiencing the different viewpoints expressed in the artistic processes of learning, each 
learner can open her or his viewpoint to the multiple and experience the coming together of 
different outlooks which produces a multidimensional perspective. This co-creative process of 
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learning, in common, is how I suggest we carry out Sousanis’s argument for the development 
of ‘kaleidoscopic views’ (39). By learning to swim with other learners, the different 
personalised styles of swimming expressed in the sea may emit signs that can be grasped and 
developed with the waves, producing a multiplicity of different bodily movements with the 
waves, but which are influenced by each other’s movements. It is an artistic experiential 
pedagogy that can resist the rote learning employed in the traditional classroom, in favour of 
an experimental approach that can explore different personalised styles and engender different 
kaleidoscopic perspectives in each learner’s artistic process of learning. 
 
(DRIP: In the drip, Drizzle, I explore artistic process as a schizoanalytical process that can open 
up new possibilities for thinking and being by developing Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
schizo-revolutionary art (2013, 420-1).) 
 
The nature of learning with artistic encounters can now be summarised as an artistic process of 
learning to think difference and to experience the world through a kaleidoscopic perspective. 
It is a pedagogy which can transform the given processes of thought that is taught by rote 
learning and instead can bring about new ways of thinking through artistic encounters. In this 
proposal, the pedagogical task of the teacher becomes that which is neatly summarised by 
MacKenzie and Porter as making ‘an event of thought’ by constructing teaching as ‘an event 
or, what amounts to the same thing, an art-work!’ (2011, 141). Pedagogy practiced through 
artistic approaches, according to MacKenzie and Porter, will mean that teachers, and learners, 
















This puddle will outline an account of a feminist artistic pedagogy I have put into practice in 
collaboration with Heaney in recent years in order to offer a response to the question of what 
can be done to challenge the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. I will argue 
that this pedagogical approach develops a feminine practice that can challenge aspects of 
patriarchy and capitalism within the academic institution. In particular, the hypermasculine 
environment of the academic institution that produces a subjectivity which is aligned with the 
interests of patriarchy, and the corporate institutional processes that capture social spaces and 
create the conditions for the production of a capitalistic subjectivity. It will be argued that new 
feminist artistic encounters can be created by individuals who are in a position to intervene and 
change the refrain of learning from within the hypermasculine institutionalisation of 
knowledge. The pedagogical task of creating new feminist artistic encounters within the 
academic institution will be posited as a process that reinvents the environment of the 
institution and incites different experiences of the institution that could change the way 
individuals are produced. This artistic process of (re)organising the space of the institution will 
take the academic space which is in the process of being reinvented and make it a hypothetical 
space-as-process. Which will be proposed as a space concerned only with the processes of 
creative construction involved when individuals, or artists-as-process (Cutler 2013a, 356), 
achieve autonomy from, but still maintain a relation to, the institution and reinvent the 
environment. Although this puddle will provide an example of a feminist artistic pedagogy, it 
is not to be read as instructions to enforce a particular course of action to confront these aspects 
of patriarchy and capitalism within the academic institution. This approach is formed from our 
own response and outlined in this puddle in the hopes that it will encourage or invite readers 
to carve out their own possible ideas for inventing new pedagogies. This puddle is an invitation 
to explore creative practices of learning that promote existential production with the aim to 
generate conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers. 
 
In this exploration, I will turn to Cutler’s proposal to change the refrain of learning (2013b, 
24). Cutler makes this proposal through her critique that learning in the art institution is 
discussed in primary relation to institutional critique (1). Through this perspective, education 
in the art institution is discussed in terms of its institutional position rather than as a practice 
in itself (13). Drawing upon Fraser’s definition of institutional critique, Cutler proposes to 
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use the very debate in which learning in the art institution is discussed to find ways to change 
the refrain (41). According to Fraser, institutional critique is defined  
 
as a methodology of critically reflexive site specificity … [that] engages sites above all as social sites, 
structured sets of relations that are fundamentally social relations … it does not aim to affirm, expand 
or reinforce a site or our relation to it, but to problematise and change it (2006b, 305-6).  
 
Fraser’s use of terms relating to the social allows her to argue for the use of the term “us” as 
implicated within the social relations in the “institution” (2005a, 123). With the purpose of 
addressing Fraser’s “us” and how change can be engendered in the refrain of learning in the 
art institution, Cutler employs Guattari’s work on The Three Ecologies (2000) and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of the refrain (2004). Given that Cutler’s framework is developed in 
the context of an art institution where “learning” is often a team as well as a matter of practice, 
the “us” she is accounting for are the learning teams and practices of learning in art 
institutions. The purpose of employing Cutler’s work in this puddle is to apply the 
poststructuralist framework she puts together to engender a different approach to learning in 
the academic institution. The “us” I call upon within the context of the academic institution are 
those who are implicated in transmitting the refrain of learning. I argue that the refrain of 
learning in the academic institution prioritises the hypermasculine institutionalisation of 
knowledge over feminine difference, and is transmitted through traditional pedagogical 
approaches of instruction aimed at achieving knowledge. Cutler’s framework will be useful to 
find ways of changing the refrain of learning in the academic institution from within the 
hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge.  
 
In building upon Cutler’s poststructuralist framework, I will incorporate Guattari’s proposal 
for schizoanalysis. For Guattari, changing the refrain does not always discount the possibility 
that it will become the new form of normalisation (1995, 16-7). In the context of changing the 
refrain of learning in the academic institution, it is not a case of suggesting a new pedagogical 
model or environment that is fairer and more inclusive, only for it to become the new dominant 
refrain of learning. I argue that a schizoanalytical approach affords “us” the potential to create 
new processes of learning in each class because it operates through practices of 
experimentation (Guattari 2000, 34-5). A schizoanalytical approach can change the refrain of 
learning through experimentation or improvisation, to not only produce new songs of learning 
as proposed by Cutler (2013b, 47), but in ways that can avoid the lurch back into normalisation 
(Guattari 1995, 79). I will argue that the new songs of learning produced through a 
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schizoanalytical approach explores existential productions that challenge production aligned 
with the interests of capitalism and patriarchy. This puddle will explore a way of changing the 
refrain of learning that prioritises the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge through 
a schizo-revolutionary feminist artistic approach. What this amounts to, I propose, is a schizo-
revolutionary feminist artistic pedagogy that engenders processes of learning through practices 
of experimentation. 
 
(DRIP: This pedagogical approach is developed from the schizo-revolutionary labial theory of 
artistic practice proposed in the drip, Drizzle. Developing upon Zepke’s account of schizo-
revolutionary artistic practice (2014), I posit a feminist artistic practice of resistance that can 
challenge the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation and thoroughly incite the 
practice of becoming-woman.) 
 
In order to explore why Cutler’s framing matters, I will now turn to her engagement with this 
poststructuralist framework to map how differences can be made through individual, social and 
institutional practices. According to Guattari, the three ecologies are constituted by ‘the 
environment, social relations and human subjectivity’ (2000, 28). He describes the interplay 
between these three ecological registers as an ecosophy (28). For Cutler,  
 
Ecosophy usefully addresses the “us” and poses a direct challenge to the perpetuation of the 
institutional conditions described by Fraser through rethinking contradiction as a potential for re-
assemblage and invoking an always-implied individual responsibility in relation to the social and the 
environment (2013b, 27).  
 
In turning to the Guattarian concept of the subject, Cutler considers the always-implied “us” 
as the potential for the interruption and alteration of the refrain of learning (28). According 
to Genosko, the Guattarian subject  
 
is not an individual, an individuated person, thinking and thus being … Rather, [it] is an entangled 
assemblage of many components, a collective (heterogeneous, multiple) articulation of such 
components before and beyond the individual; the individual is like a transit station for changes, 
crossings and switches (2009, 106).  
 
Changing the refrain is not a simple matter of wishing it into existence however, new songs are 
learnt through a processual practice. Moreover, changing the refrain does not occur instantly 
with the creation of a new song. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the song needs time to 
establish itself as a refrain (2004, 343-4). Songs are not to be understood in terms of a finished 
 127 
product, but in terms of a processual practice. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the refrain is 
established through a process of repetition (343-4). Cutler describes the importance of 
repetition in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the refrain because it ‘is used to maintain order 
as well as create difference’ (2013b, 35). Deleuze and Guattari explain that a process of 
repetition enables the refrain to delineate a territory and create its own ‘improvisation’ (2004, 
343-4). My understanding of the individual’s potential to change the refrain is therefore 
understood in terms of her or his engagement in a processual practice.  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari,  
 
Refrains could accordingly be classified as follows: (1) territorial refrains that seek, mark, assemble a 
territory; (2) territorialized function refrains that assume a special function in the assemblage … (3) the 
same, when they mark new assemblages, pass into new assemblages by means of deterritorialization – 
reterritorialization… (4) refrains that collect or gather forces, either at the heart of the territory, or in 
order to go outside it … They cease to be terrestrial, becoming cosmic (2004, 360). 
 
The refrain begins from the act of material appropriation through which something is selected 
and its direction is changed, thereby establishing and expressing a territory. By employing 
examples from nature, such as birdsongs or the dance of the stickleback, Deleuze and Guattari 
explain that the point of this process of expression is to open the territory to admit a mate 
(procreation) or to access a necessary energy source (348-53). In these examples, animals are 
considered as artists and the territory is considered as a readymade (348-9). Based on the model 
of the readymade, this material appropriation also includes an expressive and aesthetic excess, 
which opens the territory onto the Cosmos and introduces difference into the territorial 
assemblage thereby producing new possibilities to express a different world (372).  
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for a description of this model of the readymade which develops 
Zepke’s concept of the Guattarian affectual readymade (2008) by arguing that we need to bring 
the made out of the readymade; not in order to return to the artist-as-maker, but to posit that 
new existential territories are always ready-to-be-made.) 
 
A difference is created in the refrain through an improvisation which occurs in the opening of 
the territory onto the Cosmos, through which the refrain joins ‘with the forces of the future, 
cosmic forces’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 343). By lurching forth and hazarding an 
improvisation with the cosmic forces, the refrain ventures from its established territory onto a 
different future (343-4). However, Cutler argues that in order for the improvisation to make a 
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difference, it must be made audible to others. She suggests that for the different song to be 
heard, it must extend beyond the subject to the social and environmental registers (2013a, 365). 
Cutler describes that the risk of the improvisation being unheard will result in it being  
 
a call in the dark without potential to connect or adhere and therefore it will fail to move beyond its own 
limits, changing only its own refrain and not moving between the ecosophic registers, but humming 
quietly to itself as a distanced voice. … These refrains will never be heard if not understood, and therefore 
the movement of meaning amongst subjects, what one might term the social relations, is required … to 
interrupt mass-transmission. To re-create the refrain is not simply to deconstruct the codes, conventions 
and significations therein, but to re-signify, re-codify and invent new signification – the act of creation 
as making a difference (365). 
 
With the purpose of making a difference through social relations, the implicated “us” have the 
potential to interrupt and change the refrain by learning new songs in processes of responding 
to the dominant refrains. I agree with Cutler’s reasons for using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of the refrain in her proposal to change the refrain of learning, because the creation of 
‘improvisations’ within the refrain brings about a different direction of learning. In applying 
this concept to the refrain of learning in academic institutions, I will argue that these 
‘improvisations’ can change the direction of learning that is guided by the will to know to a 
different direction of learning which is creative. The “us” implicated in transmitting the refrain 
of learning in academic institutions have the pedagogical task of interrupting and changing the 
dominant hypermasculine refrain by learning and teaching new songs.  
 
With the aim to produce new songs that prioritise the perspective of creative learning over the 
hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge, it is necessary to consider Cutler’s 
description of songs as artworks (2013b, 42). According to Cutler,  
 
The practices of artists, curators and educationalists may look similar, in that all seek to challenge 
dominant refrains and form new “songs” in the form of new works, new models of exhibition and 
types of display or develop new insights with the public that break open territories. All of these creative 
acts can be considered to be, or to involve, learning (42). 
 
In describing the creative process as a process of learning, Cutler describes the artist in the 
terms, ‘artist as learner’ (43). She also posits the idea of the ‘artist-as-process’ elsewhere to 
further clarify that learning occurs in the processes of changing the refrain (2013a, 356). Her 
use of the figure of the artist is not to focus on the subject who is an artist, but to develop 
Guattari’s argument for ways of operating like an artist:  
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it is not the concept of an artist as a creative “self” that is at stake here but rather the processes of creative 
construction involved when the refrain is changed and learning occurs (2013b, 43). 
 
I agree with Cutler’s argument that the artistic process should be understood as a process of 
learning because I claim that an artistic approach allows for experimentation, or 
improvisations, which resists the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge and 
engenders new perspectives and experiences. In order to apply a schizoanalytical approach, I 
suggest swapping Cutler’s description of the artistic process as a process of learning with the 
understanding of the process of learning as an artistic practice. In making this swap, I propose 
a further development to Cutler’s idea of the ‘artist-as-process’ or ‘artist as learner’, by positing 
that learners, when learning, engage in a process of becoming-artists. 
 
(DRIP: In the drip, Wave, I propose the idea of an artistic experiential pedagogy by developing 
a Deleuzian pedagogy that posits learning as an artistic experience incited by an artistic 
encounter. In this idea of an artistic experiential pedagogy, I argue that both the teacher and the 
learners co-participate in the process of learning by becoming artists.) 
 
This schizoanalytical approach to an artistic practice of learning is constituted by Guattari’s 
proposal for ethico-aesthetic paradigms (1995, 10). Which, he argues, is to ‘be considered in 
terms of the production of subjectivity’ (11). In his critique of Integrated World Capitalism 
(IWC) and the institutionalisation of psychoanalysis, Guattari explains the dominant processes 
of capture and production of subjectivity. According to Guattari, IWC captures and mentally 
manipulates people through its structures of control at the level of the subject (2000, 47). He 
describes IWC in the following excerpt: 
 
Post-industrial capitalism, which I prefer to describe as Integrated World Capitalism (IWC), tends 
increasingly to decentre its sites of power, moving away from structures producing goods and services 
towards structures producing signs, syntax and – in particular, through the control which it exercises over 
the media, advertising, opinion polls, etc. – subjectivity (47). 
 
The control these structures have is experienced in the production of a ‘capitalistic 
subjectivity’, which Guattari argues, ‘is manufactured to protect existence from any intrusion 
of events that might disturb or disrupt public opinion’ (50). This capitalistic subjectivity is 
produced so that IWC can  
 
manage the worlds of childhood, love, art, as well as everything associated with anxiety, madness, pain, 
death, or a feeling of being lost in the Cosmos … IWC forms massive subjective aggregates from the 
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most personal – one could even say infra-personal – existential givens, which it hooks up to ideas of 
race, nation, the professional workforce, competitive sports, a dominating masculinity [virilité], mass-
media celebrity … Capitalistic subjectivity seeks to gain power by controlling and neutralizing the 
maximum number of existential refrains (50).  
 
My understanding of Guattari’s proposal to liberate subjectivity from the control of IWC is to 
“take back control” and energise the refrain’s creative potential for improvisation.  
 
Such a task is not easy given that dominant refrains become normalised. According to Cutler,  
 
Dominant refrains are those that become habituated into our thinking as though the song were always 
there, natural, obvious, unquestionable. These become our own songs, the songs we are so used to 
hearing and singing that we think we have always sung them (2013b, 37).  
 
In the dominant refrain of learning in the academic institution, the hypermasculine 
institutionalisation of knowledge is taken as normal, positing that patriarchal refrains have 
become our dominant habits of thought and modes of existence. With this problem in mind, 
we can turn to Guattari’s proposal for ecological praxes which can initiate processes of 
singularization. Kaiser provides a neat summary of what Guattari means by processes of 
singularization: ‘Singularization is the processual emergence of entities. It is … always a re-
singularization: a response to and redirecting of standardized, entrenched habits towards new, 
different modes of living’ (2017, 155). Singularization is concerned with processes of 
(trans)formation of the subject, and is not to be confused with the individual that is already 
formed at the level of the molar (156). According to Guattari, processes of singularization 
operate according to an ‘eco-logic’ that is opposed to systems, structures and universal rules, 
and ‘is concerned only with the movement and intensity of evolutive processes’ (2000, 44). 
These processes, for Guattari, strive ‘to capture existence in the very act of this constitution, 
definition and deterritorialization’ (44). In order to “take back control” and energise the 
refrain’s creative potential for improvisation, the task becomes that of inciting processes of 
singularization to redirect dominant refrains towards new modes of existence.  
 
Guattari argues that  
 
Ecological praxes strive to scout out the potential vectors of subjectification and singularization at each 
partial existential locus. They generally seek something that runs counter to the “normal” order to things, 




Guattari describes this forming of new existential configurations as a process of obtaining 
existential Territories. Guattari’s definition of existential Territory is explained by Watson as 
‘the incorporated, embodied, singular self, which includes the body and its intensities’ (2013, 
117). This process of obtaining existential Territories, in Guattari’s words, is one ‘of opening 
up processually from a praxis that enables it to be made “habitable” by a human project’ (2000, 
53). In its search for a counter-repetition, this process has the potential to open up new 
possibilities of subjectivity that distances itself from the control of IWC and, I argue, 
patriarchy. Guattari explains that these new possibilities are obtained through processes of 
singularization which ‘activate isolated and repressed singularities that are just turning in 
circles’ (51). He proposes that processes of singularization can therefore produce alternative 
realities and refrains of existence. Through this praxis of distancing subjectivity from the 
control of IWC, Guattari argues that ‘[i]ndividuals must become both more united and 
increasingly different. The same is true for the resingularization of schools, town councils, 
urban planning, etc.’ (69). That is to say, individuals become more united in their resistance to 
the production of a capitalistic subjectivity, and different insofar that each will follow his or 
her own process of singularization. 
 
Guattari proposes ecological praxes as a question of indicating ‘the lines of reconstruction of 
human praxis in the most varied domains’ (33). This process of seeking the reconstruction of 
human praxis entails  
 
in each instance of looking into what would be the dispositives of the production of subjectivity, which 
tends towards an individual and/or collective resingularization, rather than that of mass-media 
manufacture, which is synonymous with distress and despair (33-4).  
 
Guattari argues that the ecological process of reconstructing human praxis can be produced by 
‘implementing effective practices of experimentation … on a microsocial level as on a larger 
institutional scale’ (34-5). We do not know how social practices should be reinvented, and 
Guattari is clear in not prescribing any suggestions (64), it is only by engaging in an ecological 
practice that we can encourage the organisation of, and direct, individual and collective 
ventures towards an ecology of resingularization (65). Locating existential refrains through 
experimentation is how we can engender new realities and different experiences of the world 
because these cannot be presupposed as they do not yet exist under the repression of a 
capitalistic subjectivity and, I argue, a subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy. 
Although Guattari emphasises ‘that the work of locating these existential refrains is not the 
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sole province of literature and the arts’ (46), he posits the production of a new subjectivity as 
a creative process. He proposes aesthetic paradigms because these can create ‘new modalities 
of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette’ (1995, 7). 
According to Guattari, ‘art … engenders unprecedented, unforeseen and unthinkable qualities 
of being’ (106). I agree that an artistic approach can create possibilities for new subjectivities 
because it allows for experimentation and creativity.  
 
Guattari posits the production of a new kind of subjectivity not in terms of a new personality, 
or a new system of belief or experience, but one that is based upon the psychotic: the schizo. 
Psychosis becomes the model for a revolutionary subjectivity rather than neurosis because, 
according to Guattari, ‘[w]ith neurosis, symptomatic matter continues to bathe in the 
environment of dominant significations while with psychosis the world of standardised Dasein 
loses its consistency’ (1995, 63). To this extent, Guattari goes on to say that ‘[p]sychosis thus 
not only haunts neurosis and perversion but also all the forms of normality’ (79). Guattari 
proposes schizoanalysis because of its ability to map the psyche to create a corresponding 
existential Territory. Watson describes these existential Territories as the ‘schizoanalytic 
counterpart to identity; a non-discursive, intensive, affective, proto-subjective incorporation’ 
(2013, 117). She explains that Guattari proposes schizoanalysis because of its ability to create 
a mapping through experimentation, in opposition to a tracing through representation (58). 
These schizoanalytical maps are described by Genosko as ‘non-representational maps of 
processes of singularization that are not amenable to capture in psychogenetic stages, 
personological constructs, or in terms of universal complexes’ (2013, 271). To take the 
example Guattari offers us in Chaosmosis of a patient who got stuck during treatment and, 
through schizoanalytic encouragement, expressed the sudden desire to take up driving again; 
Guattari claims that a ‘remark of this kind may remain unnoticed in a traditional conception of 
analysis’ (1995, 17-8). The importance of this particular example is its process of 
singularization that activates  
 
a complex refrain, which will not only modify the immediate behaviour of the patient, but open up new 
fields of virtuality for him: the renewal of contact with long lost acquaintances, revisiting old haunts, 
regaining self-confidence… (18).  
 
Guattari does not reject psychoanalysis but looks to reinterpret all its terms, and to revalue all 
its values. He describes this rethinking of psychiatric models as ‘less a question of taking stock 
of these practices in terms of their scientific veracity than according to their aesthetic-
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existential effectiveness’ (2000, 56). For Deleuze and Guattari, a ‘schizophrenic out for a walk 
is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch. A breath of fresh air, a 
relationship with the outside world’ (2013, 12). Rather than applying the same structures of 
analysis again and again to different situations, schizoanalysis creates a new map for each 
analysis. This schizoanalytical approach is, therefore, necessarily creative because the 
schizoanalyst cannot predict the direction the experiment will take the analysis, but it is in the 
experiment that he or she can explore existential Territories. It is to this extent that Genosko 
says, for Guattari, ‘[t]he work of the schizoanalyst, ecosopher, and artist … converge in 
diagrams of transformation (becomings)’ (2013, 201). Guattari puts it like this: ‘the best 
cartographies of the psyche, or, if you like, the best psychoanalyses, [are] those of Goethe, 
Proust, Joyce, Artaud and Beckett, rather than Freud, Jung and Lacan’ (2000, 37). In other 
words, art is a kind of alternative therapy; a non-scientific form of mental treatment.  
 
It is important to emphasise Guattari’s claim that these existential Territories can only produce 
a ‘partial subjectivity’ (56), not an individual. It is a partial subjectivity because, Guattari 
explains, the process of obtaining existential Territories is derived from a ‘pre-objectal and pre-
personal logic of the sort that Freud has described as being a “primary process”’ (54). In 
psychoanalytic theory, primary processes are conceptualised as unconscious (91). Traditional 
forms of psychoanalysis posit that the expression of the unconscious in the imaginary, a 
phantasy, is read in terms of the primary processes. However, in the following quote, Guattari 
suggests swapping these terms out and reading the primary processes in terms of their 
imaginary phantasms: 
 
These focal points of creative subjectification in their nascent state can only be accessed by the detour 
of a phantasmatic economy that is deployed in a random form. In short, no one is exempt from playing 
the game of the ecology of the imaginary! (57). 
 
Guattari explains that this detour liberates singularities from a process that apprehends 
existence in an attempt to represent the unconscious, and instead explores processes of 
singularization through imaginary phantasms (57). This detour is necessarily aesthetic to the 
extent that,  
 
In the particular case of the ecology of the phantasm, each attempt to locate it cartographically requires 
the drafting of an expressive framework that is both singular and, more precisely, singularized (54).  
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Initiating processes of singularization reveals different directions for existential refrains, which 
can only be explored through practices of experimentation because they do not yet exist. 
Artistic approaches can map processes of singularization because they allow for 
experimentation and creativity which means they can express the unexpected changes of 
direction. According to Guattari: 
 
As in painting or literature, the concrete performance of these cartographies requires that they evolve 
and innovate, that they open up new futures, without their authors [auteurs] having prior recourse to 
assured theoretical principles or to the authority of a group, a school or an academy … Work in progress! 
An end to psychoanalytic, behaviourist or systematist catechisms (40). 
 
The new futures opened up are the virtual existential Territories revealed in the subject. 
According to Guattari, these virtual existential Territories are accessible to the subject because 
they are ‘already there’ in the subject, however they have no authors because they are pre-
personal and are only made available in the ‘existential event that brings them into play’ (45). 
It is not the artist herself or himself that can incite processes of reinventing ideas she or he has 
of herself or himself, rather, it is the artistic process of responding to the ‘existential event’ that 
can reinvent new ideas in the realm of mental ecology. In agreement with Guattari’s description 
of the revolutionary potential of artistic processes, I have argued elsewhere that art has the 
revolutionary potential to open up new possibilities for thinking and being that can transform 
normative ideas of subjectivity that are aligned with the interests of patriarchy and capitalism 
(Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 70). 
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, in which I develop Zepke’s account of schizo-revolutionary 
artistic practice (2014) to posit an artistic process of escaping the patriarchal and capitalist 
systems of representation to open up new possibilities for thinking and being. I explore the 
potential of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of art that I propose can provide a resistance 
to the representational image of thought that Braidotti describes is based on the phallogocentric 
system (1994, 101), and engender processes of transformation that can explore the 
emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression.)  
 
Changing the refrain is not a simple matter of creating new artwork, it is in the processes of 
singularization that the artist creatively responds to the dominant refrains and makes a 
difference. This emphasis on process enables Cutler to argue that  
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the artist-as-process has ways of operating that identify dominant transmissions and in acts of creativity 
(also one of the ways of operating that “resemble” that of the artist) of imagining, of generating a new 
idea, of creating and making a difference, disrupting the forces of mass-transmission. The artist-as-
process represents a re-singularisation of subjectification, one that is constant to itself and not to the 
“deathly refrain” of IWC (2013a, 356).  
 
It is a process that involves learning what dominant refrains manipulate our mental processes 
and condition us to think through a normalised subjectivity by expressing a cartography of 
one’s psyche, and learning how to respond to these dominant refrains and engender a new song 
through processes of expression in the ecology of the phantasm (see Guattari 2000, 57). In 
following Guattari, Cutler explains that the artist does not know what new song he or she will 
come to articulate, it is in the creative process that the artist learns what to sing (2013a, 365). 
 
In the context of the academic institution, I argue that the refrain of learning that prioritises the 
hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge engenders a production of subjectivity that 
is aligned with the interests of patriarchy. According to Haslanger, this hypermasculine process 
of mental manipulation forms ‘schemas’ relating to individuals or groups of people that 
influence an unconscious bias (2008, 212). 
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Ripple Effect, for an argument that positive perceptions of men and 
negative perceptions of women are institutionalised in academia insofar that we learn that 
‘proper’ knowledge is written by “great” male political theorists.) 
 
In her experience of philosophy departments in America, Haslanger critiques philosophy 
departments as ‘hypermasculine places’ (217). She describes this environment as ‘competitive, 
combative’, ‘highly judgmental, orientated toward individual accomplishment, individual 
intelligence, and agency,’ and ‘hostile to femininity’ (217). The subjectivity that is produced 
is masculine insofar that this hypermasculine environment requires women to sublimate 
‘potentially important aspects of identity’ in order to fit in (217). While Haslanger’s analysis 
is an investigation into philosophy as a discipline and philosophy departments as an 
institutional expression of that discipline, it is reasonable to assume that this hypermasculine 
environment is an effect of the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. Guattari 
suggests that to change our experience of the environment, the environment must be ‘in the 
process of being reinvented’ (2000, 68). I will apply Guattari’s suggestion to the 
hypermasculine environment of the academic institution by proposing that its environment 
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must be in a process of reinvention in order to change the way it produces subjectivity aligned 
with the interests of patriarchy.  
 
Guattari’s proposal to change the experience of the environment of institutions is grounded in 
his work at the Clinique de La Borde (1995, 6). Guattari critiqued the psychotherapeutic 
practices and treatments of patients and argued for new institutional practices that could 
engender different experiences for both analysts and patients. According to Genosko, Guattari 
treated the institution as an object of analysis: 
 
The idea of an institutional object captured, for Guattari, the massive conjugation of all of the effects on 
individuals and bureaucracies (patients, analysts, administrators), on theoretical concepts and analytic 
practices and goals, of the hospital setting (2000, 112).  
 
In foregrounding these institutional effects, a shift of focus occurs in which individuals, 
bureaucracies, concepts, practices, and goals can achieve autonomy from, but still maintain a 
relation to, the institution. Guattari explains that this shift occurs in a new space, which he 
models on Winnicott’s idea of the potential space. Winnicott claims in his thesis that  
 
The place where cultural experience is located is in the potential space between the individual and the 
environment (originally the object). The same can be said of playing. Cultural experience begins with 
creative living first manifested in play (2005, 135).  
 
The potential space is an intermediate area of experiencing the space between the individual’s 
inner psychic reality and the external actual world the individual lives in (138). It is a 
‘hypothetical area’ which exists between, but is not actual (144). It is in this interplay between 
that the individual experiences creative living (139). Winnicott goes on to say  
 
how important it can be for the analyst to recognize the existence of this place, the only place where play 
can start, a place that is at the continuity-contiguity moment, where transitional phenomena originate 
(139).  
 
For Winnicott, play is a transformative experience. He argues that from playing, the foundation 
for cultural experience is formed (143). According to Genosko, Guattari developed a sense of 
this potential space as the virtual, ‘a space in which becomings are truly creative – radically 
open and simply not what is now actual’ (2000, 115). Within this potential space, Genosko 
continues, Guattari proposes that new encounters can be created within the institution that are 
not determined by the institution (136). By creating new experiences of the institution within 
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the institution, the environment of the institution can be reinvented, therefore changing the way 
it produces individuals.  
 
To the extent that cultivating a potential space within the institution may produce a process of 
reinventing the environment of the institution, I propose that the space which is in the process 
of being reinvented can be understood as a space-as-process. This idea of the space-as-process 
also aligns with Cutler’s concept of the ‘artist-as-process’ (2013a, 356) and extends it to 
include the environment of the institution. In accordance with Guattari’s foregrounding of 
institutional effects, the space-as-process concerns itself with the processes of creative 
construction involved when individuals, or artists-as-process, achieve autonomy (but still 
maintain a relation to the institution) and reinvent the environment. The space-as-process is an 
actualisation of the potential space within an institution. The new encounters that are created 
within this potential space, which are not determined by the institution, I suggest entails an 
artistic process of reorganising the space of the institution.  
 
(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for a description of artistic process as the artistic organisation of 
the territorial assemblage. It develops Zepke’s concept of the readymade (2008) by arguing 
that we need to bring the made out of the readymade; not in order to return to the artist-as-
maker, but to posit that new existential territories are always ready-to-be-made.) 
 
The reorganisation of the environment of the institution can be understood as the creation of 
new artistic encounters which can incite becomings in the space. The space-as-process can be 
understood as an ethical claim that individuals should intervene in the physical proceedings of 
the institution.  
 
In order to produce these new encounters, Guattari calls upon individuals to form agency in 
their relation to the institution by creating and determining their own practices. He describes 
that he has  
 
invoked ethical paradigms principally in order to underline the responsibility and necessary 
“engagement” required, not only of psychiatrists but also of those in the fields of education, health, 
culture, sport, the arts, the media and fashion, who are in a position to intervene in individual and 
collective physical proceedings (2000, 39). 
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In accordance with Guattari’s argument, I suggest that new feminist artistic encounters can be 
produced by individuals who are in a position to intervene and change the refrain of learning 
from within the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution. Creating these new 
encounters can be understood as a pedagogical task to the extent that those transmitting the 
refrain of learning can take responsibility to change it, and form agency in their relation to the 
academic institution by creating and determining their own pedagogical practices. I argue that 
practices of learning can be reinvented through an artistic pedagogical approach to the extent 
that it can implement Guattari’s suggested practices of experimentation. Like Guattari, I will 
not prescribe instructions for a feminist artistic pedagogy, because it can be actualised in a 
number of different ways and to suggest a readymade model would limit the very creative and 
experimental process that a feminist artistic practice of learning can engender. By 
implementing practices of experimentation in processes of learning, we can explore and 
organise, through art, individual and collective ventures towards an ecology of 
resingularization. Through the pedagogical task of creating new feminist artistic encounters 
within the academic institution, we can reinvent the hypermasculine environment of the 
institution and incite different experiences of the institution that could change the way 
individuals are produced.  
 
By creating feminist artistic encounters within an academic institution and not an art institution 
which is built to house artistic encounters and their potential for different experiences, I argue 
that they become more disruptive to and able to change the normal experience of the academic 
institution. According to Zepke’s discussion of the American artist Adrian Piper:  
 
Piper argues that for the catalytic event to have its full impact the viewer must be unaware that they are 
experiencing art, which is precisely the problem with galleries or museums, which “prepare the viewer 
to be catalysed, thus making actual catalysis impossible” … Ironically, Piper suggests that we do not 
need a more “democratic” art but one that is less so. It is only when we are forced to confront alterity in 
and as our lives - and not as “information” or as a museum “experience” - that a sufficient “shock” can 
be administered that might provoke an affect that escapes the gravity of its self-evidence. It would be in 
this shock that art would call forth a new people, and it is only in this call that art can both be political 
and achieve its immanence with life (2008, 42). 
 
It is in this ‘shock’ that the encounter of new songs cannot be presupposed, thereby forcing 
individuals to incite their own processes of learning in order to make sense of what they have 
experienced. Therefore, for artistic encounters to be capable of changing the environment of 
the institution, they must be shocking. 
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With the aim to explore how artistic encounters can be shocking, Zepke develops Piper’s 
suggestion by drawing a connection to his concept of the readymade to argue that 
 
by placing art in the midst of life, by making it the vital mechanism of life’s own process of becoming, 
art provides not only the condition, but the criteria of any revolutionary politics (42). 
 
I suggest that by placing art in the midst of the formal setting of an educational institution, art 
can provide a shocking experience to individuals because they are not expecting to encounter 
it. By making the academic institution an artistic organisation, or space-as-process, I propose 
that we can make art the vital mechanism of and in the process of learning to the extent that 
unexpecting individuals are forced to incite their own processes of learning in order to make 
sense of the artistic encounter they have experienced. I propose that an artistic organisation of 
the academic space can therefore inform new experiences and social practices within the 
hypermasculine environment of the academic institution. With the purpose of exploring the 
implementation of a feminist artistic pedagogy in the hypermasculine environment of the 
academic institution, I will reflect on the collaborative artistic pedagogy I put into practice with 
Heaney. In order to practice a schizoanalytical artistic pedagogical approach capable of 
creating a difference to the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge, we looked to 
make a feminine difference by creating feminist artistic encounters.  
 
(DRIP: See Labial Drip, where I employ the term feminine difference to carve out an 
understanding of the feminine as a new and non-phallic model of difference through Irigaray’s 
feminist project of sexual difference.) 
 
This pedagogy has been implemented in the form of three workplayshops, each entitled as 
iterations of Learning, Exchange and Play (LEP) (for the films of LEP, see Mackenzie 2015). 
 
All of the workplayshops have featured a variety of artistic encounters and have been placed 
in the midst of the UK academic institutions of King’s College London (2015) and the 
University of Kent (2016) (we also constructed an LEP intervention at Warwick University 
(2016)). By reinventing the academic environments of the Anatomy Museum at King’s College 
London (LEPI), a university foyer at the University of Kent (LEPII), a conference room at the 
University of Kent (LEPIII), and a studio at Warwick University (LEP Intervention); LEP 
countered the normal experience of the academic institutions because it disrupted the everyday 
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workings of the academic institution by inviting individuals to participate in workplayshops. 
LEP is a disruption to the normalised processes of the academic institution that are aligned 
with the interests of patriarchy and, Heaney and I argue elsewhere, operate according to the 
market (2017, 38). By placing workplayshops in the midst of academic institutions that operate 
according to patriarchal and capitalist logic, LEP aims to create new institutional processes that 
promote existential productions rather than production that is determined by knowledge and 
capitalist profit. Heaney and I argue that the corporate processes of the academic institution are 
not only deteriorating conditions in teaching and learning, but also labour conditions in the 
tertiary education sector (49). We argue that these deteriorating conditions weaken  
 
the possibilities of solidarity, of collective organisation and therefore of key potential avenues through 
which such trends could be resisted and/or confronted in creative and dynamic ways. Such solidaristic 
possibilities are attacked through incentive structures of incessant competition, the potential exacerbation 
of gendered and racialised privilege and accelerating processes of precarisation (49). 
 
Our purpose of LEP as an ongoing campaign against the normalised processes of the academic 
institution and its deteriorating pedagogical and labour conditions is to create experiments in 
commonisation (Heaney, Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2017, 41). MacKenzie, who joined our 
collaboration for LEPI, describes these experiments as that of ‘forging new forms of common 
experience, new forms of learning’ (41). By creating an opportunity for learning in common, I 
argue that the feminist artistic encounters in LEP can engender exercises in ‘bond formation’ 
in which creative acts of solidarity can incite new ways of experiencing and being in academic 
institutions (42).  
 
We understand LEP as a necessary ongoing campaign, not only because the environment of 
the academic institution must be reinvented, but also because this campaign becomes a practice 
of learning itself. For Heaney and I, as the organisers, to construct a space of play and risk in 
order to encourage collaborative, creative, and experimental practices for participants to find 
and learn new songs to sing within the dominant refrain of learning, we have to also engage in 
collaborative processes of play, risk taking and creativity in order to experiment with producing 
encounters capable of inciting such processes of learning. Constructing LEP therefore becomes 
its own experiment in commonisation, through which, Heaney and I attempt processes of 
exchange that positions ourselves as: colearners, where we try to learn in common to articulate 
and sing songs which are coherent to our experiment; co-creators to co-create artistic 
encounters with the aim to transmit these songs in the hope that LEP participants will 
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experience the urge to engage with the artistic encounters in ways that allow them to follow 
their own processes of co-learning, experimentation and wonder; and coproducers of learning 
where we can also incite our own processes of learning with each other and other participants 
in the workplayshops.  
 
(DRIP: For the full original definitions of these descriptions of artist’s positions in education, 
see Pringle 2013.) 
 
Through our collaborative song of LEP, we intend to sing along with others who have 
contributed similar songs (such as The Dark Would), and sing to others to encourage and invite 
them to articulate their own possible songs that also seek to confront the normalised processes 
of the academic institution and its deteriorating pedagogical and labour conditions, and 
engender conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers.  
 
(DRIP: The Dark Would was a two-day event held by the Institute of Advanced Teaching and 
Learning, IATL, at the University of Warwick in 2015, which explored innovative and 
experimental pedagogical approaches. This project reinvented the academic environment as a 
space both quite like but also very unlike the space we attempted to create with LEP.) 
 
In our song for LEP, we propose a process of learning in which the purpose is not to judge or 
practice cynicism and disempower each other, but to cultivate hope and empower each other 
to explore, imagine and create different structures, practices and processes of the academic 
institution, in common.  
 
With the purpose of exploring the different songs contributed in the practices of learning in 
LEP that may have made a difference to individual, social and institutional practices within the 
academic institution, I will focus on three specific experiences which include ‘Playtime I’ and 
‘Playtime II’ featured in our most recent workplayshop, LEPIII (2016), and Not One / To Be 
Two, a large labial installation which has featured in all three workplayshops. 
 
§1. LEPIII: Playtime I 
The first experience was produced in ‘Playtime I’, the first section of LEPIII, which introduced 
artistic encounters that were created along the theme of ‘Worldly Signs’. Some of these 
included: ‘Employability Packs’, in which participants were given individual barcodes to wear 
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on their person throughout the first playtime, journals, where activities/tasks/communication 
was listed in the form of a ‘shopping list’ for participants to complete in order to unlock 
achievements and rewards, and ‘LEP Endowments’ for participants to spend on participating 
in artistic encounters, the amount of which varied to produce an effect of social hierarchy in 
the space; four workstations, each demanding different types of labour/tasks from participants 
that included consuming, judging, taking an LEP Exam, and shopping, recycling and restacking 
in the ‘L3P Convenience Store’; an incarceration station for the participants who failed to keep 
up with the cost of participating in the activities; an ‘Escape Public House’, which represented 
a bureaucratic waiting area/liminal space containing a bar and stalls; and a ‘Luxury Escape 
Lounge’, in which only privileged participants could enter and experience the luxury seating 
with a selection of subvertisements and The Daily Capitalist newspaper to read. 
 
(DRIP: The Daily Capitalist was a one-off short, satirical “newspaper” that featured “real” and 
“satirical” articles that problematised the ways in which “ideology” or “truth” is coded into the 
seemingly neutral language of popular media. The featured articles were contributed by people 
who attended LEPIII, colleagues who were not able to attend, and participants who had 
attended previous workplayshops.)  
 
(drip: We also collated another newspaper entitled creative communisation to feature in the 
second playtime of LEPIII, which was a creative confrontation to the work of The Daily 
Capitalist and encouraged suggestions of resistance to the epistemologically narrow, politically 
conservative, creatively stultifying and ontologically homogenising systems of neoliberalism 
and capitalism. We recommended that these suggestions of resistance took the form of macro- 
or micro- movements, hacking operations, policy ideas, desires, and dreams on the changes 
contributors wanted to see in the world. The submissions for creative communisation served 
as a basis for the co-creation of an LEP policy document/femifesto, which is an open document 
that is democratically co-produced by all those who wish to participate.) 
 
LEPIII was the first workplayshop to feature these artistic encounters as an attempt to produce 
a completely different experience to the previous workplayshops. These artistic encounters 
played upon the dominant refrains of the academic institution by making visible and audible 
the normalised processes, with the intention of producing an entirely hypermasculine and 
marketised environment. This environment was overseen by three actors hired to play the parts 
of LEP Security Male 001, 002 and Female 003, who enforced the continual operation of 
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participation in the artistic encounters. By amplifying the subliminal songs that transmit the 
inequalities and injustices of the dominant refrains of the academic institution, ‘Playtime I’ 
aimed to create an atmosphere that was hierarchical, hypermasculine, hyper-competitive and 
anxiety provoking. For some of the participants, this was a shocking experience and they 
started to create acts of resistance. The first act of resistance was formed as an occupy 
movement in the space to disrupt the functioning of the hypermasculine and marketised 
environment. LEP Security Male 001, 002 and Female 003 managed to control these resisting 
participants at first by transporting them to the incarceration station. However, one of the 
resisting participants caused a revolt by pushing the shelving units over in the ‘L3P 
Convenience Store’ which incited other participants to join the “revolution”. LEP Security 
Female 003 played a pivotal feminist role in the revolution and was forcibly escorted out of 
the space by LEP Security Male 001 and 002. In response to the departure of LEP Security 
Female 003, the participants created and signed a petition for her release and threatened to go 
to the “People’s Court”. 
 
Although it could be argued that for some participants, ‘Playtime I’ deepened the hierarchical, 
patriarchal, and competitive refrains in thought, it was clear that it caused a shock to the 
participants who created the acts of resistance. For these participants, their acts of resistance 
can be understood as responses to the dominant refrains of the academic institution amplified 
within the workplayshop. Without determining what difference the participant’s acts of 
resistance called for, it could be argued that the reinvention of the space through an occupy 
movement and a disordering of the shelving units in the ‘L3P Convenience Store’ enabled these 
participants to create new existential Territories by reorganising the territorial assemblage. 
Such that, even though these artistic encounters were created to make visible and audible the 
normalised processes of the academic institution, they produced shocking experiences for some 
that engendered processes of resingularization which sought existential productions. The 
participant’s acts of resistance can be understood as their own improvised songs which made 
visible and audible their own processes of learning to respond to the dominant refrains. Insofar 
that these acts of resistance invited others to join the “revolution”, the participants involved in 
resisting engaged in processes of co-learning with each other which resulted in collaboratively 
producing a petition. I suggest that this process of co-learning with each other was instigated 
by experiencing a shock in common, and this experiment in commonisation incited a creative 
process in which some of the participants became ‘co-creators’ (Guattari 1995, 14) to transmit 
alternative songs. Therefore, it could be argued that these artistic encounters that made visible 
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and audible the dominant refrains of the academic institution, encouraged the participants to 
think for themselves in re-creating shocks through acts of resistance that exposed these 
dominant refrains.  
 
The pedagogy practiced in ‘Playtime I’ conveyed a strict authoritarian structure, which was 
enforced by the LEP Security Guards. LEP Security Male 001, 002 and Female 003 took on 
authoritative roles by determining the terms of engagement for the participants with the artistic 
encounters, with the intention to transmit a dominant refrain of learning and hinder the 
participants from learning to sing their own individual refrains. ‘Playtime I’ was organised 
according to a strict pedagogical structure in which the artistic encounters were designed with 
the aim to provide units of knowledge that conformed to a consensus outcome that the LEP 
Security Guards demanded the participants to know by the end of their experience. By offering 
activities/tasks for participants to complete in order to unlock achievements and rewards, 
‘Playtime I’ sought to make visible and audible a mechanism of, what Heaney and I have 
termed elsewhere, perpetual pedagogical control that regulates pedagogical possibilities 
instead of creating conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers (2017, 38). 
‘Playtime I’ was created to convey a hypercompetitive environment that aimed to regulate the 
participant’s possibilities of learning and create conditions for their disempowerment. To the 
extent that this pedagogical structure was resisted, it can be argued that those resisting did not 
support these conditions and took on the responsibility to challenge them. The question of what 
can be done to confront this mechanism of perpetual pedagogical control Heaney and I have 
suggested becomes ‘a pedagogical task to be participated in and explored for those interested 
in transforming them’, that is, a pedagogical task undertaken by individuals who are in a 
position to intervene and change the refrain of learning from within the academic institution 
(51). We have asked the question: ‘[h]ow may we mutually empower each other and support 
inclusive and open educational practices rather than submitting to the exclusionary logic of the 
market?’ (51). Without wishing to perpetuate our own mechanisms of control over other 
possible confrontations, I will turn to our own response to this question, which can be found in 
the artistic encounters in ‘Playtime II’.  
 
The pedagogy practiced in ‘Playtime II’ contrasted the strict authoritarian structure of 
‘Playtime I’ because Heaney and I removed ourselves and the LEP Security Guards from any 
position of authority and, instead, entered ‘Playtime II’ as participants. With the intention that 
the artistic encounters would do the teaching, ‘Playtime II’ was organised according to a 
 145 
practice of experiential learning in which the participants were invited to start with the 
application and experimentation by engaging with the artistic encounters. By offering artistic 
encounters for participants to explore voluntarily and at their own pace, this artistic experiential 
pedagogy aimed to invite participants to navigate their own processes of learning. In doing so, 
we aimed to create a playtime that enabled participants to feel central to the pedagogical 
process and for their own experiments with the art provided to yield results we could not 
predict. 
 
§2. LEPIII: Playtime II 
The second experience was produced in ‘Playtime II’, the second playtime section of LEPIII, 
which featured artistic encounters that were constructed along the theme of ‘Signs of Art’. 
Some of these included: poetry, quotes and collective mind-maps on the wall which 
participants were invited to add to, edit, annotate, delete, etc.; a large labial installation named 
Not One / To Be Two, which participants were invited to crawl into and share eye-contact with 
another participant for an extended period; a hidden/curtained installation named Of Other 
Spaces, where participants were invited to put on headphones and watch from a select list of 
potentially challenging music videos; unnamed and undescribed paintings were hung on the 
wall and participants were invited to title and describe them and stick these descriptions on the 
wall; a central area with canvasses, paints, toys and other tools scattered with only the 
injunction ‘Build the Revolution’ placed amidst them; a Communised Discussion / Drawing 
Game in which two participants interviewed each other in front of a camera using only the 
questions and discussion styles suggested, and were then invited to add in their own questions 
and discussion styles for future participants; and a Communised Drawing Game where three 
participants collaborated in a drawing method known as ‘exquisite’ or “rotating” corpse, in 
which they were asked to draw parts that contributed to the make-up of a “revolutionary 
figure”.  
 
Although all of the workplayshops featured these artistic encounters, ‘Playtime II’ produced a 
different experience that we had not experienced in previous workplayshops. Perhaps a 
contributing factor was due to a noticeable lack of energy in the participation in the encounters, 
because ‘Playtime II’ filled the second half of the day-long workplayshop which followed the 
‘Playtime I’ that aimed to create an atmosphere that was hierarchical, hypermasculine, hyper-
competitive and anxiety provoking. That being said, we found that the different experience of 
the second playtime engendered a contrasting atmosphere that was calming and relaxing, in 
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which participants explored the artistic encounters at their own pace. Towards the end of this 
playtime, the participants had gathered altogether in an organic process in the central area, at 
the artistic encounter Build the Revolution, where they made art with the provided canvasses, 
paints, toys and other tools. With a sense of the hypothetical, I suggest that this gathering of 
participants becoming-artists cultivated a potential space as part of the LEP workplayshop. By 
contributing new artistic encounters, the participants becoming-artists reorganised the 
academic space further. This hypothesis posits LEP as a space-as-process to the extent that 
their artistic organisation actualised the potential space cultivated in the academic space. It can 
be argued that this reinvention of the academic environment produced a stark contrast to the 
normal experience of the academic institution because, as participants becoming-artists, we 
had created new institutional processes that promoted existential productions rather than 
production that was determined by knowledge and/or capitalist profit. Moreover, by 
reinventing the social practices within the academic institution through art, we reconstructed 
the modality of our existence as a group within the academic institution that creatively resisted 
the hypermasculine and corporate institutional processes that seek to separate us through 
constant processes of examination and competition.  
 
It is worth mentioning a significant improvisation that occurred during this gathering, which 
was the contribution of an actual song. Colquhoun, who was hired to act the part of 
LEP Security Female 003 in ‘Playtime I’, returned to ‘Playtime II’ as Alice (a character inspired 
by Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1865)) and was invited to participate freely. Without 
instructions, Alice was inspired to sing a song and asked the gathering of participants for 
keywords that described their thoughts of their experience of the workplayshop (including 
‘Playtime I’) before offering to perform. These keywords included: “exploitation”, 
“incarceration”, “flight”, “anarchy”, “appropriation”, “learning”, “oppression”, “existence”, 
“art”, “produce”, and “black is the new poetry”. Her lyrics articulated the exchanges we had 
participated in throughout the workplayshop and reflected on the critiques we had expressed 
about, and the new ideas we had developed for, our existence in academic institutions. By 
making explicit her process of learning through singing, Alice transmitted an alternative song 
to the academic processes of writing and publishing a critique of the academic institution.  
 
(DRIP: I propose that by submitting an art-thesis, I am making explicit my own process of 
learning and transmitting an alternative song to the academic processes of writing and 
publishing a feminist critique of the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge.) 
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It could therefore be argued that Alice’s experience of the workplayshop invited her to re-create 
the shocks that expose the dominant institutional processes through her own creative 
improvisation.  
 
It may be contended that the differences that this ‘Playtime II’ made to the environment, social 
practices, and the modalities of group existence in the academic institution did not last longer 
than the day-long workplayshop. The normalised institutional processes can overcode any 
difference made in LEPIII to the extent that the new songs contributed are absorbed within the 
dominant refrain of learning. It would even be somewhat foolhardy to suggest that this day-
long workplayshop was capable of affecting all the learners, let alone other teachers, various 
other staff, departments, colleagues in the academic institution and beyond. However, we can 
argue that it did engage all of the 14 participants who came from different departments at the 
University of Kent, one from the Department of Performing Arts at the University of 
Roehampton, one from the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University 
of Warwick, and an independent academic from Vienna. Furthermore, since LEPIII, we have 
heard two new songs respectively sung by two previous LEP participants that also attempted 
to reinvent the environment, social practices, and the modalities of group existence in the 
academic institution through social and aesthetic processes.  
 
(DRIP: These songs were sung in the form of workshops, and were entitled: Joyful Ontologies, 
which was hosted by the ‘Social Theory Centre’ and the ‘Warwick Politics and Performance 
Network’ at the University of Warwick (2016), in which Heaney and I were invited to construct 
an LEP Intervention; and Changing Classroom, which was organised by Jonjo Brady and 
implemented at the University of Kent (2016) and at Open School East (2018).)  
 
In joining up these different songs, we can hear a multiplicity of different songs sung in 
academic institutions that find a coherency in terms of seeking existential productions through 
processes of resingularization, rather than in terms of knowledge and/or capitalist productivity. 
Constituted by songs that have been affected by each other in one way or another, it can be 
argued that this multiplicity of songs has the potential to also affect others in ways that could 
encourage them to develop and contribute their own songs. In agreement with Cutler’s 
suggestion that the contribution of small or large acts/songs can be effective (2013b, 59), 
LEPIII was our diligent contribution to sing to others with the purpose of encouraging and 
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inviting them to articulate their own possible songs to contribute to this multiplicity. If all the 
participants who have been affected by one of these songs takes on the responsibility to sing 
these new songs, or contribute their own songs, while being mindful of reproducing them as 
dominant transmissions; there will be new multiplicities of songs that could have the potential 
to interrupt and change the dominant refrain of learning in any and all academic institutions in 
a multiplicity of different ways. 
 
§3. Not One / To Be Two 
The third experience will focus on the art installation, Not One / To Be Two, which was created, 
and has featured in all the workplayshops, as a response to the marketised and hypermasculine 
environment of the academic institution. Not One / To Be Two is an enclosed art installation 
that is exhibited within the clinical and hierarchical spaces of the academic institution. These 
spaces not only express the corporate institutional processes that capture social spaces and 
create the conditions for the production of a capitalistic subjectivity, they also express the 
hypermasculine environment of the academic institution that produces a subjectivity which is 
aligned with the interests of patriarchy. With the aim to challenge these conditions, Not One / 
To Be Two was created as a feminist artistic encounter. It was inspired by Irigaray’s feminist 
approach to the canon of Western philosophy, which aims to problematise and reinvent it by 
articulating and promoting a space for the feminine within it through an exploration of 
the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and difference. Not One / To Be 
Two is constructed as a large labial installation that aims to problematise and reinvent the 
hypermasculine environment of the academic institution by creating a feminine space within 
it. To the extent that it is constructed within the academic institution, it also aims to cause a 
disruption to the marketised environment of the academic institution by constructing an 
enclosed space within the corporate captured space. As an enclosed art installation, it could be 
argued that it is operating in a similar way to the hypermasculine and corporate institutional 
processes that capture social spaces. However, I argue that Not One / To Be Two captures 
social spaces in its enclosed space with the purpose of liberating it from its patriarchal and 
capitalist conditions.  
 
(DRIP: In the drip Drizzle, I propose that feminist artistic encounters can release labial 
machines that open the territory onto the female. By following Deleuze and Guattari’s 
description of the resistance of the smooth space (2004, 411), I posit that this opening can be 
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understood as smooth patches of labial space which can reconquer the properties of contact 
that free it from the patriarchal and capitalist structures.) 
 
Faced with an opening that symbolises the two labial lips, two participants are invited to crawl 
one by one through the opening into the dark inside. The inside space contrasts the cold clinical 
and hierarchical space of the academic institution outside, as it offers dim warm lighting and a 
soft inflatable ground. The two participants are asked to sit in the enclosed space and exchange 
eye contact for five to 10 minutes. Through this silent non-instrumentalised exercise, the 
engaged participants are encouraged to enact an unspoken exchange with one another. The 
purpose of this silent exchange is motivated by Irigaray’s suggestion that teaching does not 
have to only consist in ‘speaking, but in being capable of remaining silent too, of withdrawing 
in order to let the other be, become and discover his or her path, his or her language’ (2008b, 
234).  
 
(DRIP: For further information on Irigaray’s suggested approach to teaching, see the drip 
Ripple Effect, in which I incorporate her proposal for a sexuate education to develop an 
understanding of learning à deux. Irigaray’s proposal is for a sexuate education that, put simply, 
teaches us to be ‘respectful towards the other’ through the cultivation of our sexual energy 
(204). She suggests building dwellings so that we can protect ourselves in our differences, 
whilst being open to encountering other differences. Constructed as a large labial enclosed 
installation, Not One / To Be Two was built as an Irigarayan inspired dwelling to protect 
ourselves in our differences, whilst forming bonds with others.) 
 
This silent exchange is encouraged as an experiment in bond formation, and is an attempt at 
inciting a common experience that counters the normal experience of the academic institution. 
The normalised corporate and hypermasculine processes of the academic institution seek to 
separate us through competition and examination and, according to Haslanger, requires women 
to sublimate ‘potentially important aspects of identity’ to fit in (2008, 217). For Not One / To 
Be Two, the incorporation of Irigaray’s feminist project gives Guattari’s description of 
processes of resingularization a different gloss that makes possible the argument that the 
participants become both more united in their common experience, and increasingly different 
in their cultivation of relational energy with one another (2000, 69). By offering a different 
experience, Not One / To Be Two was created with the intention to encourage participants to 
think against the normalised processes of the academic institution in order to engage in and 
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create new ways of experiencing and being in academic institutions, in common. The silent 
exchange produced in Not One / To Be Two is not a solution to the dominant refrain of learning 
in the academic institution, however it can be posited as an attempt at an interruption with the 
aim to initiate processes of resingularization of the academic space and of the subjectification 
of the participants involved.  
 
By reinventing the environment of the academic institution, LEP achieves autonomy from, but 
still maintains a relation to, the institution. This autonomy of LEP allows the hypothesis to be 
made that LEP enables participants to form agency in their relation to the institution to the 
extent that participants are encouraged to determine their own creative processes of learning. 
By cultivating a potential space in LEP, practices of experimentation can take place that are 
not determined by the academic institution, but by the participants in LEP. The new 
improvisations that are sung in LEP are sung within the dominant refrain of learning in the 
academic institution. In our song for LEP, we propose a feminist artistic process of learning 
with the aim to change the hypermasculine institutionalisation of learning from within the 
academic institution. Moreover, our purpose of LEP is to propose a creative strategy to change 
the capitalist and patriarchal structures of the academic institution from within. I propose that 
it is by creating new encounters in the academic institution that we can cultivate different 
experiences of the academic institution. To the extent that the academic institution is not built 
to house artistic encounters and experiences, I argue that art is capable of reinventing the 
environment of the academic institution and of creating a shocking experience that counters 
the normal experience of the academic institution. 
 
From our song in LEP, I propose the initiation of workplayshops or playtimes to take place in 
academic institutions in the hopes that they will create ‘potential spaces’ that might enable 
participants to find agency and take responsibility to determine and contribute their own songs 
to the process of changing the dominant refrain of learning. These workplayshops or playtimes 
may enable those, who are in a position to participate in the pedagogical task of challenging 
the mechanism of perpetual pedagogical control, to explore experiments in commonisation. 
Although I have provided examples of an artistic feminist pedagogy, I will not and do not wish 
to enforce a particular course of action as that would transmit a form of pedagogical control 
over which potential ways to confront the dominant refrain of learning. It is important to 
understand that one cannot presume that there would only be one response to the question of 
what a schizo-revolutionary artistic feminist pedagogy might look like because it can, in fact, 
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be actualised in a multiplicity of different ways. To this extent, I hope that the collaborative 
feminist artistic pedagogy carved out in this puddle will encourage or invite readers to carve 
out their own possible ideas for reinventing the hypermasculine and corporate environment of 
the academic institution. 
 
This puddle can now be summarised as a call to those who are in a position to intervene and 
change the dominant refrain of learning in the academic institution, to take responsibility and 
explore how differences can be made within the present context of the academic institution by 
creating and determining their own pedagogical practices. I propose that learning to sing new 
songs within the dominant refrain of learning from within the academic institution, by changing 
it from within through improvisation, is a pedagogical task of exploring, imagining and 
creating different structures, practices and processes of the academic institution, in common. 
It is a process of learning to become artists to the extent that learning to articulate and contribute 
songs to change the dominant refrain requires creative acts to make a difference. I propose that 
by learning to become artists in common, the creative acts produced can constitute a 
multiplicity of songs that can produce possibilities of solidarity and collective organisation 
within the academic institutions; which can not only interrupt and change the dominant refrain 
of learning in any and all academic institutions in a multiplicity of different ways, but also 
engender new ways of experiencing and being in academic institutions. This puddle is an 
invitation to explore creative practices of learning that promote existential production with the 
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